Rozankovich v. Kalamazoo Spring Corp.
This text of 200 N.W.2d 719 (Rozankovich v. Kalamazoo Spring Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Plaintiff, Evelyn Rozankovich, was employed by the Kalamazoo Spring Corporation. She became pregnant and her employer required that she take a leave of absence at the end of the fifth month of her pregnancy although she was able and willing to work. She now appeals from a judgment of the circuit court affirming an order of the Employment Security Appeal Board denying unemployment benefits. The Employment Security Commission, not the employer, files a brief in opposition to her appeal.
The circuit court and the appeal board found that Mrs. Rozankovich was not unemployed within the meaning of the act because she was sent home-on a leave of absence pursuant to the terms of an agreement between the employer and the union.
We reverse because it has not been shown that the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union obligated Mrs. Rozankovich to accept against her will a leave of absence which she did not request.
Section 48 of the Employment Security Act provides in relevánt part:
"An individual shall not be deemed to be unemployed during any leave of absence from work granted by an employer either at the request of the individual or *719 pursuant to an agreement with his duly authorized bargaining agent, or in accordance with law.” MCLA 421.48; MSA 17.552.
Section 14(C) of article IV of the agreement between the employer and the union provides that a female employee "may secure a maternity leave of absence not to exceed nine (9) months”, and that "such maternity leave shall start not later than the fifth (5th) month of pregnancy”. (Emphasis supplied.)
The entire text of § 14 of the agreement is set forth in the margin. 1 Reading §14 of the agree *720 ment as an entirety, it is clear that the drafters of the agreement employed the words "may” and "shall” in the ordinary sense in which those terms are used — "may” as permissive, and "shall” as mandatory. In subparagraphs (A), (B), (D) and (E) the operative words clearly refer to the employer:
—Employees "unable to work because of illness”, temporarily transferred employees, and employees who are accepted for the Peace Corps "shall” be granted leaves of absence under subparagraphs (B), (D) and (E) of § 14. The causes stated —disabling illness, transfer, and enrollment in the Peace Corps — leave no room for choice by the employer; it must grant leave.
—A temporary leave of absence "for good cause” "may be granted” by the employer. The intention that the employer not be compelled to grant leave is conveyed by the word "may”.
The language of subparagraph (C) is somewhat different, for the language here refers to the employee — "female employees may secure”. We must conclude that in the context of § 14 this gives the employee the option of "securing” leave of absence, if one is desired, by submitting a doctor’s certificate to the employer as proof of pregnancy.
Subsequent to the appeal board’s decision, the Michigan Employment Security Commission issued a formal interpretation of the relevant statutory language. It is there stated that an employee will be treated as "unemployed” for the purposes of the act unless the agreement between the employer and the union which it is asserted provides for a compulsory leave of absence is a "firm directive and mandatory in the pertinent situation” or a request for the leave of absence is submitted by the employee. 2
*721 Mrs. Rozankovich did not request a leave. The collective bargaining agreement between her union and her employer cannot properly be described as containing a firm directive, mandatory in the pertinent situation.
After the agreement between the union and the employer was signed, a question arose concerning the meaning of the contract language regarding pregnancy leaves of absence and a memorandum of understanding was signed by the employer and the local union. The appeal board referred to this document in its opinion as evidence that the parties to the collective bargaining agreement intended a mandatory leave of absence. 3
*722 The memorandum of understanding was not offered in evidence during the hearing before the referee. We might overlook that record deficiency since it appears undisputed that the memorandum was in fact signed in behalf of the employer and the local union.
Mrs. Rozankovich disputes, however, the authority of the local union to modify the collective bargaining agreement without the consent of the parent union. 4
The appeal board erred in considering the memorandum of understanding in deciding whether Mrs. Rozankovich was obliged to accept a leave of absence without taking evidence and considering the question whether the person who signed in behalf of the local union was authorized to enter into an agreement modifying or construing the collective bargaining agreement and to bind Mrs. Rozankovich in that regard.
Until the issue of the correct construction of the agreement is properly resolved, we see no need to address ourselves to the other issues raised by the parties regarding § 48 of the act.
The Attorney General of Michigan has ruled that §28(l)(c) 5 of . the Michigan Employment Security Act is unconstitutional, and we have been advised that the Employment Security Commission accepts his decision. Accordingly, we do not consider the constitutionality of that section of the act.
Remanded to the Employment Security Appeal Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
"Section 14. (A) Employees may be granted a temporary leave of absence without loss of seniority for good cause for period of time up to thirty (30) days. Application for such leave shall be made to the Company and the Union. No such leave shall be valid unless approved by both the management and bargaining committee of the Union. This leave of absence may be extended for similar periods upon approval of management and the Union.
"(B) An automatic sick leave shall be granted employees who are unable to work because of illness. When required by the Company and the bargaining committee or when absence extends beyond eight (8) days, such employees will be required to furnish doctor’s statements stating necessity for such leave and when they are able to return to work. During all leaves of absence under Section 14, seniority shall be accumulative.
"(C) Maternity Leave.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
200 N.W.2d 719, 41 Mich. App. 717, 1972 Mich. App. LEXIS 1371, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rozankovich-v-kalamazoo-spring-corp-michctapp-1972.