1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BLAKE R., Case No.: 3:20-cv-1759-AHG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER:
13 v. (1) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 14 ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, and Social Security, 15 (2) DENYING WITHOUT Defendant. 16 PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN 17 FORMA PAUPERIS 18 [ECF No. 2] 19 20 Plaintiff Blake R. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against the Commissioner of Social 21 Security, Andrew Saul, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final administrative 22 decision denying his application for Social Security Supplemental Security Income 23 Disability Benefits for lack of disability. ECF No. 1. Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff 24 also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 25 ECF No. 2. After due consideration and for the reasons set forth below, the Court 26 DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend, if amended within 28 days of the 27 date of this Order, and DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP without 28 prejudice. 1 I. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A motion to proceed IFP presents two issues for the Court’s consideration. First, a 3 complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to a 4 mandatory and sua sponte review by the Court. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th 5 Cir. 2000). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to evaluate whether an applicant’s 6 complaint sufficiently states a claim upon which relief may be granted. See id. (“1915(e) 7 not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that 8 fails to state a claim.”). Second, the Court must determine whether an applicant properly 9 shows an inability to pay the $400 civil filing fee required by this Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 10 1914(a), 1915(a). To that end, an applicant must also provide the Court with a signed 11 affidavit “that includes a statement of all assets[,] which shows inability to pay initial fees 12 or give security.” CivLR 3.2(a). 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 As discussed above, every complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 15 U.S.C. § 1915 is subject to a mandatory screening by the Court under Section 16 1915(e)(2)(B). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. Under that subprovision, the Court must dismiss 17 complaints that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be 18 granted, or seek monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 19 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Social Security appeals are not exempt from this screening 20 requirement. See Hoagland v. Astrue, No. 12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *1 21 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (“Screening is required even if the plaintiff pursues an appeal of 22 right, such as an appeal of the Commissioner's denial of social security disability benefits 23 [under 42 U.S.C. 405(g)].”); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 24 (affirming that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners”); 25 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129. 26 Rule 8 sets forth the federal pleading standard used to determine whether a complaint 27 states a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see also Ashcroft v. 28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (“[A] complaint must contain a “short and plain 1 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Bell Atlantic Corp. 2 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (noting that “detailed factual allegations” are not 3 required, but a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 4 recitation of the elements of a cause of action” to justify relief). A proper pleading “does 5 not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the- 6 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions 7 . . . will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further 8 factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations and quotations omitted) 9 (referring to FED. R. CIV. P. 8). When a plaintiff fails to provide “enough facts to state a 10 claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” the Court must either dismiss a portion, or the 11 entirety of the complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547; Hoagland, 2012 WL 2521753, at *1. 12 For example, in social security cases, “[t]he plaintiff must provide a statement 13 identifying the basis of the plaintiff's disagreement with the ALJ’s determination and must 14 make a showing that he is entitled to relief, ‘in sufficient detail such that the Court can 15 understand the legal and/or factual issues in dispute so that it can meaningfully screen the 16 complaint pursuant to § 1915(e).’” Jaime B. v. Saul, No. 19cv2431-JLB, 2020 WL 17 1169671, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2020) (quoting Graves v. Colvin, No. 15cv106-RFB- 18 NJK, 2015 WL 357121, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2015)). “Every plaintiff appealing an 19 adverse decision of the Commissioner believes that the Commissioner was wrong. The 20 purpose of the complaint is to briefly and plainly allege facts supporting the legal 21 conclusion that the Commissioner’s decision was wrong.” Hoagland, 2012 WL 2521753, 22 at *2 (dismissing conclusory complaint in IFP screening process for failure to state a 23 plausible claim for relief due to insufficient factual allegations). 24 Here, Plaintiff contends that a reversal of Defendant’s decision is warranted because 25 (1) “[t]here is no substantial medical or vocational evidence in the record to support the 26 legal conclusion of plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act;” (2) “[t]here is 27 no substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s finding that plaintiff 28 could perform any substantial gainful activity;” (3) “[t]he evidence in the record supports 1 only the finding that plaintiff is disabled and has been continuously disabled[;]” and (4) 2 “[n]ew and material evidence for which good cause exists for failure to submit earlier exists 3 and warrants a remand of this matter for further proceedings.” ECF No. 1 at 2–3. However, 4 Plaintiff does not explain what this new evidence is, how the evidence is material or relates 5 to the period of disability, or how the new evidence has a reasonable probability of 6 changing the outcome of the Commissioner’s decision. Plaintiff also does not explain how 7 the conclusions and findings of fact of the Defendant are not supported by substantial 8 evidence or how these conclusions and findings are contrary to law and regulation. These 9 boilerplate allegations are precisely the type of conclusory statements that fail to satisfy the 10 federal pleading standard.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BLAKE R., Case No.: 3:20-cv-1759-AHG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER:
