Ruanta Deangelao Price v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: November 21, 2023
• Docket: 0985223
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED

Present: Judges Huff, O’Brien and AtLee Argued at Lexington, Virginia

RUANTA DEANGELAO PRICE MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0985-22-3 JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR. NOVEMBER 21, 2023 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE Joseph W. Milam, Jr., Judge

Brett P. Blobaum, Senior Appellate Attorney (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

Timothy J. Huffstutter, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court for the City of Danville convicted appellant

Ruanta Deangelao Price of strangulation, in violation of Code § 18.2-51.6.1 He received a sentence

of five years’ imprisonment, with three years suspended and one year and six months of supervised

release. On appeal, Price argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. For

the following reasons, we affirm.

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 The court acquitted Price of brandishing a firearm, possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a nonviolent felony, and two counts of assault and battery, stemming from incidents on another date. I. BACKGROUND2

Kristy Custer began dating Price in November 2021. On January 22, 2022, they were

together at her apartment when Price became angry because Custer had disabled the text message

notifications on her phone. They had previously fought over messages other men had sent to

Custer. Price accused Custer of “being sneaky” and “up to no good.” Although Custer showed

Price the messages on her phone, he seized it and threw it across the room. An argument ensued.

During this argument, Price pushed Custer onto her bed, placed his hands around her throat, and

squeezed with “medium pressure.” Custer did not “remember breathing,” testifying that “[i]t only

lasted a few seconds, I’m sure. But it felt like . . . it felt like a long time.”

Price released Custer but then pushed her back onto the bed and again squeezed her neck,

this time with “[d]efinitely more than medium” pressure. She explained that “[t]his time it was

more, it was harder to breathe. [A]nd I felt like I was getting ready to pass out.” Custer repeated

that it was difficult to breathe; her “airway was closing up,” and she “felt like [she] was gonna pass

out and throw up.” She further testified that she was unable to stand after Price released his grip on

her neck: “I felt like I was, like, my legs were weak. Like I had no control over [th]em. I was

falling pretty much, and [Price] made a comment about me not being able to stand up, falling

around.” Custer “was having a hard time trying to catch [her] breath to breathe.” Price continued to

press Custer about the messages on her phone while scrolling through the contents and sending

messages, pretending to be her, in an attempt to prove that she was being unfaithful.

2 “Consistent with the standard of review when a criminal appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the evidence below ‘in the “light most favorable” to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.’” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). This standard “requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)). -2- Meanwhile, Custer’s coworker, Lisa Pearman, had been trying to contact her. Growing

worried, she asked police to perform a welfare check on Custer. When the responding officer spoke

with Custer at her residence, she told him that she was “okay,” but “just hadn’t felt that well that

day.” Custer testified that Price asked about the officer after he left, describing Price as “nervous.”

Pearman arrived at Custer’s home a short time later and asked Custer if she was okay; Custer

“shook [her] head, yes,” but “really didn’t say yes or no,” but “made eye reactions . . . , just kind of

blinked her eyes.”

Custer testified that she was winking and blinking her eyes “trying to give [Pearman] a

signal,” and told Pearman that she was not alone. Pearman invited Custer to lunch, and Custer

accepted. Pearman noticed that Custer was “very distressed and upset.” Custer said she needed to

go get dressed, and Pearman said that if Custer was not out of the apartment in ten minutes,

Pearman would call police again. Price left the house in a separate vehicle when Custer left with

Pearman.

At lunch, Custer told Pearman about Price’s attack. Pearman noticed that Custer had bruises

and marks on her neck and arms and that the neck marks were “fresh.” Pearman asked Custer if she

wanted to leave the apartment, but Custer declined and returned there after lunch. Custer went to

the hospital the next day where she reported the attack.

While Custer was at the hospital, Courtney Moss, a forensic nurse, performed an

examination on her and later testified as an expert at Price’s trial. At trial, the Commonwealth

introduced several photographs of Custer’s injuries, taken during Moss’s examination and in the

days immediately following the assault. Moss observed three marks on Custer’s head and neck, two

on her chest, six on her arms, eight on her left leg, and seven on her right leg. Moss recounted

Custer’s report of the January 22 attack, given at the exam, stating that Custer reported she had

difficulty breathing, nausea, and feelings of faintness. Moss opined that Custer’s faintness, nausea,

-3- and “weakness or numbness” in the arms and legs were consistent with carotid artery and jugular

vein compression and that Custer’s trouble breathing was consistent with tracheal compression.

Moss measured Custer’s neck during the initial examination and then again at a follow-up visit on

February 9, 2022; the results indicated that Custer’s neck had been swollen on January 23, which

Moss described as “consistent with pressure being applied and causing injury or trauma to those

tissues.”

Custer testified that she did not speak with Price for several days after January 22. When

Price texted her, they discussed koala bears and her joking that she’d like to have one as a pet. In

the text exchange, Custer said she was “[j]ust dreaming,” and Price responded, “[y]eah you do that a

lot that’s why I almost killed you.” Custer reported the attack to police on February 9, 2022, after

her follow-up visit with Moss. At trial, she explained her delay in reporting, saying that she “kept

going back and forth in [her] mind if [she] wanted to go through with it or not.” She decided to

make the report after learning that her neck had been swollen on her initial visit after the

strangulation incident.

Price testified that he broke up with Custer on February 4, 2022. Price denied sending the

text stating that he had almost killed Custer and claimed that Custer was attacking him during the

January 22 altercation, when he had to “pry” her off him.

The circuit court convicted Price of strangulation, for which he received a sentence of five

years’ imprisonment, with three years suspended and one year and six months of supervised release.

