STATE OF VERMONT
ENVIRONMENTAL COURT
} In re: } Rozzi Real Estate, Inc., Subdivision Final Plan Application } Docket No. 225‐10‐05 Vtec (Appeal of Koval and McCormack) } }
Decision and Order on Appellee‐Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Appellants Eric Koval and Thomas McCormack (Appellants) appealed from a
decision of the Planning Commission of the Town of Essex granting final plan approval
to Appellee‐Applicant Rozzi Real Estate, Inc.’s application for a seven‐lot subdivision of
property located at 197 Weed Road. Appellants represent themselves; Appellee‐Applicant
Rozzi Real Estate, Inc. is represented by Elizabeth M. Demas, Esq.; and the Town is
represented by William F. Ellis, Esq. Appellee‐Applicant has moved for summary
judgment on each of the seven questions in Appellants’ Statement of Questions.
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Appellee‐Applicant
owns a parcel of land, approximately 23.2 acres in area, located at 197 Weed Road, in the
Agricultural Residential zoning district. The property as a whole is bounded on the north
by Weed Road and on the east by Naylor Road. Lot 1 is bounded on the west by a private
residential lot. Lot 7, which is proposed to be deeded to the Town, consists of an area
within the floodplain of the Browns River that is bounded on its west, south and east by
a loop of the Browns River, connecting with a long, narrow area extending along the
northerly bank of the Browns River, generally within the 100‐year floodplain, and
connecting with Naylor Road along the southerly and easterly boundaries of Lot 6. The
easterly end of Lot 7 lies between Lot 6 and the former school house referred to on the
proposed subdivision plat and in Appellants’ documents as the Grace Naylor property.
1 Much of Lot 7, as well as the southerly portions of development Lots 1 through 5, is also
located within the Flood Plain zoning district.1 In addition, an easement for trail use
(footpath and bridal trail) is proposed to be deeded to the Town along the Weed Road
frontage of the property.
Appellant Eric Koval owns property directly across Weed Road from the proposed
project. While neither party provided the minutes of the August 25, 2005 Planning
Commission hearing, the decision shows that a copy was sent to Mr. Koval, from which we
may deduce that he either appeared and testified at the hearing or submitted evidence or
a statement of concern in writing sufficient to qualify as a party‐appellant under 24 V.S.A.
§4465(b)(3) and §4471(a), and under 10 V.S.A. §8504(b)(1). Neither the site plan nor the
Planning Commission’s decision reveals whether Appellant Thomas McCormack qualifies
as a party‐appellant under those sections; however, no motion to dismiss him as a party
is at present before the Court.
Appellee‐Applicant proposes to subdivide the property into six three‐acre building
lots, and a seventh 5.2‐acre open space lot along the Brown’s River proposed to be
dedicated to the Town. Lots 1 and 2 share a single driveway access from Weed Road, Lots
4 and 3 also share a single driveway access from Weed Road, while Lots 6 and 5 share a
single driveway access from Naylor Road. The open space Lot 7 has access directly from
Naylor Road. In addition, the southerly portion of each proposed house lot is designated
as a conservation portion of those lots; this portion comprises the steep bank down to the
Browns River. All of the property is undeveloped, except for an existing barn, stable, and
shed located towards the Weed Road frontage of Lot 6.
As discussed in the unappealed decision on preliminary plan approval submitted
1 The parties have not supplied the portion of the Zoning By‐Laws relating to this district.
2 by Applicant, these structures are identified in the Town Plan as part of an historic 19th
century farmstead cluster. As discussed in the staff memorandum for sketch plan approval
submitted by Applicant, at least the large barn is also listed in the State Register of Historic
Places and in the Town Plan. Neither party provided the 2001 Town Plan or the State
Historic Register.
The preliminary plan approval for this subdivision was not appealed, and therefore
cannot be challenged in the present proceeding, either directly or indirectly. 24 V.S.A.
