Rudisill v. McDonough

601 U.S. 294

Opinion

PRELIMINARY PRINT

Volume 601 U. S. Part 2 Pages 294–329

OFFICIAL REPORTS OF

THE SUPREME COURT April 16, 2024

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 294 OCTOBER TERM, 2023

Syllabus

RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit No. 22–888. Argued November 8, 2023—Decided April 16, 2024 Since World War II, the Federal Government has provided educational assistance to servicemembers with qualifying service through various GI bills. Typically, GI bills provide 36 months of educational benefts each up to a cap of 48 months in cases where servicemembers become eligible for benefts under more than one GI bill. See 38 U. S. C. § 3695(a). This case concerns two GI bills with overlapping service pe- riods—the Montgomery GI Bill Act of 1984 (covering service between 1985 and 2030) and the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (covering service on or after September 11, 2001). Petitioner James Rudisill enlisted in the United States Army in 2000 and served a total of eight years over three separate periods of military service. He became entitled to Montgomery Bill benefts as a result of his frst period of service. Rudisill earned an undergraduate degree and used 25 months and 14 days of Montgomery benefts to fnance his education. Through his subsequent periods of service, Rudisill also be- came entitled to more generous educational benefts under the Post- 9/11 GI Bill. Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefts to fnance a graduate degree. Rudisill understood that such benefts would be lim- ited to 22 months and 16 days under § 3695's 48-month aggregate- benefts cap. But the Government informed Rudisill that he was only eligible for 10 months and 16 days of Post-9/11 benefts (the length of his unused Montgomery benefts) due to § 3327, a provision in the Post- 9/11 Bill designed to coordinate benefts for those servicemembers meet- ing the criteria for both Montgomery benefts and Post-9/11 benefts. Section 3327 provides that a servicemember meeting the criteria for both GI bills can elect to swap Montgomery benefts for the more gen- erous Post-9/11 benefts, up to a total of 36 months of benefts. § 3327(d)(2)(A). Ultimately, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, sided with the Government, explaining that when Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefts, he had made an “election” under § 3327(a)(1) to swap his Montgomery benefts for Post 9/11 benefts, making his benefts sub- ject to § 3327(d)(2)'s 36-month limit. Held: Servicemembers who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefts under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 295

may use either one, in any order, up to § 3695(a)'s 48-month aggregate- benefts cap. Pp. 305–314. (a) The Government claims that someone in Rudisill's position is sub- ject to § 3322(d)'s mandatory coordination clause, so, to receive any Post- 9/11 benefts, he must make an election under § 3327(a), which in turn subjects him to § 3327(d)(2)'s 36-month beneft limit. Rudisill counters that § 3322(d) does not apply to him because he has earned two separate entitlements to benefts. Rudisill further maintains that § 3327(a)'s election mechanism is optional in any event, and that he does not forfeit any entitlement by declining to make a § 3327(a) election. The statutory text resolves this case in Rudisill's favor. Rudisill earned two separate entitlements to educational benefts, one per the Montgomery GI Bill and the other per the Post-9/11 GI Bill, by serving in the military for nearly eight years over three separate periods. Fo- cusing on these two separate benefts entitlements—rather than on his periods of service—leads to two relevant observations about the statute. First, the statute establishes a baseline rule that, absent some other limitation, the VA “shall pay” a veteran's benefts. §§ 3014(a), 3313(a). Second, Congress has plainly delineated certain durational limits on these benefts entitlements; i. e., each program entitles the recipient to up to 36 months of benefts, and both are subject to § 3695's 48-month aggregate-benefts cap. §§ 3013(a)(1), 3312(a). Rudisill is thus sepa- rately entitled to each of two educational benefts, and absent specifed limits, the VA is statutorily obligated to pay him 48 months of benefts. Pp. 305–306. (b) Section 3322(d), which creates a mechanism for certain service- members to “coordinate” their benefts, does not limit Rudisill's entitle- ment. First, nothing in the statute imposes a duty for any veteran to “coordinate” entitlements in order to receive benefts. Section 3322(d) does not mention the receipt of benefts but addresses instead the “coor- dination of entitlement.” Because Rudisill is already entitled to two separate benefts, he has no need to coordinate any entitlement under § 3327. As used in the statute, the word “coordination” denotes a swap. Section 3327, to which § 3322(d) points, describes coordination as making an election that permits the individual to get Post-9/11 benefts “instead of ” Montgomery benefts. § 3327(d)(1). There are two additional clues that § 3322(d) does not address a vet- eran who just wants to use one of his two separate entitlements. First, § 3322—titled “Bar to duplication” of benefts—does not speak to some- one who has earned each beneft separately and is asking to receive each beneft separately. Second, § 3322(d) applies to individuals with Montgomery entitlements “as of August 1, 2009,” the effective date of the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Before that date, individuals could have been 296 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

accruing Post-9/11 benefts (ever since September 11, 2001) but would have had no way to opt into a benefts program that was not enacted until 2008. The swap Congress devised in § 3327 gives such individuals a mechanism for accessing these benefts. Pp. 307–310. (c) The contention that Rudisill can only use his Post-9/11 benefts by invoking § 3327 is contradicted by that provision's text. Pp. 310–314. (1) To start, an election under § 3327(a) is optional, i. e., an individ- ual “may elect to receive” Post-9/11 benefts. And a decision not to make a § 3327(a) election does not purport to alter one's entitlement. To argue that Rudisill may receive Post-9/11 benefts only by making a § 3327(a) election is to misread § 3322(a) as imposing a substantive requirement to elect benefts via § 3327(a). The two elections are differ- ent. While § 3322(a) requires Rudisill to elect which beneft to receive at any particular time, it does not follow that he must also make an election under § 3327(a) to swap out his benefts. And it is noteworthy that § 3322(a) does not mention, much less cross-reference, either § 3322(d) or § 3327. Other parts of the statute confrm that not all elec- tions are the same. Compare § 3322(a) with § 3322(h); § 3327(a) with § 3327(c)(1). In the context of a statute that establishes multiple dis- tinct elections, attempts to equate a § 3322(a) election with a § 3327(a) election are unpersuasive. Pp. 310–312. (2) The plain text of § 3327(d) makes clear that § 3327(d)—which details the consequences of making an election under § 3327(a)—does not limit a servicemember in Rudisill's situation. One such consequence is that a § 3327 election entitles an individual to Post-9/11 benefts instead of basic Montgomery benefts. But Rudisill was entitled to both bene- fts, and he had no need to swap one set of benefts for another. A second consequence of a § 3327 election is that “the number of months of [Post-9/11 benefts] shall be . . . the number of months of unused [Montgomery benefts], as of the date of the election.” § 3327(d)(2)(A). Like subsection (d)(1), this provision only relates to an individual mak- ing a § 3327(a) election. This makes perfect sense under Rudisill's read- ing of the statute, but would be nonsensical under the Government's view, as it would impose an exhaust-or-forfeit requirement for veterans with two separate entitlements. The more sensible view is that § 3327(d)(2) is a limit on exceeding one's entitlement through the swap- ping mechanism § 3327 creates. Pp. 312–314. 55 F. 4th 879, reversed and remanded.

Jackson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Kavanaugh, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Barrett, J., Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 297

joined, post, p. 314. Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined, post, p. 319.

