Ruben Sanchez and Liliana Sanchez v. Fay Servicing LLC, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 RUBEN SANCHEZ and Case No.: 25-CV-3589 JLS (MMP) LILIANA SANCHEZ, 12 ORDER: Plaintiffs, 13 v. (1) GRANTING APPLICATIONS TO 14 PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT FAY SERVICING LLC, et al., 15 WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR Defendants. COSTS, 16

17 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, 18

19 (3) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR 20 MANDATORY AND PROHIBITORY 21 INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PREVENT WASTE, DESTRUCTION, 22 AND MOOTNESS, AND 23 (4) DENYING AS MOOT 24 PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY 25 MOTION TO EXEDITE RULING ON APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 26 FORMA PAUPERIS AND ISSUANCE

28 1 (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 2 3 Presently before the Court are pro se Plaintiffs Ruben Sanchez’s and Liliana 4 Sanchez’s Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1), Liliana Sanchez’s Application to Proceed in 5 District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“Liliana IFP Appl.,” ECF No. 2), Ruben 6 Sanchez’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs 7 (“Ruben IFP Appl.,” ECF No. 3), Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Mandatory and 8 Prohibitory Injunctive Relief (“TRO Mot.,” ECF No. 4), and Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion 9 to Expedite on Ruling on Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and Issuance of 10 Summons (“Mot. to Expedite,” ECF No. 5). Having carefully considered Plaintiffs’ 11 Complaint and the law, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ IFP Applications, DISMISSES 12 Plaintiffs’ Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ 13 TRO Motion, and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ Motion to Expedite. 15 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 16 United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1 17 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee 18 only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1915(a)(1). 20 Section 1915(a)(1) provides: 21 [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the 22 commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor, 23 by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of 24 all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. 25

26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 28 Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 1 As § 1915(a)(1) does not itself define what constitutes insufficient assets to warrant 2 IFP status, the determination of indigency falls within the district court’s discretion. See 3 Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Section 1915 typically 4 requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the 5 affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”), reversed on other grounds 6 by, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where 7 it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” 8 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont 9 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). “One need not be absolutely destitute to 10 obtain benefits of the [IFP] statute.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 11 1960). “Nevertheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some 12 particularity, definiteness[,] and certainty.’” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234 (quoting United 13 States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir.1981)). 14 In Plaintiff Liliana Sanchez’s IFP Application, she states that her monthly income is 15 $2,000.00. Liliana IFP Appl. at 1. Plaintiff is an IHSS care giver, has savings of $1,800, 16 and has monthly expenses totaling $619.00. Id. at 2–5. In Plaintiff Ruben Sanchez’s IFP 17 Application, he states that his monthly income is $1,200.00. Ruben IFP Appl. at 1. 18 Plaintiff is self-employed, has savings of $1,200, and has monthly expenses totaling 19 $359.00. Id. at 2–5. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated 20 that paying the $405 filing fee would result in their inability to afford the necessities of life. 21 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ IFP Applications. 22 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 23 I. Legal Standard 24 Because Plaintiffs seek to proceed IFP, their Complaint requires a pre-answer 25 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See, e.g., Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 26 845 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are 27 not limited to prisoners”); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 28 banc) overruled, in part on other grounds by, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 1 2014) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] 2 complaint that fails to state a claim.”). Under this statute, the Court sua sponte must 3 dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, 4 or seeks damages from immune defendants. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27. “The 5 purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not 6 bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 7 2014) (citations omitted). 8 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 9 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 10 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 11 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain 12 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 13 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff 15 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 16 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility requires pleading facts 17 supporting a claim for relief, as opposed to conclusory allegations or the “formulaic 18 recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The “mere 19 possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me 20 accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; 21 see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 22 Independently, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires pleadings to state “a short 23 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Id. at 25 8(d)(1). Rule 8 “applies to good claims as well as bad, and is a basis for dismissal 26 independent of Rule 12(b)(6).” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). A 27 complaint which is “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant” 28 does not meet Rule 8’s requirement of simplicity, directness, and clarity. Id. at 1177–78. 1 Further, courts have a duty to construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally. See 2 Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). A district court 3 should grant leave to amend if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the 4 defect.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 5 Breier v. N. Cal. Bowling Proprietors’ Ass’n, 316 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1963)). 6 II. Discussion 7 Plaintiffs appear to bring claims for: (1) procedural discrimination; (2) fraud and 8 concealment; (3) discrimination wrongful foreclosure; (4) wrongful foreclosure practice; 9 (5) FHA & ECOA retaliation; (6) conspiracy and joint enterprise; (7) aiding and abating 10 lawyers title and fidelity; (8) title companies and quite title; (9) violation of due process; 11 (10) violation of bankruptcy stay; (11) declaratory and injunctive relief; and (12) non-core. 12 Compl. at 1. Yet, the Complaint’s “Statement of Claim” section is left completely blank, 13 providing no context as to the facts of this dispute or the nature of the claims. See Compl. 14 at 3–4. Further, Plaintiffs provide no clarity as to which of the several Defendants are the 15 subject of which specific claims and why. See generally id. 16 Plaintiffs’ allegations lack the requisite clarity to provide Defendants “fair notice of 17 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 18 (quotation and alteration omitted); see also McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178 (explaining that a 19 complaint lacking “simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom [a plaintiff is] suing for 20 what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a complaint”). As the Complaint 21 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must sua sponte dismiss 22 it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court therefore DISMISSES AS MOOT 23 Plaintiffs’ TRO Motion and Motion to Expedite. 24 However, as the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims are not fully comprehensible by the 25 Court at this time, the Court cannot rule out the possibility that Plaintiffs can plausibly 26 allege facts addressing the deficiencies described in this Order. Thus, the Court will grant 27 Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. 28 / / / 2 In light of the above, the Court: 3 1. GRANTS Plaintiffs’ IFP Applications (ECF Nos. 2, 3). 4 2. DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF No. 1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE 5 || for its failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 6 || 1915(e)(2). Given Plaintiffs’ pro se status, the dismissal is WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 7 Plaintiffs thus have forty-five (45) days’ leave from the date of this Order to file an 8 |}amended complaint curing the pleading deficiencies noted above. Plaintiffs are advised 9 || that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 10 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Any amended complaint must be complete in and of 11 |/itself without reference to Plaintiffs’ original Complaint; claims not realleged in the 12 ||amended complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Lacey, 693 F.3d 13 928 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend that are not realleged in an 14 ||amended pleading may be “considered waived”). If Plaintiffs fail to amend within the 15 || time provided, the Court will enter a final order dismissing this civil action. See Lira v. 16 || Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of 17 ||the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the 18 || complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 19 3. DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Mandatory and 20 || Prohibitory Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 4). 21 4. DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Expedite on Ruling on 22 || Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and Issuance of Summons (ECF No. 5). 24 || Dated: March 26, 2026 : tt □ 25 pen Janis L. Sammartino 6 United States District Judge 27 28

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