Rubio v. City of Visalia

District Court, E.D. California·Decided November 3, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-00286·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMUNDO VICENTE RUBIO, Case No. 1:21-cv-00286-DAD-SAB

Plaintiff, ORDER ENTERING STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER v. (ECF No. 25) CITY OF VISALIA, et al., Defendants. 1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Disclosure and discovery activity in this action are likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting or defending this litigation would be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter this Stipulated Protective Order. The Parties acknowledge that this Stipulated Protective Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords extends only to the specified information or items that are entitled, under the applicable legal principles, to treatment as confidential. The Parties further acknowledge, as set forth below, that this Stipulated Protective Order creates no entitlement to file confidential information under seal, except to the extent specified herein; Eastern District Local Rules 141, 141.1 and 251 set forth the procedures that must be followed and reflects the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. Nothing in this Stipulated Protective Order shall be construed so as to require or mandate that a Party disclose or produce privileged information or records that could be designated as Confidential Documents/Protected Material hereunder. 2. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for the following reasons: First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure of California Law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Department, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 WL 394200, *2-3, 5 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while [f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613, n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of Non-Party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberations/decision- making or evaluation analysis, or communications for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis, potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d 15 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-105 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D., at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D.D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D.Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial measures that may be required. Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled statements. (See generally, Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 40 Cal.3d 822, 838-830.) Accordingly, although Plaintiff disputes the extent to which the foregoing categories of documents should remain confidential during discovery, the parties hereby otherwise agree, that to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. The parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized need for protection as to any medical or psychotherapeutic records, because of the privacy interests at stake. Because of these sensitive interests, a court order should address these documents rather than a private agreement between the parties. 3. DEFINITIONS 3.1. Party: Any party to this action, including all of its officers, directors, employees, agents, consultants, retained experts, house counsel and outside counsel (and/or the support staff thereof). 3.2. Challenging Party: A Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of information or items under this Order. 3.3. Non-Party: Any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity not named as a Party to this action. 3.4. Disclosure or Discovery Material: All items or information, regardless of the medium or manner generated, stored or maintained (including, among other things, testimony, transcripts, or tangible things) that are produced – or generated in disclosures or responses to discovery – by any Party in this matter. 3.5. “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: Information (regardless of the medium or how generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and/or applicable federal privileges. This material includes, but is not limited to, medical and psychotherapeutic records; as w

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