§4472(d). It contained the following condition with respect to the structures on proposed
Lot 6:
The site also includes several structures identified in the Town Plan as part of a historic cluster. The applicant provides a study of the large barn on the property, indicating that the barn was built in the late 20th century. However, no information is provided about the smaller shed, which appears to be a part of the 19th century farmstead cluster. It is recommended that some study be done on the smaller structure and that the applicant preserve it should such study find it historically significant. Any Final Plan submission needs to include a statement regarding what analysis has been conducted and what are the applicant’s plans for the historic structures.
In the cover letter to its final application which is before the Court in the present appeal,
Appellee‐Applicant referred to the previously‐submitted study to propose that the large
barn is not historically significant and therefore is not proposed to be retained, but that:
[w]ith regards to the smaller structure to the east of the barn (labeled as stable), this appears to be the oldest structure of all the structures on lot #6. Since no evaluation has been performed on this structure, a note has been added to sheet #1 of the plans as follows[:] “Existing stable building to remain until a historic resource evaluation is performed and submitted to the Town Community Development Director for review.”
3 Appellee‐Applicant has moved for summary judgement on all seven questions in
Appellants’ Statement of Questions, arguing that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that Appellee‐Applicant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure (V.R.C.P.) 56(e) provides that when a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported by a statement of facts as required under
V.R.C.P. 56(c)(2), the party opposing the motion for summary judgment “may not rest
upon . . . mere allegations or denials,” but rather “must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” As explained in V.R.C.P. 56(c)(2), all of the material facts
set forth in the statement supporting the motion for summary judgment will be deemed
to be admitted, unless controverted by the statement of facts filed by the party opposing
the motion. The purpose of this requirement is to determine in advance of the trial whether
a trial is necessary on each of the issues in the appeal; that is, whether the party opposing
the motion for summary judgment has sufficient contrary evidence to present at trial. See,
e.g., Tierney v. Tierney, 131 Vt. 48, 52 (1972); Gilman v. Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 175 Vt.
554, 556 (2003); Travelers Ins. Companies v. Demarle, Inc., 2005 VT 53, ¶6.
Question 1 of Appellants’ Statement of Questions
Question 1 of the Statement of Questions asks the Court to determine whether the
subdivision should be approved, in light of language specifically protecting the parcel from
development in the 1991 and 1994 versions of the Town Plan. Appellee‐Applicant argues
that the current Town Plan, as adopted in 2001, contains no provisions specifically
protecting this parcel. Although Appellee‐Applicant has not provided a copy of the 2001
Town Plan, and nor have Appellants provided the sections of the 1991 and 1994 Town
Plans to which they refer, Appellants do not dispute that the protective language was not
included in the 2001 Town Plan.
The Court appreciates the effort expended by Mr. McCormack and his mother, artist
4 Lois Foley, as described in Appellants’ November 10, 2005 filing, as well as in Mr. Koval’s
February 2, 2006 filing and in Mr. McCormack’s filings in response to the motion for
summary judgment, towards the protection of this portion of the former Naylor farm in
the 1991 and 1994 Town Plans. However, it is up to each municipality to decide what it
wishes to include or delete from its municipal plan and its zoning and subdivision
ordinances. It is the Court’s role only to apply those provisions to the application before
it. In the present case, the Court can only apply the provisions of the Town of Essex Town
Plan that was in effect at the time of the application. As it is undisputed that any protection
of this property that may have existed in the 1991 and 1994 Town Plans was deleted from
the 2001 Town Plan, Appellee‐Applicant’s motion for summary judgment on Question 1
must therefore be granted.
Question 2 of Appellants’ Statement of Questions
Question 2 of the Statement of Questions asks the Court to determine whether the
subdivision should be approved in light of a recommendation made by an unnamed
environmental group to the Planning Commission, allegedly urging protection of the
parcel. Appellee‐Applicant merely argues that the statement alluded to does not appear
“in the record” of the Planning Commission’s proceedings, and that 5.3 acres of the project
near the river are being donated to the Town, as well as a conservation easement and a
“trail and horseback” easement. However, because this appeal is not an on‐the‐record
appeal, the question for this court is not whether a particular statement is “in the record,”
but whether material facts are disputed by Appellants, as to the applicable criteria for
subdivision approval. Neither party has specified the standards applicable to Question 2
of the Statement of Questions; they appear to be found in §§10.1.14, 10.13.1, 10.13.5, 10.15,
and/or 10.1.2 of the Subdivision Regulations.