Misha Tseytlin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Sean T. H. Dutton, Kevin M. LeRoy, Tim- othy L. McHugh, and David J. DePippo. Vivek Suri argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor Gen- eral Stewart, and Galina I. Fomenkova.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Common- wealth of Virginia et al. by Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General of Vir- ginia, Andrew N. Ferguson, Solicitor General, Erika L. Maley, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Kevin M. Gallagher, Deputy Solicitor General, and Rick W. Eberstadt, Assistant Solicitor General, by Angela Colmen- ero, Provisional Attorney General of Texas, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Kristin K. Mayes of Arizona, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Rob Bonta of Cali- fornia, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kath- leen Jennings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Ashley Moody of Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Raúl R. Labra- dor of Idaho, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Daniel Cam- eron of Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Andrea Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Joshua Stein of North Carolina, Edward E. Manibusan of the Northern Mariana Islands, Gentner F. Drummond of Oklahoma, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Mi- chelle A. Henry of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Charity R. Clark of Ver- mont, Robert W. Ferguson of Washington, Patrick Morrisey of West Vir- ginia, Joshua L. Kaul of Wisconsin, and Bridget Hill of Wyoming; for the American Legion by Glenn R. Bergmann, Thomas M. Polseno, and James D. Ridgway; for the Edison Electric Institute et al. by Elbert Lin; for Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America by Adam G. Unikowsky and Mi- chelle S. Kallen; for Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc., by Melanie L. Bost- wick and John B. Wells; for the National Institute of Military Justice by Juan O. Perla and T. Barry Kingham; for the National Veterans Legal Services Program et al. by Michael E. Kenneally; for the Veterans of 298 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

Opinion of the Court

Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner James Rudisill first enlisted in the United States Army in the year 2000. Over the next decade, he reenlisted twice, serving a total of eight years on active duty. As a result of his frst period of military service, Rudisill was entitled to 36 months of educational benefts under the Montgomery GI Bill, to be paid by the Department of Veter- ans Affairs (VA). Rudisill's subsequent periods of service separately entitled him to 36 months of educational benefts under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Both of Rudisill's entitlements were subject to a 48-month aggregate-benefts cap. Rudisill used 25 months and 14 days of his Montgomery benefts to help fund his undergraduate degree. Then, after serving his third tour of duty, Rudisill sought to use his Post- 9/11 benefts to attend divinity school. The VA informed Rudisill that his Post-9/11 benefts were limited to the duration of his unused Montgomery benefts, pursuant to a provision of the Post-9/11 GI Bill, 38 U. S. C. § 3327(d)(2). In other words, according to the VA, by re- questing Post-9/11 benefts before exhausting all of his Mont- gomery benefts, Rudisill could receive only 36 months of benefts in total, not the 48 months to which he would other- wise be entitled. The question before us is whether Rudisill can access his Post-9/11 benefits entitlement without being subject to § 3327(d)(2)'s durational limit. We hold that he can. Be- cause he simply seeks to use one of his two separate entitle- ments, § 3327(d)(2) does not apply. I A “The United States has a proud history of offering educa- tional assistance to millions of veterans, as demonstrated by Foreign Wars of the United States by Rex W. Manning; for Jeremy C. Doerre, pro se; for Sen. Tim Kaine et al. by Roman Martinez; and for 10 Veterans by Matthew A. Fitzgerald and R. Andrew Austria. Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 299

the many `G.I. Bills' enacted since World War II.” Post- 9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, § 5002(3), 122 Stat. 2358, 38 U. S. C. § 3301 et seq. GI bills honor the sacrifces of those who have served in the military, and as such, “ha[ve] a positive effect on recruitment for the Armed Forces.” Ibid. These education benefts have also helped to “reduce the costs of war, assist veterans in readjusting to civilian life after wartime service, and boost the United States economy.” Ibid. In the more than 75 years since Congress passed the frst GI Bill in response to World War II, it has enacted additional GI bills, most of which share two relevant features. First, an individual with the requisite period of military service becomes “entitled to” educational benefts, typically in the form of a stipend or tuition payments, which the VA is then required to provide once the veteran enrolls in an eligible education program. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 288, 289; see also, e. g., Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 664–666; Veterans' Readjust- ment Benefts Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 13, 15. Second, with one brief exception,1 GI bills from the Korean War onward have provided education benefts to fully qualifed servicemem- bers for a fxed duration: 36 months of benefts per GI bill, up to a total of 48 months of benefts for those servicemem- bers who become eligible for educational benefts under mul- tiple GI bills. See 66 Stat. 665; 82 Stat. 1331; 90 Stat. 2396.2 This case relates to the overlap between two recent GI bills. The frst is the Montgomery GI Bill Act of 1984, 38 U. S. C. § 3001 et seq. The Montgomery GI Bill provides “[b]asic educational assistance” to servicemembers who frst enter active duty between 1985 and 2030. § 3011(a). Mont- gomery benefts give veterans a “basic educational assist- 1 Veterans' Readjustment Benefts Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 14. 2 Congress has amended this provision over the years, but the statutory language has remained largely the same, and the 48-month aggregate cap has not varied. 38 U. S. C. § 3695(a). 300 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

ance allowance” that “help[s] meet, in part, the expenses of such individual's subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books, equipment, and other educational costs.” § 3014(a); see also § 3015 (setting forth amount of assistance). This limited sti- pend ordinarily does not pay the full costs of a veteran's education. As with other GI bills, the Montgomery GI Bill consists of a detailed series of statutory provisions that include an entitlement and also durational limits. To be “entitled to basic educational assistance” under the Montgomery bene- fts program, a servicemember must satisfy certain mili- tary service requirements—typically two or three years of continuous active duty. § 3011(a). The servicemember is then “entitled to 36 months” of Montgomery benefits. §§ 3013(a)(1), (c)(1). An eligible servicemember “may make an election not to receive [Montgomery benefits], ” § 3011(c)(1) (emphasis added), but unless he opts out, he con- tributes $1,200 into the program, usually through a series of pay reductions. §§ 3011(b)(1)–(2). The Montgomery Bill's 36-month entitlement is also “[s]ubject to section 3695,” § 3013(a)(1), a provision that predates Montgomery and limits “[t]he aggregate period for which any person may receive assistance under two or more [GI bills]” to 48 months, § 3695(a). The second GI bill at issue in this case is the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, 122 Stat. 2357, 38 U. S. C. § 3301 et seq. When it enacted this bill, Congress expressly recognized that “[s]ervice on active duty in the Armed Forces has been especially arduous . . . since Septem- ber 11, 2001,” and that the Montgomery GI Bill's modest edu- cational benefts, which were “designed for peacetime serv- ice,” had become “outmoded.” §§ 5002(2), (4), 122 Stat. 2358. Therefore, the Post-9/11 GI Bill gives servicemembers “en- hanced educational assistance benefts” that “are commensu- rate with the educational assistance benefts provided by a Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 301

grateful Nation to veterans of World War II.” § 5002(6), ibid. A servicemember entitled to Post-9/11 benefts ordi- narily receives the actual net cost of in-state tuition, addi- tional public-private cost sharing to cover the cost at private institutions, a monthly housing stipend, a lump sum for books and supplies, and additional amounts for other specifed ex- penses. 38 U. S. C. §§ 3313(c), 3315–3318. As with the Montgomery GI Bill, the Post-9/11 GI Bill es- tablishes an entitlement and also prescribes durational lim- its. To be entitled to Post-9/11 benefts, servicemembers must typically serve on active duty in the Armed Forces for at least three years starting on or after September 11, 2001. § 3311(b). “[A]n individual entitled to educational assistance under [the Post-9/11 GI Bill] is entitled to . . . 36 months” of enhanced educational benefts. § 3312(a). And as with Montgomery benefts, this entitlement is “[s]ubject to section 3695,” ibid., meaning that a servicemember's aggregate ben- efts from the Post-9/11 GI Bill and other GI bills are capped at 48 months, see § 3695(a). Because the Montgomery and Post-9/11 bills cover over- lapping service periods, eligibility for benefts under these two bills overlaps as well. Consequently, the Post-9/11 GI Bill contains a provision titled “[b]ar to duplication of educa- tional assistance benefts.” § 3322. This bar clarifes that an individual with entitlements to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefts “may not receive assistance under two or more such programs concurrently, but shall elect . . . under which chapter or provisions to receive educational assist- ance.” § 3322(a). A later enacted provision further ensures that an individual may not receive double credit for a single period of service; rather, he “shall elect . . . under which authority such service is to be credited.” § 3322(h)(1). Thus, to summarize: Per § 3322, servicemembers who are eligible for educational benefts under either the Montgom- ery GI Bill or the Post-9/11 GI Bill—from a period of service 302 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

that could qualify for either program—can opt to credit that service toward one educational benefts program or the other. If servicemembers serve for long enough, they may be entitled to both. But such servicemembers cannot re- ceive disbursements from both entitlement programs at the same time, nor may they receive any combination of benefts for longer than 48 months. Outside of those limitations, their service “entitle[s]” them to the benefts that they have earned, and the VA “shall pay” them these benefits. §§ 3011(a), 3014(a), 3311(a), 3313(a).

