Royston v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Royston v. State

304 S.E.2d 732, 166 Ga. App. 386, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2179

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedApril 8, 1983

Docket65526

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 304 S.E.2d 732 (Royston v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Royston v. State, 304 S.E.2d 732, 166 Ga. App. 386, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2179 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).

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Opinion

Carley, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of speeding based upon evidence obtained by a speed detecting device employed by the City of Athens police department. On appeal, she attacks her conviction by asserting that the evidence of her speeding was inadmissible because the City of Athens was not in total literal compliance with the following requirements of OCGA § 40-14-6 (Code Ann. § 68-2105): “Each county and municipality using speed detection devices shall erect signs on every highway which comprises a part of the state highway system at that point on the highway which intersects the corporate limits of the municipality or the county boundary.” (Emphasis supplied.) This argument was advanced and rejected in Ferguson v. *387 State, 163 Ga. App. 171 (1) (292 SE2d 87) (1982). “[W]e are unwilling to hold that incomplete compliance with [OCGA § 40-14-6] requires exclusion of evidence gathered by use of a speed detection device. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for a directed verdict.” Ferguson v. State, supra at 172.

Decided April 8, 1983 Rehearing denied April 25, 1983 William C. Head, for appellant. Ken Stula, Solicitor, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Deen, P. J., and Banke, J., concur.

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Carley, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of speeding based upon evidence obtained by a speed detecting device employed by the City of Athens police department. On appeal, she attacks her conviction by asserting that the evidence of her speeding was inadmissible because the City of Athens was not in total literal compliance with the following requirements of OCGA § 40-14-6 (Code Ann. § 68-2105): “Each county and municipality using speed detection devices shall erect signs on every highway which comprises a part of the state highway system at that point on the highway which intersects the corporate limits of the municipality or the county boundary.” (Emphasis supplied.) This argument was advanced and rejected in Ferguson v. *387 State, 163 Ga. App. 171 (1) (292 SE2d 87) (1982). “[W]e are unwilling to hold that incomplete compliance with [OCGA § 40-14-6] requires exclusion of evidence gathered by use of a speed detection device. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for a directed verdict.” Ferguson v. State, supra at 172.

Decided April 8, 1983 Rehearing denied April 25, 1983 William C. Head, for appellant. Ken Stula, Solicitor, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Deen, P. J., and Banke, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

304 S.E.2d 732, 166 Ga. App. 386, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2179, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/royston-v-state-gactapp-1983.

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