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<P><SPAN STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><CENTER></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG>NUMBER 13-05-073-CV</CENTER>
</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG><CENTER></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG>COURT OF APPEALS</CENTER>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG><CENTER>THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS</CENTER>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG><CENTER>CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG </STRONG></SPAN></CENTER>
</P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><STRONG> </STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><STRONG></STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><STRONG>RUBEN LUNA, III AND</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><STRONG>JORGE LUIS HERNANDEZ, Appellants,</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><STRONG><CENTER>v.</CENTER>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><STRONG>ULTIMATE INVESTMENTS, INC., Appellee.</STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman"><STRONG>
</STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><CENTER><STRONG>On appeal from the 206th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.</STRONG></CENTER>
</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><STRONG> </STRONG></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 14pt"><STRONG><CENTER>MEMORANDUM OPINION</STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><STRONG></CENTER>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><CENTER><STRONG>Before Justices Hinojosa, Yañez, and Rodriguez</CENTER>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><STRONG><CENTER>Memorandum Opinion by Justice Yañez</STRONG></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"></CENTER>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"> </SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"> The sole issue in this appeal is whether Ruben Luna III and Jorge Luis Hernandez's
negligence claim against appellee, Ultimate Investments, Inc., is barred by the statute of
limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment for appellee. Appellants, Luna and
Hernandez, contend that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary
judgment. We affirm the trial court's judgment.</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"> On August 4, 2000, appellants were shot and injured while working as security
personnel ("bouncers") at Club Liquid in McAllen, Texas. On August 2, 2002, appellants
sued Liquid, Inc. d/b/a Club Liquid ("Liquid") and Ricardo Roux ("Roux") for negligence.<A HREF="#N_1_"><SUP> (1)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: '">
On May 13, 2004, Liquid and Roux filed a third-party petition against Hotties Grill & Bar,
Inc. d/b/a Kooly's ("Hotties"), asserting they were entitled to contribution and indemnity.<A HREF="#N_2_"><SUP> (2)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: ">
Appellants later amended their petition and asserted claims against Hotties; Hotties was
ultimately served with appellants' amended petition on June 19, 2004. Hotties then in turn
filed a third party petition against appellee on August 16, 2004.<A HREF="#N_3_"><SUP> (3)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"> Shortly thereafter, on
September 3, 2004, appellants amended their pleadings to include appellee as a
defendant. Appellee moved for summary judgment on the sole ground that appellants'
negligence claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations.<A HREF="#N_4_"><SUP> (4)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> The trial court granted
summary judgment for appellee. This appeal followed.</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> The standards for reviewing a traditional summary judgment are well established.<A HREF="#N_5_"><SUP> (5)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: ">
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.<A HREF="#N_6_"><SUP> (6)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> When a
defendant moves for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense, such as the
statute of limitations, the defendant bears the burden of proving each essential element
of that defense.<A HREF="#N_7_"><SUP> (7)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> Once the defendant establishes its right to summary judgment as a
matter of law, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a genuine issue
of material fact, thereby precluding summary judgment.<A HREF="#N_8_"><SUP> (8)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> A nonmovant need not answer
or respond to a motion for summary judgment to contend on appeal that the grounds
expressly presented by the movant's motion are insufficient as a matter of law to support
summary judgment. However, the nonmovant may not raise any other issues as grounds
for reversal.<A HREF="#N_9_"><SUP> (9)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> Appellee filed its motion for summary judgment, contending appellants' claim was
barred by the two-year statute of limitations because it was filed more than four years after
the day the cause of action accrued.<A HREF="#N_10_"><SUP> (10)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> The pleadings on file establish appellee's
contention. Therefore, appellants, as the nonmovants, were required to come forward with
evidence to raise a fact issue as to whether the statute of limitations should apply.<A HREF="#N_11_"><SUP> (11)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> In their response to appellee's motion for summary judgment, appellants argued that
suit was timely filed in accordance with section 33.004(e) of the civil practice and remedies
code.<A HREF="#N_12_"><SUP> (12)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> Section 33.004(e) provides: "A claimant may join a responsible third party, even
though such joinder would otherwise be barred by limitations, if the claimant seeks to join
the responsible third party not later than 60 days after a third party claim is filed under
Subsection (d)."<A HREF="#N_13_"><SUP> (13)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> Appellants asserted that their claim was timely under this section
because they added appellee as a defendant within sixty days of Hotties' third party claim