B When it enacted the Post-9/11 GI Bill, Congress addressed one immediate problem that arose due to the lag time be- tween the start of the Post-9/11 GI Bill's entitlement period and the bill's effective date. The case before us concerns the scope of that solution. As we have explained, the Post-9/11 GI Bill created an educational benefts entitlement for veterans who serve on or after September 11, 2001. But the legislation granting that entitlement was not passed until 2008 and did not take effect until August 1, 2009. See 122 Stat. 2378. Thus, serv- icemembers who were entitled to Post-9/11 benefts but had been funneled through the Montgomery program until the Post-9/11 GI Bill went into effect needed a way to access the more generous Post-9/11 benefts program. Section 3322(d) informs these servicemembers that “coor- dination of entitlement to educational assistance under [the Post-9/11 GI Bill], on the one hand, and [the Montgomery GI Bill] on the other, shall be governed by [§ 3327].” Then, under § 3327, an individual who meets the criteria for Mont- gomery benefts and Post-9/11 benefts based on the same (overlapping) period of service can elect to exchange the Montgomery benefts he has received for the Post-9/11 bene- fts that he wants. Section 3327(a) states that “[a]n individ- ual may elect to receive educational assistance under [the Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 303

Post-9/11 GI Bill]” if they meet two criteria. First, they must fall into one of six categories “as of August 1, 2009,” including, as relevant here, individuals who are “entitled to [Montgomery benefts].” §§ 3327(a)(1)(A), (C). Second, they must “mee[t] the requirements for entitlement to [Post- 9/11 benefts]” “as of the date of the” § 3327(a) election. § 3327(a)(2). Making a § 3327(a) election effects a swap by operation of § 3327(d): “[A]n individual making an election under [§ 3327(a)] shall be entitled to [Post-9/11 benefts], instead of [Montgomery benefts].” § 3327(d)(1). And, notably, the statute further clarifes that, if the individual has already used some Montgomery benefts when he makes that swap, the new entitlement is not a full 36 months of Post-9/11 bene- fts. Instead, his new entitlement capped at “the number of months of unused entitlement . . . under [the Montgomery GI Bill], as of the date of the election.” § 3327(d)(2)(A). Once a servicemember elects to swap his Montgomery benefts en- titlement for a Post-9/11 benefts entitlement, that “election . . . is irrevocable.” § 3327(i). II Petitioner James Rudisill spent nearly eight years on ac- tive duty in the U. S. Army, providing three distinct periods of military service.3 He was deployed to Iraq and Afghani- stan, experienced combat, and sustained multiple injuries. He reached the rank of captain and earned several medals and commendations, including a Bronze Star. After each period of service, Rudisill received an honorable discharge. In between his second and third periods of military serv- ice, Rudisill earned an undergraduate degree. To help f- nance this education, he used 25 months and 14 days of the Montgomery benefts he was entitled to receive due to his 3 Rudisill's frst period of service was from January 2000 to June 2002; his second and third periods of service were from June 2004 to December 2005, and November 2007 to August 2011, respectively. 304 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

frst period of service. After graduating in 2007, he reen- rolled in the Army for a third period. By 2015, Rudisill suc- cessfully sought admission to Yale Divinity School; he in- tended to earn and use that degree to become a chaplain in the Army. To fund his graduate school education, Rudisill applied to the VA for Post-9/11 benefts, relying on the entitlement that he had earned with respect to his second and third periods of service. But the VA issued a certifcate of eligibility stat- ing that Rudisill was only eligible for 10 months and 16 days of Post-9/11 benefts—the length of his unused Montgomery benefts. This response did not accord with Rudisill's under- standing of the scope of his entitlement: In his view, he had earned an entitlement to 36 months of Post-9/11 benefts based on his second and third periods of service, and he could use 22 months and 16 days of that Post-9/11 entitlement due to § 3695's 48-month aggregate-benefts cap. Rudisill fled a notice of disagreement with the VA, which eventually denied his claim for the additional entitlement. The Board of Veterans' Appeals affrmed the VA's decision, but the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims reversed. It reasoned that although the statutory scheme was ambiguous, the statutory structure, regulatory framework, congres- sional purpose, and pro-veteran canon supported Rudisill's interpretation of the statute. BO v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 321 (2019). Over a dissent, a panel of the Federal Circuit agreed, hold- ing that veterans with multiple periods of qualifying service are not subject to § 3327(d)(2). 4 F. 4th 1297 (2021). The en banc Federal Circuit then considered the matter, and, over- ruling the panel in a 10-to-2 decision, it reversed. 55 F. 4th 879 (2022). It explained that, when Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefts, he had made an “election” under § 3327(a)(1), making his benefts subject to § 3327(d)(2)'s limit. We granted certiorari and now reverse the judgment of the Federal Circuit. 599 U. S. ––– (2023). Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 305

III The question before us is this: When servicemembers have separate entitlements to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefts, can they use their benefts, in any order, up to § 3695's aggregate 48-month cap? In the Government's tell- ing, a veteran in this position is subject to § 3322(d)'s manda- tory coordination clause; to receive any Post-9/11 benefts, he must make an election under § 3327(a), which subjects him to § 3327(d)(2). By contrast, Rudisill argues that he already has two separate entitlements to benefts—36 months under each program—so § 3322(d) does not apply to him. And, even if it did, Rudisill says, § 3327(a)'s election mechanism is optional, and he does not forfeit any entitlement by declining to make a § 3327(a) election. As explained below, the pertinent statutory text resolves this dispute in Rudisill's favor. Section 3327(d)(2)'s limit ap- plies only to an individual who makes a § 3327(a) election. But Rudisill never made an election under § 3327(a), nor must he have done so, because § 3327 is triggered only if a service- member is “coordinat[ing]” an entitlement per § 3322(d). Someone in Rudisill's situation—who just uses one of his two entitlements—is not coordinating anything. This view is further reinforced by our reading of § 3327(a). That provi- sion's election mechanism is optional, and Rudisill does not forfeit his entitlements by declining to make a § 3327(a) election. A We start by examining Rudisill's benefts entitlements generally. It is undisputed that Rudisill earned two sepa- rate entitlements to educational benefts due to the length of his military service. Based on his frst period of service, he became “entitled to” Montgomery benefts, as the statute clearly states. § 3011(a). Equally clear is that his second and third periods of service “entitled” him to Post-9/11 bene- fts. § 3311(a). 306 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

So, from the outset, we know that Rudisill earned two sep- arate benefts entitlements, one per the Montgomery GI Bill and the other per the Post-9/11 GI Bill, by serving in the military for nearly eight years over three separate periods. Notably, our analysis does not focus on his periods of service. Contra, post, at 325 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Rather, what matters is that his lengthy service conferred two separate entitlements. Recognizing Rudisill's separate entitlements leads us to two observations. First, the statute establishes a baseline rule that, absent some other limitation, the VA must pay a veteran's benefts. The Montgomery GI Bill requires that “[t]he Secretary shall pay to each individual entitled to [Montgomery benefts] who is pursuing an approved program of education a basic educational assistance allowance. ” § 3014(a) (emphasis added). Likewise, the Post-9/11 GI Bill states that “[t]he Secretary shall pay to each individual enti- tled to [Post-9/11 benefts] who is pursuing an approved program of education . . . the amounts specifed.” § 3313(a) (emphasis added). Second, Congress has clearly and plainly delineated cer- tain durational limits on these benefts entitlements. Mont- gomery and Post-9/11 entitlements have specifed outer lim- its: Each program entitles the recipient to up to 36 months of benefts, and both are “[s]ubject to section 3695,” which imposes a 48-month aggregate-benefts cap. §§ 3013(a)(1), 3312(a). The benefts entitlements are likewise qualifed by certain enumerated exceptions. Ibid. Thus, even before turning to the statutory provisions that are most directly implicated here, it is clear that (1) Rudisill is separately entitled to each of two educational benefts; and (2) absent specifed limits, the VA is statutorily obligated to pay him 48 months of benefts. As explained below, no stat- utory constraint prevents Rudisill from accessing his bene- fts, up to 48 months, in whichever order he chooses. Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 307