Appellee‐Applicant’s motion for summary judgment argues, at least implicitly, that
5 the 5.3 acres of the project near the river being donated to the Town, together with the
conservation easement and the “trail and horseback” easement, satisfy the applicable
criteria. Accordingly, if Appellee‐Applicant identifies the applicable review criteria in its
motion, that motion for summary judgment on Question 2 would be granted unless
Appellants can provide the Court with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial on this question.
As the trial is now scheduled to commence on April 11, 2006, and to continue, if
necessary, on April 21 and/or April 27, 2006, on or before March 15,2 2006, Appellee‐
Applicant shall file any supplemental memorandum relating to its motion for summary
judgment on Question 2, including what review criteria Appellee‐Applicant argues are
applicable to Question 2. On or before March 20,3 2006, Appellants shall file any
supplemental V.R.C.P. 56(c)(2) statement of facts, specifying the review criteria Appellants
argue are applicable to Question 2, and providing the environmental group’s
recommendation or other affidavit in support of their argument that material facts are in
dispute, and shall disclose the witnesses who will be called to testify about that
recommendation. The Court will rule on the following day whether any issue remains for
trial on Question 2 of the Statement of Questions, so that, if any issue remains, the parties
may conduct any necessary discovery in preparation for trial.
Question 3 of Appellants’ Statement of Questions
Question 3 of the Statement of Questions asks the Court to determine whether the
subdivision should be approved as proposed, or instead whether “alternative layouts and
ideas that better protect the scenic and historic nature of the site” should be given “honest
2 The date the documents must be received at the Court and by the other parties. 3 The date the documents must be received at the Court and by the other parties.
6 consideration.” Appellee‐Applicant argues that the subdivision was designed with house
sites placed in locations to minimize the effect on the scenic nature of the land, and that the
house sites were moved several times in response to issues raised in the unappealed sketch
plan and preliminary plan decisions by the Planning Commission, addressing concerns
regarding the potential for riverbank erosion and the protection of scenic resources. In
their responsive memoranda, Appellants propose alternative ideas, including a historical
museum, community gardens, and an arts and crafts center.
The municipal process of subdivision plan review merely compares a particular
subdivision proposal for a particular property to the standards for subdivision approval
under, in this instance, Article X of the Subdivision Regulations. In this de novo
proceeding, this Court only has authority to stand in the shoes of the Planning Commission
to consider the application against those standards, not to suggest or require an applicant
to submit any alternative proposals. Appellee‐Applicant’s motion for summary judgment
on Question 3 must therefore be granted.
Question 4 of Appellants’ Statement of Questions
Question 4 of the Statement of Questions asks the Court to determine whether,
instead of the proposed residential subdivision, agricultural use of the parcel should be
required, as the district is zoned as Agricultural Residential. In the Zoning By‐Laws
pertaining to the Agricultural Residential district, the purpose statement (§3.0) gives equal
weight to “promot[ing] the continuation of agriculture and open space on lands so suited”
and to “facilitat[ing] rural residential development.” Nor do the Subdivision Regulations
require agricultural use of land in the Agricultural Residential district. Single family
residences are a permitted use in the Agricultural Residential district. Appellee‐
Applicant’s motion for summary judgment on Question 4 must therefore be granted.
7 Question 5 of Appellants’ Statement of Questions
Question 5 of the Statement of Questions asks the Court to determine whether the
subdivision should be approved, given that adjoining properties contain an historic house
and an historic former schoolhouse; a state‐recognized deer resting area; and wildlife
habitat for moose, turkey, hawk, and bear. As with Question 2 discussed above, neither
party has specified the standards applicable to Question 5 of the Statement of Questions
from the Subdivision Regulations. Unless there are review criteria in the Subdivision
Regulations that require assessment of a subdivision’s effect on features found on
neighboring or more distant property, Appellee‐Applicant’s motion for summary judgment
on Question 5 must be granted.