This appeal followed.

-4- II. ANALYSIS

Price argues that Custer’s testimony was inherently incredible, and therefore the evidence

was insufficient to convict him of strangulation. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does

not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,

228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193

(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted

to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by

the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

“Determining the credibility of witnesses . . . is within the exclusive province of the

[factfinder], which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they

testify.” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (first alteration in original)

(quoting Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304 (1993)). “This Court must ‘accept the

trial court’s determination of the credibility of witness testimony unless, “as a matter of law, the

testimony is inherently incredible.”’” Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 328 (2018)

(quoting Nobrega v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 508, 518 (2006)). “Witness testimony will not be

-5- found inherently incredible ‘unless it is “so manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to

believe it” or “shown to be false by objects or things as to the existence and meaning of which

reasonable men should not differ.”’” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 239-40 (2022)

(quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 487 (2018)).

B. The evidence was sufficient to convict Price of strangulation

“Any person who, without consent, impedes the blood circulation or respiration of another

person by knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully applying pressure to the neck of such person

resulting in the wounding or bodily injury of such person is guilty of strangulation, a Class 6

felony.” Code § 18.2-51.6(A). To secure a conviction for strangulation, the Commonwealth must

prove that the act caused a bodily injury consisting of “damage or harm or hurt that relates to the

body”; an “impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty”; or “impairment

of a physical condition.” Ricks v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 470, 479 (2015). Bodily injury need not

include “any observable wounds, cuts, or breaking of the skin” or “proof of ‘broken bones or

bruises.’” Id. (quoting English v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 711, 719 (2011)). “[I]nternal

injuries—no less than external injuries—fall within the scope of Code § 18.2-51.” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting English, 58 Va. App. at 719). The element of bodily injury may be proven by any

injury, “no matter how temporary,” including rendering the victim unconscious. Id. at 478, 480

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(5)(E)).

Price asserts that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to sustain the strangulation

conviction because Custer was “inherently incredible as a matter of law” and that the court therefore

erred in denying his motion to strike. In support of this argument, Price points to Custer’s statement

to the officer conducting the welfare check on the day of the incident that she was “okay” and just

not feeling well that morning. He further notes her decision to have lunch with a friend shortly after

the attack and her continued contact with him. Also weighing against Custer’s credibility, in Price’s

-6- estimation, was her delay in reporting the incident to law enforcement “for over two weeks.” Price

characterizes this behavior as “contrary to human experience.” “Without the inherently incredible

testimony,” he tells us, the “evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of strangulation.” We

disagree.

“Potential inconsistencies in testimony are resolved by the fact finder. We do not revisit

such conflicts on appeal ‘unless “the evidence is such that reasonable [persons], after weighing the

evidence and drawing all just inferences therefrom, could reach but one conclusion.”’” Towler v.

Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 292 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Molina v.

Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 338, 369, aff’d, 272 Va. 666 (2006)). Neither the delay in reporting

knowledge of a crime nor the mere fact that a witness has been impeached renders the witness’s

testimony inherently incredible. See Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 (2006) (“The

mere fact that a witness may have delayed in reporting knowledge of a case . . . does not necessarily

render the testimony unworthy of belief.”); Ray v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 291, 306 (2022)

(holding that “the mere fact that a witness’[s] testimony may have been impeached does not

necessarily render the testimony inherently incredible”). “Evidence is not ‘incredible’ unless it is

‘so manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to believe it’ or ‘shown to be false by objects or

things as to the existence and meaning of which reasonable men should not differ.’” Gerald, 295

Va. at 487 (quoting Juniper, 271 Va. at 415).

Whatever “incongruities” Price finds in her testimony, Custer’s account of the strangulation

itself was consistent. Moreover, Pearman testified that Custer was “distressed and upset” on the day

of the attack. She also noticed “fresh” marks on Custer’s neck. Moss, a qualified forensic nurse

with experience evaluating strangulation cases, noted three marks on Custer’s head and neck, along

with other injuries. Moss opined that Custer’s reported symptoms were consistent with

compression of the carotid artery, jugular vein, and trachea. Moss also found that Custer had

-7- suffered swelling in her neck, which was “consistent with pressure being applied and causing

trauma or injury to those tissues.” In short, the physical evidence was consistent with Custer’s

account of the attack.

We acknowledge, as the circuit court did, that there were “some interesting incongruities in

the evidence and the actions of the individuals involved” because “sometimes people who are in an

emotional state do not act in a logical or rational way.” But any contradictions in a witness’s

testimony goes to the credibility and the weight of that testimony. Simpson v. Commonwealth,

199 Va. 549, 557 (1957). It is not, as Price argues, “contrary to human experience” that a domestic

violence victim might be hesitant to report an attack when the assailant is physically in her presence,

or that there may be many other reasons to be reluctant to report the crimes of her romantic partner.

Because there is nothing in this record to suggest that Custer was inherently incredible, it was up

to the circuit court, sitting as factfinder, to judge Custer’s credibility. “When the law says that it

is for the [factfinder] to judge of the credibility of a witness, it is not a matter of degree.” Sidya

v. World Telecom Exch. Commc’ns, LLC, 301 Va. 31, 37 (2022) (quoting Simpson, 199 Va. at

557). According the proper deference to the factfinder’s evaluation of Custer’s credibility, and

noting the overwhelming consistencies between the physical evidence and Custer’s account of the

attack, the circuit court did not err in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Price

was guilty of strangulation.

III. CONCLUSION

The circuit court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to support Price’s conviction

for strangulation. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

-8-