B Section 3322(d) is the frst of two statutory provisions that are at the heart of this dispute. That subsection, titled “Ad- ditional coordination matters,” states: “In the case of an individual entitled to educational as- sistance under [the Montgomery GI Bill or other speci- fed programs], or making contributions toward [the Montgomery Program], as of August 1, 2009, coordina- tion of entitlement to educational assistance under [the Post-9/11 GI Bill], on the one hand, and such chapters or provisions, on the other, shall be governed by [38 U. S. C. § 3327].” There is no dispute that subsection (d) applies to a service- member who is entitled to Montgomery benefts but has be- come eligible for Post-9/11 benefts for his period of qualify- ing service as of August 1, 2009, given the overlap of those two entitlement programs. See Part I–B, supra. But in the context of the instant dispute, the Government argues, and the dissent echoes, that an individual who has two sepa- rate benefts entitlements under the Montgomery and Post- 9/11 bills must also “coordinate” those two entitlements under § 3322(d) in order to access his Post-9/11 benefts. We conclude that the plain text of § 3322(d) does not support that assertion. First, nothing in the statute imposes a duty for any vet- eran to “coordinate” entitlements in order to receive benefts. Sections 3011 through 3014, which outline the Montgomery entitlement, do not refer to coordination. Nor do §§ 3311 through 3313, which establish the Post-9/11 benefts entitle- ment. And § 3695—the provision that specifcally addresses veterans with more than one entitlement—does not require, or even mention, coordination. For the person covered by § 3322(d)'s coordination require- ment, the provision does discuss “coordination of entitle- 308 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

ment” to benefts. But the statute distinguishes between “entitlement to” and “receipt of ” benefts. For example, §§ 3322(e), (f), and (g) bar duplicative receipt of benefts. Similarly, § 3322(a) says that a servicemember “may not re- ceive” two benefts at the same time. But § 3322(d) does not concern the receipt of benefts—that term appears nowhere in that subsection. Instead, subsection (d) addresses “coor- dination of entitlement.” Rudisill has no need to coordinate any entitlement: He is already entitled to two separate bene- fts. Section 3322(d) says that “coordination of entitlement . . . shall be governed by” § 3327, but, as Rudisill correctly observes, with nothing to coordinate, § 3327 does not govern. Both the Government and the dissent argue that this view misconstrues the meaning of the term “coordination.” In their view, “coordinat[ing]” an entitlement is not converting or exchanging entitlements. But what, then, does it mean to coordinate an entitlement under this statutory scheme? They contend that coordination “refers to a veteran choosing which `entitlement' . . . he would like to use.” Post, at 323 (opinion of Thomas, J.). But choosing an entitlement is an election, not coordination. And the statute uses the word “elect” repeatedly to say that veterans should choose be- tween two different entitlements. Here, § 3322(d) speaks of “coordination,” not “election,” and we generally “presume differences in language like this convey differences in mean- ing.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 86 (2017). Nor does the reference to “coordination” in subsection (d) exist in isolation. Rather, subsection (d) points to § 3327, which—as we explain below, see Part III–C–2, infra—tells us what coordination means: making an election that permits the individual to get Post-9/11 benefts “instead of ” Mont- gomery benefts. § 3327(d)(1). In ordinary parlance, if a person who is directed to “coordinate” receives one thing “instead of ” another, that “coordination” is understood to ef- fect a swap. Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 309

If we were left with any doubt that § 3322(d) simply does not speak to a veteran who just wants to use one of his two separate entitlements, two additional clues would tip the bal- ance. First, § 3322 is titled “Bar to duplication” of benefts. There is no duplication for someone in Rudisill's situation. He earned each beneft separately, and he is asking to receive each beneft separately. “[S]ection headings . . . `supply cues' as to what Congress intended,” Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U. S. 366, 380 (2018), and § 3322's heading tells us that its provisions prevent dou- ble dipping, something that Rudisill is not doing. Second, § 3322(d) applies to individuals with Montgomery entitlements “as of August 1, 2009.” The Government says that this language just references the bill's effective date. See Brief for Respondent 16, and n. But, in the entire Post- 9/11 GI Bill, only two statutory provisions—§ 3322(d) and § 3327(a)(1)—specifcally reference this date. Why would Congress refer to the effective date of the Post-9/11 GI Bill in only these two places and nowhere else? The most logical inference is that this date is material to the work of those particular provisions. And under the in- terpretation we adopt today, August 1, 2009, is highly rele- vant, because before then, individuals could have been accru- ing Post-9/11 benefts (ever since September 11, 2001) but would have had no way to opt into that benefts program. The swap Congress devised in § 3327 gives such individuals a mechanism for accessing these benefts. The invocation of the bill's effective date in § 3322(d) thus provides another clue that these provisions are not relevant to someone, like Rudi- sill, who has no need to make a swap.4 Adding all this up, we come to the conclusion that § 3322(d) serves a specifc function: to allow individuals with Mont- gomery benefts who would prefer to swap them for Post- 4 To be clear, as both parties agree, the August 1, 2009, effective date does not limit servicemembers' ability to use § 3327's election mechanism to swap benefts earned after this date. 310 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

9/11 benefts to “coordinate” these entitlements via § 3327. But when a person already has two separate entitlements and simply uses one after the other, he is not coordinating anything. Because that is Rudisill's situation, § 3322(d) does not speak to him. C Based on the analysis we have already laid out, Rudisill never reaches § 3327 when using his benefts because he is not coordinating his entitlements. And the contention that Rudisill can only use his Post-9/11 benefts by invoking § 3327 is contradicted by the text of § 3327 itself.

1 We cannot agree that, to receive Post-9/11 benefts, a serv- icemember in Rudisill's situation must elect them via § 3327. The statute simply does not say that a servicemember with more than one entitlement receives Post-9/11 benefts only by making a § 3327(a) election. To start, a § 3327(a) election is optional: An eligible indi- vidual “may elect to receive” Post-9/11 benefts. “ `[T]he “word `may' clearly connotes discretion.” ' ” Opati v. Re- public of Sudan, 590 U. S. 418, 428 (2020). So a veteran can opt for a § 3327(a) election, but he does not have to. If he decides not to opt for a § 3327(a) election, nothing in § 3327, § 3322, or anywhere else purports to alter his entitle- ment. Instead, the veteran remains in the exact same posi- tion as before. A veteran who had only Montgomery bene- fts is left with only Montgomery benefts. Likewise, for the veteran (like Rudisill) who started out with both Montgom- ery and Post-9/11 benefts, both sets of benefts remain. To argue that Rudisill may receive Post-9/11 benefts only by making a § 3327(a) election, the dissent invokes—and misreads—§ 3322(a). See post, at 322– 323 (opinion of Thomas, J.). To repeat, as relevant here, § 3322(a) provides: “An individual entitled to [Post-9/11 benefts] who is also eligi- ble for [Montgomery benefts] may not receive assistance under [both] programs concurrently, but shall elect . . . under Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 311

which chapter or provisions to receive educational assist- ance.” As is clear from its text, § 3322(a) just says, and means, that a veteran cannot use Montgomery and Post-9/ 11 benefts at the same time to fund his education. Section 3322(a) bars double dipping—it does not impose a substan- tive requirement to elect benefts via § 3327(a). So, while Rudisill must make an election per § 3322(a) when he wants to have a particular aspect of his education funded, it does not follow that he must also make an election under § 3327(a). The two elections are completely different, and making one is not the same as making the other. By blurring all elections into one, instead of recognizing that the statute contemplates multiple distinct elections, the Govern- ment—and the dissent—make a crucial misstep. In this regard, it is noteworthy that § 3322(a) does not mention, much less cross-reference, either § 3322(d) or § 3327. Even though § 3322(a) and § 3327(a) both use the word “elect,” nothing in the text of either provision suggests that these two elections are one and the same. Rather, to “elect” just means to choose. See New Oxford American Diction- ary 545 (2d ed. 2005) (“elect” means to “opt for or choose to do something”). And that says nothing about the substance of any option. Other parts of the statute confrm that not all elections are the same. For example, § 3322(a) requires a person with two or more entitlements to “elect” which to receive at any given time, while § 3322(h) bars “duplication of eligibility based on a single event or period of service,” and thus re- quires certain individuals to “elect” under which benefts programs their service is to be credited.5 Turning to § 3327, subsection (a) similarly allows a person who is entitled to Montgomery benefts to “elect” to receive Post-9/11 benefts