Further, Appellee‐Applicant argues that these features are located across the road4
and some distance away from the property proposed for development, and that they
would not be affected by the development proposal. Appellants’ February 2, 2006 filing
argues that the deer resting area is separated from the proposed development by twelve‐
foot‐wide road, but does not present any countering information to suggest that there are
disputed issues of fact as to the location or the effect of the proposed subdivision on the
listed features. Therefore, even if there are applicable review criteria in the Subdivision
Regulations, the motion must be granted unless Appellants can provide the Court with
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial on this question.
As the trial is now scheduled to commence on April 11, 2006, and to continue, if
necessary, on April 21 and/or April 27, 2006, on or before March 15,5 2006, Appellants shall
file any supplemental V.R.C.P. 56(c)(2) statement of facts, and shall specify the review
4 Except for the schoolhouse adjacent to Lot 7, which is now a residence and which Appellee‐Applicant argues also would not be affected. 5 The date the documents must be received at the Court and by the other parties.
8 criteria Appellants argue are applicable to Question 5, and shall provide any facts in
support of their argument that material facts are in dispute on this question, together with
disclosure of any witnesses who will be called to testify about this issue. On or before
March 20,6 2006, Appellee‐Applicant shall file any supplemental memorandum relating
to its motion for summary judgment on Question 5, including coverage of whether any
review criteria are applicable to Question 5. The Court will rule on the following day
whether any issue remains for trial on Question 5 of the Statement of Questions, so that,
if any issue remains, the parties may conduct any discovery in preparation for trial.
Question 6 of Appellants’ Statement of Questions
Question 6 of the Statement of Questions asks the Court to determine whether the
subdivision should be approved, given the historical significance of the barn and the
property and the presence of historical artifacts excavated in the area.7 Within the
standards for subdivision approval in Article X of the Subdivision Regulations, §10.1.14
requires the proposed subdivision to “include preservation of natural assets such as
streams, . . . agricultural land, attractive scenic areas, and historic sites,” and §10.13.1
requires that “[o]utstanding natural features of the site, including groves of trees,
watercourses and falls, historic sites, exceptional views, and similar irreplaceable assets,
shall be preserved.”
6 The date the documents must be received at the Court and by the other parties. 7 As to the items excavated by Mr. McCormack, material facts are in dispute as to whether the “dozens of Civil War relics” Mr. McCormack asserts he has found on the property were found on the subdivision property itself or on nearby land that had been part of the larger farm parcel in the past. However, unless a state permit is required for this property, the state law on archeological sites does not appear to apply. 22 V.S.A. §767(1).
9 The unappealed preliminary plan decision required Appellee‐Applicant to include
in the final plan application a statement regarding what historic analysis has been
conducted of the 19th century farmstead cluster and what are the applicant’s plans for the
historic structures. Appellee‐Applicant’s notation that the “[e]xisting stable building [is]
to remain until a historic resource evaluation is performed and submitted to the Town
Community Development Director for review,” does not satisfy the requirement of the
preliminary plan decision as to the stable (and as to the shed, which is not mentioned at
all), as it is the Planning Commission (or this Court on appeal) and not the Community
Development Director which must determine whether the final plan meets the standards
for subdivision approval.
Accordingly, for this reason alone Appellee‐Applicant’s motion for summary
judgment on Question 6 must be denied, and will be addressed at the trial now scheduled
to commence on April 11, 2006, and to continue, if necessary, on April 21 and/or April 27,
2006.
Moreover, in connection with its earlier preliminary plan application, on March 11,
2005, Appellee‐Applicant provided the Planning Commission with an assessment of the
barn, prepared by Peter Marsh of Building Inspection Services of Vermont. Neither the
assessment itself nor Mr. Marsh’s qualifications has been provided to the Court. Appellee‐
Applicant’s cover letter8 to its submission stated that the evaluation concluded that the
barn is “a common, post World War II dairy barn with low historical and cultural
importance.” On April 5, 2005, the Town Conservation Committee had submitted
recommendations9 to the Planning Commission at the preliminary plan approval stage of
these proceedings, recommending against approval of the project as proposed and stating:
8 Attachment E to Appellee‐Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 1. 9 Attachment F to Appellee‐Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 2‐3.