against appellee.</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> Appellee replied to appellants' response, asserting that section 33.004(e) could only
apply if appellants complied with subsection (d). The basis for this argument is that
subsection (e) specifies that a claimant may join a responsible third party if "a third party
claim is filed under Subsection (d)."<A HREF="#N_14_"><SUP> (14)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> Section 33.004(d) provides: "A third party claim by
a defendant under this section may be filed, even though the claimant's action against the
responsible third party would be barred by limitations, if the third party claim is filed on or
before 30 days after the date the defendant's answer is required to be filed."<A HREF="#N_15_"><SUP> (15)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: "> Appellee
proved that a third party claim was not "filed on or before 30 days" after Hotties' answer
was required to be filed.<A HREF="#N_16_"><SUP> (16)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: '"> Accordingly, because subsection (d) was not properly complied
with, appellee contends that no third party claim has been "filed under Subsection (d)" as
required by subsection (e).<A HREF="#N_17_"><SUP> (17)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: " STYLE="font-size: 10pt"> Appellants assert, however, that appellee's 33.004(d)
argument raises the issue of improper joinder, not limitations. Therefore, because
summary judgment was granted solely on the basis of limitations, the only issue that
should be considered is whether appellants complied with section 33.004(e). We disagree
with this contention.</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: " STYLE="font-size: 10pt"> Though subsection (d) concerns joinder, it warrants consideration on the limitations
question before us. Appellants requested the trial court to consider section 33.004(e) as
a defense to the running of the two-year statute of limitations; subsection (e) in turn
directed the court to further examine the rules laid out in subsection (d) to fully determine
if appellants had a viable defense. Accordingly, the trial court was free to consider section
33.004(d) in deciding whether the statute of limitations had run on appellants' claim against
appellee.<A HREF="#N_18_"><SUP> (18)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: -" STYLE="font-size: 10pt"></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: " STYLE="font-size: 10pt"> Appellants further contend, however, that if consideration is given to section
33.004(d), it must be read together with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 38(a), which
discusses when a defendant may bring in a third party.<A HREF="#N_19_"><SUP> (19)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: " STYLE="font-size: 10pt"> Rule 38(a) states:</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: " STYLE="font-size: 10pt"> At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a citation and petition to be served upon a person
not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him or to the plaintiff for
all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. The third-party plaintiff need not
obtain leave to make the service if he files the third-party petition not later
than thirty (30) days after he serves his original answer. Otherwise, he must
obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties to the action.<A HREF="#N_20_"><SUP> (20)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: " STYLE="font-size: 10pt"></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 10pt">Appellants assert that rule 38(a) allows a defendant to join a responsible third party under
section 33.004(d), despite not having done so within thirty days after the day the
defendant's answer was due.</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: " STYLE="font-size: 10pt"> We believe that rule 38(a) is inapplicable to section 33.004. Section 33.004(b)
states that "[n]othing in this section shall affect the third-party practice as previously
recognized in the rules and statutes of this state with regard to the assertion by a
defendant of rights to contribution or indemnity."<A HREF="#N_21_"><SUP> (21)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: " STYLE="font-size: 10pt"> Section 33.004(b) thus "makes clear
that the procedures outlined in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 38 for the joinder of third
party defendants are neither added to nor diminished by section 33.004's requirements for
the joinder of responsible third parties."<A HREF="#N_22_"><SUP> (22)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: " STYLE="font-size: 10pt"> Furthermore, even if we were to assume that rule
38(a) is applicable, the rule would have required Hotties to obtain leave on motion prior to
filing its third party petition against appellee because more than thirty days had transpired
from the day Hotties served its original answer;<A HREF="#N_23_"><SUP> (23)</SUP></A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: " STYLE="font-size: 10pt"> the record reveals, however, that Hotties
did not ask for leave of court. We overrule appellants' point of error.</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: " STYLE="font-size: 10pt"> Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.</SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Times New Roman" STYLE="font-size: 10pt"></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Univers Regular" STYLE="font-size: 10pt"></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Univers Regular" STYLE="font-size: 10pt"> <SPAN STYLE="text-decoration: underline"> </SPAN> </SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 10pt">LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ,</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 10pt"> Justice</SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 10pt">Memorandum opinion delivered and filed </SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 10pt">this the 7th day of December, 2006.</SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Univers Regular" STYLE="font-size: 10pt">
<P><A NAME="N_1_">1. </A>In their original petition, appellants asserted that Ricardo Roux was the sole shareholder of Liquid,
Inc. and requested the trial court to disregard the corporate fiction of Liquid, Inc. and hold Roux jointly and
severally liable for appellants' damages.