5 In all, 38 U. S. C. § 3322 has six separate subsections that require differ- ent elections. See §§ 3322(a), (c), (e), (g), (h)(1), (2). Neither the Govern- ment nor the dissent offers a compelling reason as to why, out of all six provisions, § 3322(a) requires “coordination” under § 3322(d) and an “elec- tion” under § 3327(a). 312 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

under certain circumstances, and subsection (c)(1) lets a per- son “elect” to revoke an entitlement that he previously trans- ferred. Furthermore and importantly, subsection (i) refers to these two elections separately. See § 3327(i) (“An election under subsection (a) or (c)(1) is irrevocable”). In the context of a statute that establishes multiple distinct elections, at- tempts to equate a § 3322(a) election with a § 3327(a) election are unpersuasive. 2 Undeterred, the Government turns to § 3327(d), which de- tails the consequences of making an election under § 3327(a). But the plain text of § 3327(d) makes clear that the provision does not limit a servicemember in Rudisill's situation. From its start, § 3327(d) contradicts the Government's reading of the statute. Section 3327(d)(1) tells us that “an individual making an election under [§ 3327(a)] shall be enti- tled to [Post-9/11 benefts] instead of basic [Montgomery ben- efts].” § 3327(d)(1) (emphasis added). In other words, he swaps out his entitlement to Montgomery benefts for an en- titlement to Post-9/11 benefts. Rudisill had no need to get Post-9/11 benefts “instead of ” Montgomery benefts, because he was already entitled to both benefts. For veterans who have used some but not all of their Montgomery benefts, § 3327(d)(2)(A) lays out one further consequence of making a § 3327 election: When these veter- ans “mak[e] an election under [§ 3327(a)], the number of months of [Post-9/11 benefts] shall be . . . the number of months of unused [Montgomery benefts], as of the date of the election.” Two aspects of this provision stand out. First, like subsection (d)(1), this limitation only applies to “an individual making an election under subsection (a).” So, if a person does not make a § 3327(a) election, § 3327(d)(2) does not limit his entitlement. Second, this provision makes perfect sense under Rudisill's interpretation of the statute. If a veteran served for three years, he earned 36 months of benefts. If he received Mont- Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 313

gomery benefts for this service but should have been able to get Post-9/11 benefts, due to the overlap in the eligibility for these programs, § 3327 lets him opt for Post-9/11 benefts instead. But if he has already used some benefts at the time he elects the swap, a § 3327(a) election does not entitle him to a full 36-month period of Post-9/11 benefts in addition to the Montgomery benefts he has already used. Instead, § 3327(d)(2) ensures that his one period of service entitles him to 36 months of educational benefts in total—no more, and no less. By contrast, § 3327(d)(2) is nonsensical under the Govern- ment's view of the statute. It would impose an exhaust-or- forfeit requirement for veterans with two separate entitle- ments: Either use up all of your Montgomery benefts (so that you can get your full 48 months of benefts), or lose any entitlement in excess of 36 months.6 At the very least, this would be an odd way to create an exhaustion requirement, and the Government has not pointed us to any comparable one in this statutory scheme or elsewhere. Again, the more sensible view—and the view that the statutory text best supports—is that § 3327(d)(2) is a limit on exceeding one's entitlement through the swapping mechanism § 3327 creates, and is thus not an exhaustion requirement at all. In sum, § 3327(a)'s election mechanism is an optional means of trading an existing benefts entitlement for Post-9/11 ben- efts. Although § 3327 details the consequences of making that election, those consequences—by their own terms— apply only to an individual who makes a § 3327(a) election.

6 Consider, for example, a veteran who has used 24 months of Montgom- ery benefts and also has an entitlement to 36 months of Post-9/11 benefts. Under the Government's reading, if she uses up her last 12 months of Montgomery benefts, she could then get 12 months of Post-9/11 benefts (48 months in total benefts). But if she wants to immediately start using her Post-9/11 benefts entitlement without using up all the Montgomery entitlement, she could get only 12 months of Post-9/11 benefts, and noth- ing more (adding up to 36 months in total). 314 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

Kavanaugh, J., concurring

On the other hand, the entitlements of a person who does not make a § 3327(a) election are not altered. In Rudisill's case, that leaves him with two different entitlements (one under the Montgomery GI Bill and the other under the Post-9/11 GI Bill) that the VA “shall pay” to him, subject only to § 3695's 48-month cap. §§ 3014(a), 3313(a).

* * * The bottom line is this: Veterans who separately accrue benefts under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills are entitled to both benefts. Neither § 3322(d) nor § 3327 restrict veterans with two separate entitlements who simply seek to use either one. Thus, Rudisill may use his benefts, in any order, up to § 3695's 48-month aggregate-benefts cap. If the statute were ambiguous, the pro-veteran canon would favor Rudisill, but the statute is clear, so we resolve this case based on statutory text alone. Because the Federal Circuit incorrectly limited Rudisill's benefts, we reverse its judg- ment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kavanaugh, with whom Justice Barrett joins, concurring. I agree with the Court that the post-9/11 education- benefts law entitles James Rudisill, a military veteran, to additional benefts for graduate school. The Court goes on to say that the clarity of the benefts law at issue here means that we need not rely on the veterans canon of statutory interpretation. I again agree. I write separately, however, to note some practical and constitutional questions about the justifcations for a benefts-related canon (such as the veter- ans canon) that favors one particular group over others. Under the veterans canon, statutes that provide benefts to veterans are to be construed “in the veteran's favor.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994). The veterans Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 315

canon is a substantive canon of statutory interpretation. A substantive canon is a judicial presumption in favor of or against a particular substantive outcome. Some classic ex- amples include the presumption against retroactivity, the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the presumption of mens rea. Applying a substantive canon, a court may depart from what the court, absent the canon, would have concluded is the best reading of the statutory text. Otherwise, of course, the substantive canon would not be necessary or relevant. See J. Manning & M. Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation 383 (4th ed. 2021) (In “order for a substantive canon” to “do any work, it must be the case that in the absence of the canon the court would have reached a different conclusion”). Substantive canons are typically based on background con- stitutional principles or long-settled judicial understandings of congressional practice. See id., at 382–384. Because a substantive canon by defnition has important decision- altering effects, any substantive canon must be suffciently rooted in constitutional principles or congressional practices. Here, no one suggests that the veterans canon rests on background constitutional principles. Rather, the canon seems to stem from a loose judicial assumption about con- gressional intent—in particular, an assumption that Con- gress intends for courts to read ambiguous veterans-benefts statutes more broadly than the courts otherwise would read such statutes. See Boone v. Lightner, 319 U. S. 561, 575 (1943). But what is that assumption based on? The Court has never explained. The frst glimmerings of the veterans canon appeared in the 1940s. See ibid. But the early cases did not purport to establish a canon. They seem to have simply engaged in broadly purposive interpretation of the particular statutes at issue. Since those early cases, the Court has occasionally referred to a general pro-veterans interpretive principle, 316 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

