Rubenstein v. Cruikshanks

19 N.W. 954, 54 Mich. 199, 1884 Mich. LEXIS 543
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJune 18, 1884
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 19 N.W. 954 (Rubenstein v. Cruikshanks) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rubenstein v. Cruikshanks, 19 N.W. 954, 54 Mich. 199, 1884 Mich. LEXIS 543 (Mich. 1884).

Opinion

Sherwood, J.

The defendant was proprietor of a hotel at Crystal Balls, in the county of Marquette. On the 15th day of July, 1883, the plaintiff, who was a stranger in the place and engaged in peddling, accompanied by an employee, became a guest of the defendant’s, and remained at his hotel until the following Monday forenoon. On entering the hotel the defendant took charge of his baggage and goods and assigned plaintiff a room for the night, which he and his employee occupied. They each had a valise and small box which contained their baggage and goods to the amount of over $300. On Monday the plaintiff’s valise and goods, while they were thus in the hotel, were stolen, and the plaintiff brought this suit against the defendant as innkeeper, to recover the value of the property lost, and obtained a judgment therefor.

[201]*201On the trial the plaintiff’s testimony was to the effect that the plaintiff, at the time the goods were stolen, was stopping at the hotel as a guest; that his valise and goods were deposited in the usual place in the bar-room where baggage and the goo.ds of guests were kept, in the care of the defendant; and while there in his care the goods were taken. On the contrary of this, the defendant testified that on Monday morning he placed the goods and valise of the plaintiff, which were lost, on a table in the care of the plaintiff.

The testimony in the case was brief, and no exceptions were taken upon the trial other than those to the charge and the refusals to charge.

That the plaintiff was the guest of the defendant, and remained at his hotel' the length of time claimed, does not seem to have been contested. The question as to who had the custody of the goods at the time they were stolen was submitted to the jury, who were told by the court that, if the plaintiff had charge of them, he could not recover, and their general verdict determined that question in the plaintiff’s favor.

It appeared from the testimony that while the plaintiff was at the hotel he drank liquor freely at the bar, and became somewhat intoxicated, and counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge the jury that they could take that fact in consideration in determining the negligence of the plaintiff at the time the goods were lost, and the court charged this would make no difference if the goods had been placed .in charge of the defendant, and the fact that the plaintiff got intoxicated at the bar of the landlord should, if anything, cause him to be held to a stricter liability. We see no error in this charge.

It was further claimed by defendant’s counsel that it was the duty of the.plaintiff in this case to notify the defendant of the valuable character of the-goods contained in the valise and box when he became defendant’s guest. We do not think the record discloses a case making such notification necessary, although the rule, in a proper case for its applica[202]*202tion, we recognize. We think the charge of the court upon this subject was correct.

At the close of the evidence counsel for the defendant presented eight special requests to the court to charge.1 We have examined them all carefully, and are satisfied that the charge of the court covers all the questions of law therein [203]*203raised sufficiently, necessary to enable the jury to properly dispose of the facts in the case. The charge given is as follows :

Gentlemen of the jury: The plaintiff claims that he went to the hotel of the defendant on a certain day, and took with him as baggage a pack and valise containing goods, he being a peddler; that he went there as a guest of the defendant; that his goods were some of them lost while he was there as his guest, and therefore the defendant is liable to pay for them.
The liability of an innkeeper, gentlemen, is this: "Whenever a guest goes to an inn or hotel, and becomes a guest of the hotel, and leaves his property with the hotel-keeper, the hotel-keeper is responsible for the baggage or goods so deposited. It is not necessary that anything should be said between the guest and the landlord as to the liability. It is not necessary that the guest should say to him, You take these goods of mine and keep them.’ If he'goes into the office of the hotel, and deposits his goods there, — liis valise, or whatever he has accompanying him as a guest, and deposits it there, in the presence of the- landlord, in the office, in the customary place where things were ordinarily deposited, so that the landlord sees it, and there receives him as liis guest, the landlord’s liability is then fixed for these goods, and it is then his duty to take care of them. If he seeks to escape liability in case they are lost, then the burden, of proof is upon him. Mere proof that the goods are lost — mere proof even that they are stolen, without showing by whom — would not release the innkeeper from liability. Although they were stolen from his office, from the place where the guest had left them, without any negligence on the part of the guest, the innkeeper in that ease would be liable. In other words, the burden of proof is entirely upon him. So, gentlemen, if you find in this ease that the plaintiff went to the hotel of the defendant, it being admitted that he was an innkeeper; that he wenttliere as his guest; that he deposited the goods which he had with him with the landlord, the defendant in the case, or in his presence, in the office of the hotel, in the customary place where such things were deposited, and the goods were lost. — I charge you that the defendant would be liable for the goods so lost, unless there was some contributory negligence, or some other agreement on the part of the plaintiff.
Now, then, if the plaintiff and the defendant ihade an arrangement by which the plaintiff, Mr. Nubenstein, was to [204]*204take care of his own goods, that, then, would release the defendant in the case. If he gave the landlord to understand, by his acts or by his words, that he would take care of his own goods and relieve the landlord, the defendant in the ease, from liability on that account, why, of course, he could not recover, because he would then be guilty of contributory negligence, and would have assumed to take care of his own goods. That, gentlemen, is about all there is of this case, so far as the liability is concerned. If he was received there as a guest, and the defendant, under the instructions I have given you, assumed control of his goods and of him, then he is liable, unless, under the charge I have given you, you find that the plaintiff in the case made some other agreement, or an agreement to take care of his own goods, or gave the defendant in the case to understand that he would take care of his own goods. If he did not do that, then the defendant is liable. The defendant in the case claims that there were valuable goods in the plaintiff’s valise, and therefore he should have notified the defendant of that fact. It is true, gentlemen, that under certain circumstances a person may have such valuable goods in his possession that he should notify the landlord to take care of them; notify him what they were. But this would not apply to a case where a peddler went to a hotel with his pack and his valise which he used in traveling, provided he had with him the ordinary things that such a man carries for the purpose of carrying on his trade.

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Bluebook (online)
19 N.W. 954, 54 Mich. 199, 1884 Mich. LEXIS 543, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rubenstein-v-cruikshanks-mich-1884.