<P><A NAME="N_2_">2. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial">Liquid and Roux assert that immediately prior to the shooting, Hotties served the shooter alcohol to
the point where he presented a danger to himself and to others.
<P><A NAME="N_3_">3. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial">Appellee, Ultimate Investments, is the owner of the premises upon which the shooting occurred.
<P><A NAME="N_4_">4. </A>Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 16.003(a) (Vernon 1998).
<P><A NAME="N_5_">5. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><EM>See </EM>Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); <EM>Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co.</EM>, 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).
<P><A NAME="N_6_">6. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial">Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); <EM>Nixon</EM>, 690 S.W.2d at 548.
<P><A NAME="N_7_">7. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><EM>See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth.</EM>, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979); <EM>Swilley v.
Hughes</EM>, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. 1972).
<P><A NAME="N_8_">8. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><EM>City of Houston</EM>, 589 S.W.2d at 678.
<P><A NAME="N_9_">9. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><EM>See City of Houston</EM>, 589 S.W.2d at 678.
<P><A NAME="N_10_">10. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial">Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 16.003(a) (Vernon 1998).
<P><A NAME="N_11_">11. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><EM>See City of Houston</EM>, 589 S.W.2d at 678.
<P><A NAME="N_12_">12. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial">Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 33.004 (Vernon 1997). The present case was filed before the
effective date of the most recent amendments to section 33.004. The version of Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code in effect at the time appellants initially filed suit is found in the prior version of
the statute. <EM>See </EM>Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 136, 1, secs. 33.001-33.017, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws
971, 972-75 (amended 2003) (current version at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 33.001-33.017 (Vernon
1997 & Supp. 2006)). All references to Chapter 33 in this opinion are to the prior version of the Act.
<P><A NAME="N_13_">13. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial">Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 33.004(e) (Vernon 1997).
<P><A NAME="N_14_">14. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><EM>Id.</EM>
<P><A NAME="N_15_">15. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial">Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 33.004(d) (Vernon 1997).
<P><A NAME="N_16_">16. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial"><EM>Id.</EM> Hotties was first served with appellants' petition on June 19, 2004. Hotties' answer was due on
July 12, 2004. Tex. R. Civ. P. 99(b). The deadline for Hotties to file a third party action under section
33.004(d) of the civil partice and remedies code was August 12, 2004. Hotties' third party petition against
appellee was made on August 16, 2004.
<P><A NAME="N_17_">17. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 11pt">Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 33.004(e) (Vernon 1997).
<P><A NAME="N_18_">18. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 10pt">The Fifth Court of Appeals, albeit in an unpublished opinion, has similarly ruled as we now do here.
<EM>Beckham v. DePaula</EM>, No. 05-00-01230-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 4855 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 24, 2001,
no pet.) (not designated for publication).
<P><A NAME="N_19_">19. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 10pt">Tex. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
<P><A NAME="N_20_">20. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 10pt"><EM>Id.</EM>
<P><A NAME="N_21_">21. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 10pt">Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 33.004(b) (Vernon 1997).
<P><A NAME="N_22_">22. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 10pt">Gregory J. Lensing, <EM>Proportionate Responsibility and Contribution Before and After the Tort Reform
of 2003</EM>, 35 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1125, 1194 (2004). Lensing further notes that "the legislature left section
33.004(b) untouched in the 2003 amendments, further suggesting a legislative intent merely to clarify that true
third party practice under Rule 38 is completely separate and distinct from responsible-third-party practice
under 33.004." <EM>Id.</EM>
<P><A NAME="N_23_">23. </A></SPAN><SPAN STYLE="font-family: Arial" STYLE="font-size: 10pt">Tex. R. Civ. P. 38(a).</SPAN></P>
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