Royston v. City of Scottsdale

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 6, 2025
• Docket: 24-6530
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 6 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NICHOL ROYSTON, No. 24-6530 Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00542-SMB v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF SCOTTSDALE, a municipal corporation,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

JEFFREY WALTHER, individually and in their official capacities, RICHARD SLAVIN, MATTHEW EVANS, CHRISTOPHER DIPIAZZA, JILL BOEHM, DON TELLIS, DONNA BROWN, ALEXANDER RISTUCCIA, UNKNOWN PARTIES, named as Does 1- 20,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 23, 2025 Phoenix, Arizona

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Before: GRABER, TALLMAN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Nichol Royston timely appeals the district court’s entry of summary

judgment in favor of Defendant City of Scottsdale on her claims under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Family and Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”), and Families First Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”). We review

de novo and view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Samper v.

Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1235 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012). We

affirm.

1. We assume, without deciding, that Plaintiff was disabled and was

qualified to work in the photo enforcement unit. Nonetheless, the district court

correctly granted summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s ADA claims of

discrimination and failure to accommodate for two independent reasons.

a. First, Plaintiff has not shown that she suffered an adverse employment

action when Defendant rescinded her transfer to the photo enforcement unit. See

Samper, 675 F.3d at 1237 (stating the elements of failure-to-accommodate claims);

Murray v. Mayo Clinic, 934 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that

discrimination claims require an adverse employment action). The rescission of

Plaintiff’s transfer, and her later transfer to a different police aide position, did not

change her rank, title, or salary. Any humiliation that Plaintiff suffered, and any

loss of the ability to work remotely from time to time, do not amount to an “injury

2 24-6530 respecting her employment terms or conditions.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,

601 U.S. 346, 359 (2024); see id. at 354–55, 359 (interpreting Title VII’s

analogous “adverse employment action” element).

b. Second, Defendant had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

transferring Plaintiff to a different position. See Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins.

Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing the burden-shifting

framework for ADA claims); see also Murray, 934 F.3d at 1105 (stating the but-for

causation standard for ADA claims). Defendant transferred Plaintiff to patrol due

to the need for consistent coverage in the photo enforcement and vehicle impound

units; the existing backlog in the photo enforcement unit; and Plaintiff’s frequent

absences. Accordingly, Defendant placed Plaintiff in a unit that would be able to

operate normally during her absences. Plaintiff does not identify “specific and

substantial” evidence reflecting that Defendant’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Becerril v. Pima Cnty. Assessor’s Off., 587 F.3d 1162, 1163 (9th Cir. 2009) (per

curiam) (citation omitted).

2. The district court also correctly granted summary judgment to Defendant

on Plaintiff’s ADA claim of retaliation. Plaintiff’s transfer was not a “materially

adverse” action sufficient to support an ADA retaliation claim. See Burlington N.

& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (stating standard). Plaintiff

also asserts a second adverse action: her supervisor’s refusal, on one day, to assist

3 24-6530 her at the vehicle impound unit’s public window. But any “trivial harm[]” from

that incident does not rise to the level of an adverse action. Id.; see Kortan v. Cal.

Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that being

ridiculed and criticized by a supervisor did not amount to an adverse employment

action).1

3. Finally, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to

Defendant on Plaintiff’s claims under the FMLA and FFCRA. To prevail on each

of those claims, Plaintiff must show that she suffered an adverse employment

action. See Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1122, 1124–25

(9th Cir. 2001) (FMLA interference claim); Sanders v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d

772, 777 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (FMLA retaliation claim); Families First

Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 5104, 134 Stat. 178, 196–97

(2020). Again, Plaintiff’s transfer does not constitute an adverse employment

action. And any “increased scrutiny” of Plaintiff’s FMLA file was not an adverse

action. As Plaintiff acknowledged, that “scrutiny” was in fact an interactive

process that Defendant customarily holds for employees who are on light duty, and

it did not result in negative consequences for Plaintiff.

AFFIRMED.

1 Although Burlington and Kortan concern Title VII claims, we analyze retaliation claims under the ADA and Title VII using the same framework. Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 850 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004).

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