but without further explanation. See, e. g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 441 (2011); King v. St. Vincent's Hos- pital, 502 U. S. 215, 220–221, n. 9 (1991). The canon appears to have developed almost by accident. Moreover, the veterans canon has apparently not mattered—in other words, has not affected the result—in any of this Court's past decisions in veterans cases, or in this case for that matter. See, e. g., Henderson, 562 U. S., at 441; Brown, 513 U. S., at 117–118; King, 502 U. S., at 220–221, n. 9; see also Kisor v. McDonough, 995 F. 3d 1347, 1350 (CA Fed. 2021) (Prost, C. J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). The Court has “rarely” applied the veterans canon. Id., at 1350. And even when mentioned, the canon has seemingly served only as the proverbial icing on a cake al- ready frosted—that is, an extra citation after the Court has already concluded that the veteran prevails anyway under the statutory text and traditional tools of statutory interpretation. Despite the canon's seemingly nonexistent impact on this Court's decisions, the Court's refexive repetition of the canon over the years has created the appearance of deeper rooting, leading lower courts—particularly the Federal Cir- cuit where veterans benefts cases are channeled—to rely on the canon in a way that this Court has not. Compare id., at 1350–1358 with id., at 1366–1374 (O'Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). But this Court's repeti- tion of the canon has not yielded any greater justifcation or explanation by the Court for applying such a canon in the frst place. In considering whether a suffcient justifcation exists, we must confront some fundamental problems with benefts- related canons like this one. To begin with, the notion that benefts statutes should be interpreted to favor a particular group creates signifcant tension with the actual operation of the process by which Congress and the President enact spending laws. To be sure, if someone asked a Member of Congress or the Presi- Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 317

dent (or this judge, for that matter) in the abstract, “Should veterans get more benefts?” the answer would be yes. But that question is not (and cannot be) answered in the abstract. The spending process is a zero-sum game, where money spent on one group means less money for other groups and other national priorities. Would Congress prefer to pay for another semester of vet- erans' graduate-school educations, or instead for more Pell Grants for lower-income college students? Would Congress want to spend more on healthcare benefts for the disabled, or instead on prescription-drug benefts for senior citizens? Would Congress choose to increase the pension benefts of retired CIA agents, or instead the wages of soldiers who are serving in harm's way today? The list of diffcult choices goes on and on. National security, assistance to the poor, law enforcement, energy production, environmental protec- tion, border security, cancer research, housing aid, highway construction, airplane safety, school lunches, disaster relief, drug treatment, prisons, and a plethora of other national pri- orities all compete for funding in the legislative process. And the U. S. Treasury is not a bottomless well of free money—rather, the money comes primarily from the taxes paid by the American people. The spending process in Congress requires hard choices with painful tradeoffs. Judges have no principled way to make those choices or weigh those tradeoffs. Nor do judges have a principled way, other than reading the statutory text as written, to conclude that Congress and the President would prefer to favor one group over another—or stated an- other way in this zero-sum process, to disfavor one group over another. In addition to that practical problem, judges have no con- stitutional authority to favor or disfavor one group over an- other in the spending process. Rather, under the Constitu- tion's separation of powers, Congress and the President make those policy judgments. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 2; § 8, cl. 1; § 9, cl. 7. Courts must then neutrally interpret 318 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

and apply the spending laws enacted by Congress and the President. Courts do so by heeding the statutory text and employing the traditional tools of statutory interpretation— not by singling out particular groups for favored or disfa- vored treatment. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 352–354 (2012). For those reasons, courts interpreting spending laws usu- ally do not apply canons to favor or disfavor particular groups. Courts, for example, do not apply a low-income- families canon, a healthcare-for-seniors canon, or a local-law- enforcement canon to favor those groups. (Nor, from the other direction, do courts apply a general fscal-responsibility canon to narrowly construe spending statutes.) In short, any canon that construes benefts statutes in favor of a particular group—rather than just construing the statutes as written—appears to be inconsistent both with ac- tual congressional practice on spending laws and with the Judiciary's proper constitutional role in the federal spend- ing process. To be clear, Congress's commitment to assisting veterans through the many federal veterans-benefts programs is en- tirely appropriate given the sacrifces made by those who have served in the Armed Forces. The statutes that pro- vide signifcant veterans benefts—including healthcare, edu- cation, disability, and retirement benefts—properly assist those who have defended America. And when statutes af- ford broad benefts for veterans or others, as is often the case, courts should apply the statutes as written. But providing federal benefts—and determining their scope—is Congress's prerogative. The Judiciary's role is to neutrally interpret those statutes, not to put a thumb on the scale in favor of or against any particular group. For that reason, it may be important in a future case for this Court to address the justifcation for any benefts-related canon that favors one group over others. Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 319

Thomas, J., dissenting

Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito joins, dissenting. Our country rewards those who serve in the Armed Forces with educational benefts. This case involves the educa- tional benefts available under the Montgomery GI Bill and the more recent Post-9/11 GI Bill. The Post-9/11 benefts are more generous than the Montgomery benefts, and veter- ans are sometimes entitled to benefts under both programs. By statute, however, veterans cannot receive benefts under both programs at the same time. Congress therefore cre- ated an election mechanism that allows veterans to switch from Montgomery benefts to Post-9/11 benefts. Under that mechanism, when a veteran switches to Post-9/11 bene- fts after using some, but not all, of his Montgomery benefts, the amount of his Post-9/11 benefts is limited to the number of months he had remaining for Montgomery benefts. 38 U. S. C. § 3327(d). The question here is whether this limita- tion applies to James Rudisill, a retired captain in the U. S. Army. The Court agrees that Rudisill could not use his two sets of benefts concurrently, and that he switched to Post-9/11 benefts when he had some remaining Montgomery benefts. Ante, at 303–304, 310–311. But, it declines to apply the statute's corresponding limitation on his benefts because Rudisill was separately entitled to Montgomery and Post- 9/11 benefts due to his multiple periods of service. Ante, at 298. Because this approach conficts with the statute's plain text, I respectfully dissent. I Since World War II, Congress has enacted numerous stat- utes that provide veterans with a range of educational bene- fts, commonly called GI bills. Two of these statutes are at issue here: the Veterans' Educational Assistance Program Act of 1984 (Montgomery GI Bill), 38 U. S. C. § 3001 et seq., and the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act 320 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

(Post-9/11 GI Bill), 38 U. S. C. § 3301 et seq. As the majority explains, the Montgomery GI Bill had been the primary source of educational benefts since 1985, but, in direct re- sponse to the September 11, 2001, attacks and the ensuing confict, Congress enacted the Post-9/11 GI Bill and made its benefts retroactively available. Ante, at 299–301. The Montgomery and Post-9/11 programs differ in meaningful ways. Montgomery benefts provide a modest, fxed monthly stipend, whereas Post-9/11 benefts are more generous and can cover the actual net cost of in-state tuition, along with other expenses such as tutorial assistance and licensing test fees. Compare, e.g., § 3015 with §§ 3313–3315, 3317–3318. Both programs impose a durational cap on the benefts that an individual may receive. Regardless of how long a veteran has served or how many periods of service he has, a qualifying veteran is generally eligible for a maximum of 36 months of benefts under each program. §§ 3013, 3312. In addition, there is an aggregate cap on benefts that applies across programs. No veteran may receive more than 48 months of educational benefts total. § 3695. The two educational-beneft programs cover overlapping time periods. And, several statutory provisions address this overlap. No veteran can use the two sets of benefts concurrently. § 3322(a). Veterans accordingly must “elect” which benefts to receive at a specifc time. Ibid. As rele- vant here, there is a condition attached to one particular election. Under § 3327, if a veteran elects to switch to Post- 9/11 benefts when he “has used, but retains unused,” Mont- gomery benefts, he is subject to a statutory “[l]imitation on entitlement.” Under this limitation, the amount of his Post- 9/11 benefts will be limited to “the number of months of unused entitlement of the individual under” the Montgomery program. § 3327(d)(2)(A).1 1 There is another part of the limitation's formula that is of no concern in this case. Title 38 U. S. C. § 3327(d)(2)(B) encompasses “the number of months, if any, of entitlement revoked by the individual under subsection Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 321