13 v. (1) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 14 ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, and Social Security, 15 (2) DENYING WITHOUT Defendant. 16 PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN 17 FORMA PAUPERIS 18 [ECF No. 2] 19 20 Plaintiff Blake R. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against the Commissioner of Social 21 Security, Andrew Saul, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final administrative 22 decision denying his application for Social Security Supplemental Security Income 23 Disability Benefits for lack of disability. ECF No. 1. Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff 24 also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 25 ECF No. 2. After due consideration and for the reasons set forth below, the Court 26 DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend, if amended within 28 days of the 27 date of this Order, and DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP without 28 prejudice. 1 I. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A motion to proceed IFP presents two issues for the Court’s consideration. First, a 3 complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to a 4 mandatory and sua sponte review by the Court. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th 5 Cir. 2000). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to evaluate whether an applicant’s 6 complaint sufficiently states a claim upon which relief may be granted. See id. (“1915(e) 7 not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that 8 fails to state a claim.”). Second, the Court must determine whether an applicant properly 9 shows an inability to pay the $400 civil filing fee required by this Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 10 1914(a), 1915(a). To that end, an applicant must also provide the Court with a signed 11 affidavit “that includes a statement of all assets[,] which shows inability to pay initial fees 12 or give security.” CivLR 3.2(a). 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 As discussed above, every complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 15 U.S.C. § 1915 is subject to a mandatory screening by the Court under Section 16 1915(e)(2)(B). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. Under that subprovision, the Court must dismiss 17 complaints that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be 18 granted, or seek monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 19 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Social Security appeals are not exempt from this screening 20 requirement. See Hoagland v. Astrue, No. 12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *1 21 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (“Screening is required even if the plaintiff pursues an appeal of 22 right, such as an appeal of the Commissioner's denial of social security disability benefits 23 [under 42 U.S.C. 405(g)].”); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 24 (affirming that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners”); 25 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129. 26 Rule 8 sets forth the federal pleading standard used to determine whether a complaint 27 states a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see also Ashcroft v. 28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (“[A] complaint must contain a “short and plain 1 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Bell Atlantic Corp. 2 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (noting that “detailed factual allegations” are not 3 required, but a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 4 recitation of the elements of a cause of action” to justify relief). A proper pleading “does 5 not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the- 6 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions 7 . . . will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further 8 factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations and quotations omitted) 9 (referring to FED. R. CIV. P. 8). When a plaintiff fails to provide “enough facts to state a 10 claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” the Court must either dismiss a portion, or the 11 entirety of the complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547; Hoagland, 2012 WL 2521753, at *1. 12 For example, in social security cases, “[t]he plaintiff must provide a statement 13 identifying the basis of the plaintiff's disagreement with the ALJ’s determination and must 14 make a showing that he is entitled to relief, ‘in sufficient detail such that the Court can 15 understand the legal and/or factual issues in dispute so that it can meaningfully screen the 16 complaint pursuant to § 1915(e).’” Jaime B. v. Saul, No. 19cv2431-JLB, 2020 WL 17 1169671, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2020) (quoting Graves v. Colvin, No. 15cv106-RFB- 18 NJK, 2015 WL 357121, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2015)). “Every plaintiff appealing an 19 adverse decision of the Commissioner believes that the Commissioner was wrong. The 20 purpose of the complaint is to briefly and plainly allege facts supporting the legal 21 conclusion that the Commissioner’s decision was wrong.” Hoagland, 2012 WL 2521753, 22 at *2 (dismissing conclusory complaint in IFP screening process for failure to state a 23 plausible claim for relief due to insufficient factual allegations). 24 Here, Plaintiff contends that a reversal of Defendant’s decision is warranted because 25 (1) “[t]here is no substantial medical or vocational evidence in the record to support the 26 legal conclusion of plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act;” (2) “[t]here is 27 no substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s finding that plaintiff 28 could perform any substantial gainful activity;” (3) “[t]he evidence in the record supports 1 only the finding that plaintiff is disabled and has been continuously disabled[;]” and (4) 2 “[n]ew and material evidence for which good cause exists for failure to submit earlier exists 3 and warrants a remand of this matter for further proceedings.” ECF No. 1 at 2–3. However, 4 Plaintiff does not explain what this new evidence is, how the evidence is material or relates 5 to the period of disability, or how the new evidence has a reasonable probability of 6 changing the outcome of the Commissioner’s decision. Plaintiff also does not explain how 7 the conclusions and findings of fact of the Defendant are not supported by substantial 8 evidence or how these conclusions and findings are contrary to law and regulation. These 9 boilerplate allegations are precisely the type of conclusory statements that fail to satisfy the 10 federal pleading standard. Graves, 2015 WL 357121, at *2 (“a social security complaint 11 that merely parrots the standards used in reversing or remanding a case is not sufficient to 12 withstand a screening pursuant to Section 1915(e)”); see, e.g., Jaime B., 2020 WL 13 1169671, at *2 (dismissing complaint pursuant to IFP screening because the plaintiff made 14 boilerplate allegations that a reversal or remand was warranted because “the denial of 15 [Plaintiff’s] disability claim is not supported by substantial evidence under the standards 16 set forth by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) . . .”); Graves, 2015 WL 357121, at *2 (dismissing 17 complaint pursuant to IFP screening because “Plaintiff alleges merely that the 18 Commissioner’s decision to deny her benefits was wrong without any indication as to why 19 it was wrong other than a recitation of the general standards that govern this Court’s review 20 of that decision”); Harris v. Colvin, No. CV-14-0383-GW-RNB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21 36246, at *10–*11 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2014) (dismissing complaint pursuant to IFP 22 screening because “plaintiff has failed to specify in ¶ 8 of the Complaint the respects in 23 which he contends that the ALJ’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence and/or 24 that the proper legal standards were not applied”) (emphasis added). 25 Because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim, the Court DISMISSES 26 Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). However, Plaintiff shall have 28 days 27 to file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies discussed herein. 28 / / 1 || 01. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons state above, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's complaint with leave 3 amend. Plaintiff must file his first amended complaint by October 16, 2020. 4 Since it has dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, the Court DENIES as moot □□□□□□□□□□□ 5 ||motion to proceed IFP, without prejudice. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he 6 || must also refile his request to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) at that time. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: September 18, 2020 10 _Abiomt. Xl Honorable Allison H. Goddard 11 United States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28