Rubber Research, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

422 F.2d 1402, 25 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 838, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10296
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMarch 16, 1970
Docket19748
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 422 F.2d 1402 (Rubber Research, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rubber Research, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 422 F.2d 1402, 25 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 838, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10296 (8th Cir. 1970).

Opinion

BLACKMUN, Circuit Judge.

The Tax Court has upheld the Commissioner’s determination of (a) a deficiency of $65,480 in the corporation income tax of Rubber Research, Inc. (hereinafter called Research) for its fiscal year ended March 31, 1962; (b) of a deficiency of $827.59 in Research’s income tax for fiscal 1963; and (c) of the imposition of the maximum 25 per cent addition, amounting to $16,370, to the fiscal 1962 tax under § 6651(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for failure to file a return. T.C. Memo 1969-24; 28 T.C.M. 118. Judge Tannewald’s decision was not reviewed by the full court. Research appeals but, by agreement, does not contest the 1963 deficiency here. Our jurisdiction under § 7482 of the 1954 Code is established.

The basic facts are not in dispute and most of them are established by the pleadings or by stipulations.

Research is a Minnesota corporation organized in November 1960. One of its principal purposes is the development, production, and distribution of rubber products. In May 1961, in exchange for all the authorized shares of its Class B nonvoting capital stock, Research received from Wabash College, St. Louis University, and Brandéis University an exclusive license relating to certain *1404 chemical processes and patents for the treatment of natural and synthetic rubber and, as well, the power to sublicense. The three institutions were themselves assignees of patents theretofore possessed by Fred J. Stark, Sr., the owner of the voting stock of Research.

Rubber Research Elastomerics, Inc. (hereinafter called Elastomerics) is a Minnesota corporation organized in April 1961 with 262,500 authorized shares of $1 par capital stock. During Research’s fiscal year 1962, that is, during the year ended March 31, 1962, Research granted Elastomerics an exclusive sub-license (under the license hereinabove described) in return for 136,500 shares of Elastomerics stock and a royalty. 1 It is this simple transaction which has led to the challenged deficiency in Research’s fiscal 1962 tax.

Coneededly, Research filed no corporation income tax return for fiscal 1962. Coneededly, also, Research’s adjusted income .tax basis for the sublicense it granted Elastomerics was zero.

Research’s position here, as we understand it, is (1) that it is the difference between the value of the sublicense granted to Elastomerics, on the one hand, and the value of the Elastomerics stock received in exchange therefor, on the other hand, which is to measure any income tax gain to Research, and (2) that the value of the Elastomerics stock was not its par value of $1 per share. The Commissioner’s position is that the fair market value of the Elastomerics shares received by Research was $1 per share or $136,500, that this happened to coincide with par value, and that Research realized a taxable gain of that amount upon its grant of the sublicense.

It is to be noted, initially, that the transaction in question was a taxable one and was not tax-free in the sense that resulting gain or loss was not to be recognized. During the administrative aspect of the case, and initially in the Tax Court, Research had argued that its issuance of the sublicense in return for the Elastomerics stock was tax-free under § 351(a) of the 1954 Code. This argument, however, was abandoned in the Tax Court. It really could not be seriously pursued, for the 80 per cent ownership conditions of §§ 351(a) and 368(c) were not fulfilled. (At the trial Research’s counsel stated that “they never did have 80 per cent control”.) Thus no § 351 issue remains in the case.

This being so, the Commissioner and the Tax Court were obviously correct in their rulings that the income tax gain to Research is to be measured by the difference between the fair market value of the Elastomerics stock which Research received and the adjusted income tax basis to Research of the sub-license it granted. Inasmuch as that basis was zero, the gain coincides with the fair market value of the stock. Section 1012 provides, with exceptions not pertinent here, “The basis of property shall be the cost of such property * * *.” Sections 1011 and 1016 pro- *1405 vide for adjustments to basis, none of which is pertinent here. Section 1001 (a) specifies that the gain from the disposition of property “shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis * * Section 1001 (b) provides, “The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received.” And § 1002 states that, except as otherwise provided, “on the sale or exchange of property the entire amount of the gain * * * shall be recognized.” These statutes are clear and specific and, at this late date in the life and administration of the income tax laws, their controlling character and their meaning admit of little doubt.

Research’s argument appears to be that because it had no cost, or could show none, in the sublicense it granted to Elastomeries, the sublicense is to be valued and that value is to be used in measuring gain or loss, and that because that value and the value of the shares received were the same, there was no gain on the transaction. This is simply not the law and it is not the Code’s method of measuring gain on a transaction of this kind. Wessel v. United States, 49 F.2d 137, 139 (8 Cir. 1931). The value of the sublicense, as distinguished from its cost and adjusted basis, was wholly immaterial.

We see nothing at all arbitrary about the statutory scheme or about the Commissioner’s application of the statutes which would lead to the invocation and application of cases such as Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 55 S.Ct. 287, 79 L.Ed. 623 (1935), urged upon us by Research. What the Commissioner has done here, in contradistinction to the situation in the Taylor case, 293 U.S. at 514-515, 55 S.Ct. 287, 79 L.Ed. 623, is not arbitrary or irrational but is in aecord with the theory and concept of the statutes.

Having thus concluded that the exchange was a taxable transaction and that Research’s adjusted income tax basis in the sublicense was zero, then, as we have noted, the fair market value of the 136,500 shares received measures the gain to Research. The Commissioner and the Tax Court found that that stock at the time of the exchange on February 5, 1962, had a fair market value of $1 per share. Valuation of stock for tax purposes is a question of fact. Arc Realty Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 295 F.2d 98, 103 (8 Cir. 1961); Hamm v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 325 F.2d 934, 938 (8 Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993, 84 S.Ct. 1920, 12 L.Ed.2d 1046; United States v. Righter, 400 F.2d 344, 351 (8 Cir. 1968). This being so, the “clearly erroneous” standard of review, Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., has application to the Tax Court’s finding. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.

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Bluebook (online)
422 F.2d 1402, 25 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 838, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10296, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rubber-research-inc-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca8-1970.