The question before us is whether that statutory limitation applies to Rudisill's benefts. Rudisill served during three separate periods, spanning roughly eight years. He frst en- listed in the Army in 2000 and served until 2002. During this period of service, Rudisill became eligible for Montgom- ery benefts. He used some of these benefts to start and, after a second period of service spanning about a year and a half, complete an undergraduate degree. Rudisill then re- joined the Army as a commissioned offcer, serving from 2007 to 2011. Rudisill's second and third periods of service made him eligible for Post-9/11 benefts. After he completed his third period of military service, he was admitted to Yale Di- vinity School. Rudisill sought to use his remaining benefts to fund his graduate education at Yale. At that time, Rudisill had used 25 months and 14 days of his Montgomery benefts for his undergraduate education. This left him with 10 months and 16 days of remaining Montgomery benefts. Rather than use these remaining benefts, however, Rudisill decided to switch to his Post-9/11 benefts. As part of that switch, Rudisill flled out a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) form electing to receive Post-9/11 benefts “in lieu of ” Mont- gomery benefts. App. 1a. He expressly acknowledged that his “months of entitlement under chapter 33”—i. e., Post-9/11 benefts—would be “limited to the number of months of entitlement remaining under chapter 30”—i. e., Montgomery benefts. Ibid. Applying the limitation on entitlement in § 3327, the VA awarded Rudisill Post-9/11 benefts for 10 months and 16 days—the amount he had remaining for his Montgomery benefts. Rudisill appealed, arguing that the § 3327 limita- tion did not apply to him because he had separate entitle- ments to Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefts due to his mul- tiple periods of service. Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit (c)(1).” This provision concerns a veteran's transfer of benefts to family members, which Rudisill has not done. 322 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

held that the VA had correctly applied the statutory limita- tion to Rudisill's benefts. I would affrm.

II Rudisill's Post-9/11 benefts are limited to the amount of Montgomery benefts he had not used. Because he could not use his sets of benefts concurrently, the statute required that Rudisill coordinate his entitlements, and that such coor- dination would be governed by § 3327. Rudisill then used the election mechanism in § 3327 to switch to Post-9/11 bene- fts after he had used some, but not all, of his Montgomery benefts. By making that election, the statute limited his benefts to the amount of Montgomery benefts he had left. Because the statutory scheme directs how a veteran in Rudi- sill's position can switch to Post-9/11 benefts, I would apply that mechanism to Rudisill's election—and the cost that comes with it. As an initial matter, there is no dispute that Rudisill can- not use his Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefts concurrently. See Brief for Petitioner 39–40; ante, at 310–311. Under § 3322(a), a veteran “entitled to” Post-9/11 benefts “who is also eligible” for Montgomery benefts “may not receive as- sistance under two or more such programs concurrently, but shall elect (in such form and manner as the Secretary may prescribe) under which chapter or provisions to receive edu- cational assistance.” Because Rudisill is entitled to Mont- gomery and Post-9/11 benefts, he cannot receive both bene- fts at the same time. Instead, he “shall elect” which benefts to receive. How does Rudisill “elect” which benefts to receive? That is the core of the dispute in this case. In my view, the stat- ute answers that question by requiring Rudisill to coordinate his entitlements and creating an election mechanism for him to do so. After barring the concurrent use of benefts in § 3322(a), Congress included a provision titled “[a]dditional coordination matters” in subsection (d). This coordination Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 323

provision states that “[i]n the case of ” a veteran “entitled” to benefts under certain other chapters—including the Montgomery chapter—“coordination of entitlement to educa- tional assistance under this [Post-9/11] chapter, on the one hand, and such chapters or provisions, on the other, shall be governed by [38 U. S. C. § 3327].” The “coordination” here refers to a veteran choosing which “entitlement”—i.e., set of benefts—he would like to use. The ordinary meaning of “coordination” is “[t]he action of arranging or placing in the same order, rank, or degree.” 3 Oxford English Dictionary 898 (2d ed. 1989); see also Ran- dom House Dictionary of the English Language 447 (2d ed. 1987) (defning “coordinate” as “to place or arrange in proper order or position” and “to assume proper order or relation”); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 501–502 (1981) (defning “coordination” as “arrangement in the same order, class, rank, or dignity” and “coordinate” as “to make coordinate; put in the same order or rank”). In this context, coordination refers to a veteran ordering his sets of benefts. A veteran's entitlement to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefts necessarily requires “coordination” because he can- not use them concurrently, as subsection (a) prohibits such use. And, subsection (d) explains that such coordination “shall be governed” by § 3327.2 Unsurprisingly, the coordination provision points to an election mechanism. As relevant, under § 3327(a)(1), a vet- eran “may elect to receive educational assistance under this [Post-9/11] chapter” if he meets certain criteria. “[A]s of August 1, 2009,” the veteran must be “entitled” to Montgom- ery benefts and “mee[t] the requirements for entitlement” to Post-9/11 benefts. §§ 3327(a)(1), (2). Next, a veteran may make this election to switch to Post-9/11 benefts if he “has 2 Contrary to the Court's assertion, coordination and election are distinct acts. See ante, at 308. Coordination requires a veteran to choose which entitlement to use at any given time; an election is the mechanism by which he switches from one set of benefts to another. 324 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

used, but retains unused, entitlement under [the Montgom- ery] chapter.” § 3327(a)(1). Put more simply, this election mechanism applies to a veteran who is entitled to both Mont- gomery and Post-9/11 benefts and has used some, but not all, of his Montgomery benefts. There is a consequence, however, for using this election mechanism. By making a § 3327(a)(1) election, a veteran triggers a “[ l]imitation on entitlement. ” § 3327(d)(2). Under that limitation, the veteran's Post-9/11 benefts are limited to “the number of months of unused entitlement of the individual under [the Montgomery] chapter . . . as of the date of the election.” § 3327(d)(2)(A). That is, a veteran with remaining Montgomery benefts who elects to switch to his Post-9/11 benefts is limited to the amount of Montgom- ery benefts he has remaining. Rudisill is covered by the election mechanism and its ac- companying limitation. He is entitled to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefts. And, as of August 1, 2009, he had used, but retained unused, Montgomery benefts. Section 3327(a) therefore provided him a mechanism by which he could elect to switch to Post-9/11 benefts. And, Rudisill made that election. App. 1a (“By electing Chapter 33, I ac- knowledge that I understand . . . my months of entitlement under chapter 33 will be limited to the number of months of entitlement remaining under chapter 30”). Because Rudisill elected to switch to his Post-9/11 benefts before exhausting his Montgomery benefts, he was subject to the correspond- ing limitation on his entitlement: He could receive Post-9/11 benefts for only the months remaining on his Montgomery benefts. Indeed, the VA informed him of this consequence before he made his election, and Rudisill acknowledged it. See ibid. Applying this limitation, the en banc Federal Cir- cuit correctly found that Rudisill was limited to 10 months and 16 days of Post-9/11 benefts for his graduate education. That straightforward conclusion follows from the statutory Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 325