10 The barn and out‐structures extant on the property to be developed are notable for their connection to the farming heritage of Essex. These structures have been identified in the 2001 Essex Town Plan as Historical Sites (Essex Town plan, Map 19). On our site visit, it was noted that although one of the structures is a mid‐twentieth century barn addition, the other structures appear to date to the nineteenth century, and to be contiguous with other preserved structures in adjacent parcels (for example, the 19th century farmhouse directly across Weed Road). Destruction of these structures would further the loss of historical sites within the Town.
At trial the parties should be prepared to address the historical significance of all three of
the structures on Lot 6, both intrinsically and in relation to other nearby buildings, as well
as to provide the 2001 Town Plan and the zoning ordinance with respect to any definition
of the term “historic site.”
Question 7 of Appellants’ Statement of Questions
Question 7 of the Statement of Questions asks the Court to determine whether the
subdivision should be approved, considering the value of the parcel for agriculture due to
“its fertile dark soils and southern exposure.” While analysis of the need for preservation
of agricultural soils may be required under Act 250, the present appeal is only an appeal
of the municipal subdivision approval. The question of whether this project does or does
not require Act 250 review is not before this Court in this proceeding; that question must
be posed in the first instance to the District Coordinator of the applicable District
Environmental Commission. If Act 250 were applicable, the Court would consolidate the
Act 250 and municipal appeals to be heard together.
In Article X of the Subdivision Regulations, §10.1.14 requires the proposed
subdivision to “include preservation of natural assets such as streams, . . . agricultural land,
attractive scenic areas, and historic sites” (emphasis added). Therefore the issue of whether
the proposal adequately preserves agricultural land (as opposed to agricultural soils) may
11 properly be before the Court, if any facts are contested on this issue.
Appellee‐Applicant’s description of the proposed project in its motion for summary
judgment stated that the site is composed of a field sloping down to the banks of the river
and that the land was farmed by Harold Whitcomb, who grew only cow corn and hay on
the land. Appellee‐Applicant’s motion for summary judgment on Question 7 should be
granted, unless Appellants can provide the Court with specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial on this question. As the trial is now scheduled to commence on
April 11, 2006, and to continue, if necessary, on April 21 and/or April 27, 2006, on or before
March 15,10 2006, Appellants shall file any supplemental V.R.C.P. 56(c)(2) statement of facts
in support of their argument that material facts are in dispute on Question 7, together with
disclosure of any witnesses who will be called to testify about this issue. On or before
March 20,11 2006, Appellee‐Applicant shall file any supplemental memorandum relating
to its motion for summary judgment on Question 7. The Court will rule on the following
day whether any issue remains for trial on Question 7 of the Statement of Questions, so
that, if any issue remains, the parties may conduct any discovery in preparation for trial.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that
Appellee‐Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Questions 1, 3, and 4 is
GRANTED. Appellee‐Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Question 6 is
DENIED. The Court’s ruling on Appellee‐Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
Questions 2, 5 and 7 is postponed until March 20, 2006, to give the parties the opportunity
to provide the Court with specific facts showing whether or not there is a genuine issue for
trial on these questions; the ruling on those questions will be issued on March 21, 2006 on
10 The date the documents must be received at the Court and by the other parties. 11 The date the documents must be received at the Court and by the other parties.
12 the basis of whatever is received at the Court before 4:30 p.m. on March 20, 2006.
The trial now scheduled to commence on April 11, 2006, and to continue, if
necessary, on April 21 and/or April 27, 2006, will proceed on Question 6, and will proceed
on Questions 2, 5 and 7 if the Court finds there are genuine issues of fact for trial on any
of these latter questions.
Done at Berlin, Vermont, this 8th day of March, 2006.
_________________________________________________ Merideth Wright Environmental Judge