scheme that Congress created. I would simply apply that statutory limit to Rudisill. III Rudisill and the majority make various attempts at avoid- ing the statute's inevitable conclusion, but none hits the mark. That is in large part because the statute's text, though complicated, is ultimately unambiguous. Accord- ingly, they do not dispute that Rudisill earned entitlements to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefts and that he can- not use these entitlements concurrently. Ante, at 305–306, 310–311; Brief for Petitioner 25–26, 39–40. They do not dis- pute that he made an election to switch to Post-9/11 benefts. Ante, at 310; Brief for Petitioner 26–27; App. 1a. And, they do not dispute that, when he made that election, he had used, but retained unused, Montgomery benefts. Ante, at 304; Brief for Petitioner 26. Instead, Rudisill's primary argument is that the specifc provisions in the statute governing coordination and election do not apply to veterans who have multiple periods of serv- ice. But, Rudisill acknowledges that the text of § 3327(a) “does not state that its election mechanism is limited to vet- erans with only a single period of service.” Id., at 46. There is likewise no language in the coordination provision of § 3322(d) that plainly cabins its application based upon pe- riods of service. Because the plain text contains no carve- out based on periods of service, that should be the end of the debate. Rudisill's contrary argument is especially unconvincing given that Congress included other period-of-service limita- tions in the very subchapter at issue. See Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U. S. 8, 14 (2019) (“Atextual judicial supplemen- tation is particularly inappropriate when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or provision”). Congress provided that a “period of service counted for purposes . . . of an education loan under [a differ- 326 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

ent program] may not be counted as a period of service for entitlement to educational assistance under this [Post-9/11] chapter.” § 3322(b) (emphasis added); see also § 3322(h) (cre- ating a “[b]ar to duplication of eligibility based on a single event or period of service” (emphasis added)). Congress could have chosen to similarly limit the scope of § 3322's coor- dination provision or § 3327's election mechanism based upon periods of service or separate entitlements, but it did not. We cannot do so of our own accord. Next, Rudisill contends that the election mechanism in § 3327 is merely meant to provide veterans with a single pe- riod of service a way to convert lesser Montgomery benefts into more generous Post-9/11 benefts on a one-to-one basis. The text of § 3327 makes clear, however, that it is a mecha- nism for making an election to switch from Montgomery ben- efts to Post-9/11 benefts—not merely a way to convert one into the other. Section 3327 provides how a veteran “may elect to receive” Post-9/11 benefts instead of his Montgom- ery benefts. And, it echoes § 3322(a)'s requirement that a veteran entitled to multiple sets of benefts “shall elect” which benefts to receive because he cannot use them concur- rently. Moreover, the election mechanism applies only to veterans who are already eligible for both programs. See § 3327(a) (requiring a veteran to be “entitled to basic educa- tional assistance under [the Montgomery] chapter” and “mee[t] the requirements for entitlement to educational as- sistance under this [Post-9/11] chapter”). Because a veteran must already qualify for Post-9/11 benefts, this mechanism cannot provide a way for veterans who lack Post-9/11 bene- fts to “convert” their Montgomery benefts. Indeed, the en- tire point of the election mechanism is to “coordinat[e]” Mont- gomery and Post-9/11 “entitlement[s]”—i.e., to manage two existing entitlements. § 3322(d) (cross-referencing § 3327). More importantly, § 3327(a) does not cabin its application based upon period of service or separate entitlements. See supra, at 325–326. Rudisill's interpretation ultimately does Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 327

not overcome the application of § 3327's plain text to his circumstance—he is entitled to both sets of benefts and switched to Post-9/11 benefts when he “ha[d] used, but re- tain[ed] unused,” Montgomery benefts. The majority, for its part, takes a different tack. Its rea- soning seems to rest on the theory that because Rudisill was “entitled” to Montgomery benefts and “entitled” to Post-9/11 benefts, those multiple entitlements cannot be limited when switching between benefts. Ante, at 305–306. But, the majority's own reasoning undermines that theory. It agrees that Rudisill cannot receive the full 72 months of benefts he earned because a separate statutory provision limits him to 48 months total. See ante, at 306; § 3695. And, it agrees that Rudisill cannot use his two separate entitlements con- currently. Ante, at 301; § 3322(a). This is true even though Rudisill is “entitled” to 36 months of Montgomery benefts and “entitled” to 36 months of Post-9/11 benefts. See §§ 3011(a), 3311(a). In other words, the majority itself ad- mits that Rudisill's entitlements are not absolute. But, while the majority accepts certain statutory limitations on Rudisill's multiple “entitlements,” it rejects others—even ones listed in the same subsection. Indeed, even though the Court agrees that some election must be made, it rejects the election process spelled out in the statute to address Rudi- sill's circumstance. My focus on this election does not “blu[r ] all elections into one,” ante, at 311, but rather, ap- plies specifc statutory text that plainly covers Rudisill. The majority tries to justify its selective reading of the statute by suggesting that the coordination provision in § 3322(d) “simply does not speak to a veteran who just wants to use one of his two separate entitlements.” Ante, at 309. But that provision specifcally governs the “coordination of entitlement” to Post-9/11 benefts “on the one hand” and Montgomery benefts “on the other.” § 3322(d) (emphasis added). It is unclear how a statute could more explicitly cover the interaction between two separate entitlements. 328 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH

The majority also provides no satisfactory answer for why the concurrent-use bar in § 3322(a) applies to Rudisill, but the coordination provision in § 3322(d) does not. Both provi- sions cover veterans who qualify for both sets of benefts, yet the majority applies one but not the other to Rudisill. More fundamentally, the Court agrees that some election must be made. See ante, at 310. Rather than leave Rudi- sill to make some uncodifed election to switch to Post-9/11 benefts, I would apply the election mechanism that Congress created to cover his circumstance. The majority's remaining arguments are simply critiques of Congress's policy judgments. The Court calls the Gov- ernment's reading of the statute's election mechanism “non- sensical” because it requires a veteran to exhaust or forfeit his Montgomery benefts before switching to Post-9/11 bene- fts. Ante, at 313. But, in reality, the election mechanism offers a veteran in Rudisill's circumstance two paths. He may use 48 months of benefts by frst using all 36 months of his Montgomery benefts, followed by 12 months of Post-9/11 benefts.3 Or, he could use 36 months of benefts, with his choice of when to switch from Montgomery to Post-9/11 ben- efts. It is not “remarkable” for Congress to “include a rule allowing individuals to make a wholly voluntary election to receive a more generous beneft earlier, at a cost.” BO v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 321, 352 (Ct. App. Vet. Cl. 2019) (Bart- ley, J., dissenting). In any event, the wisdom of this limitation is not up to this Court. It was for Congress to decide what Post-9/11 bene- fts a veteran should receive retroactively. As Rudisill ac- knowledges, the Post-9/11 program is “far more generous” and, accordingly, costs much more than the Montgomery pro-

3 This option arises because once a veteran has used all his Montgomery benefts, he is no longer entitled to multiple sets of benefts, rendering the coordination provision and election mechanism inapplicable. Both of those provisions apply only to a veteran entitled to more than one set of benefts. See §§ 3322(d), 3327(a). Cite as: 601 U. S. 294 (2024) 329

gram. Brief for Petitioner 15. Perhaps the limitation on entitlement refects a measure to manage this growing cost, given that “[p]assing a law often requires compromise.” NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 306 (2017). Or, perhaps not. Either way, the limitation is what Congress enacted—whether the majority agrees with its fairness or not—and the text that Congress enacted must dictate the result in this case. Moving even further away from the text, the majority hints that the veteran's canon could apply if the statute were ambiguous. Ante, at 314. The veteran's canon directs that “interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran's favor.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994). Yet, as the majority recognizes, this canon cannot apply when the statu- tory text is plain, so it has no role to play here. More impor- tantly, substantive canons such as the veteran's canon rest on uncertain foundations. See Arizona v. Navajo Nation, 599 U. S. 555, 572 (2023) (Thomas, J., concurring). I share Justice Kavanaugh's concern that the veteran's canon “ap- pears to have developed almost by accident,” and no explana- tion has been provided for its foundation. Ante, at 316 (con- curring opinion). I question whether this purported canon should ever have a role in our interpretation. IV The Court holds that, although Rudisill must make some election to switch from his Montgomery to Post-9/11 benefts, the statute's corresponding limits do not apply because it would reduce the amount of available benefts. In my view, the Court ignores the statutory mechanism that Congress created in favor of an interpretation that reaches a desired outcome. I respectfully dissent. Reporter’s Note

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made:

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