[Cite as Royer v. Dillow, 2014-Ohio-53.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIANE ROYER, Individually and as JUDGES: Administrator and Representative of the Hon. William B. Hoffman, P. J. Estate and Next of Kin of DANIEL Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. LEFEBVRE, Deceased Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Plaintiff-Appellant
-vs- Case No. 13 CA 71
RAY DILLOW, et al.
Defendants-Appellees OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 12 CV 1425
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 9, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee ArcelorMittal
GORDON M. EYSTER ROBERT J. HANNEN MCKOWN & MCKOWN DANIEL TOMASSETTI 10 Mansfield Avenue 1001 Corporate Drive, Suite 200 Shelby, Ohio 44875 Canonsburg PA 15317
For Defendants-Appellees Dillow, Crouse Trucking and Mark Crouse
AUDREY E. VARWIG JOSEPH J. GOLIAN DICKIE, MCCAMEY & CHILCOTE 2109 Stella Court Columbus, Ohio 43215 Richland County, Case No. 13 CA 71 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Diane Royer, individually and as administrator and
representative of the estate and next of kin of Daniel Lefebvre, appeals from the
decision of the Court of Common Pleas, Richland County, which disqualified her trial
counsel, on the basis of conflict of interest, during the pendency of a wrongful-death
lawsuit against Defendants-Appellees Ray Dillow, et al. The relevant procedural facts
leading to this appeal are as follows.
{¶2} On November 27, 2012, appellant, individually and as administrator of the
estate and next of kin of Daniel Lefebvre, filed a lawsuit in the Richland County Court of
Common Pleas, alleging that on November 29, 2010, Appellee Ray Dillow had struck
Daniel with a tractor-trailer in the parking lot of ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Shelby,
Inc. in Shelby, Ohio, causing Daniel’s death. Appellant was represented in the suit by
Attorney Gordon Eyster, who maintains a civil law practice in addition to serving as the
part-time law director for the city of Shelby, Ohio, a position he has held since January
1, 2012. At the time Attorney Eyster took office, a criminal case against Dillow was
purportedly pending in the municipal court. It appears that Dillow entered a plea of
either guilty or no contest to vehicular homicide and/or vehicular manslaughter in that
case.
{¶3} On May 20, 2013, in the aforesaid civil case, ArcelorMittal filed a written
motion requesting the disqualification of Attorney Eyster as counsel for appellant,
alleging a conflict of interest under Prof.Cond.R. 1.11(c) and 1.11(d)(2)(ii), as well as
R.C. 102.03(A)(1). Richland County, Case No. 13 CA 71 3
{¶4} On July 25, 2013, the trial court issued a judgment entry ordering that
Attorney Eyster was precluded from representing appellant in the pending lawsuit. The
trial court found, inter alia, that “Gordon Eyster acted as law director of [the city of]
Shelby [Ohio] in the prosecution of Ray Dillow for causing the death of Daniel Lefebvre.”
Order on Defendant ArcelorMittal’s Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel, at 2. The
trial court therein relied on R.C. 102.03(A)(1), as further discussed infra, although the
court also found Attorney Eyster “is probably also precluded from that representation in
these circumstances by the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct Rule 1.11(d)(2)(ii).” Id.
at 3.
{¶5} On August 20, 2013, appellant filed a notice of appeal. She herein raises
the following sole Assignment of Error:
{¶6} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISQUALIFYING ATTORNEY
EYSTER WHEN BASING THE RULING ON AN INCORRECT ASSUMPTION – THAT
ATTORNEY EYSTER HAD PREVIOUSLY REPRESENTED THE VICTIMS IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE AND THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
MATTERS SIMULTANEOUSLY.”
I.
{¶7} In her sole Assignment of Error, appellant argues the trial court erred in
disqualifying her trial counsel, Attorney Gordon Eyster. We agree, to the extent that the
trial court should have conducted a hearing under these circumstances before deciding
the issue of disqualification.
{¶8} A trial court’s disqualification of counsel is an order that affects a
substantial right and is final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02. Ross v. Ross (1994), Richland County, Case No. 13 CA 71 4
94 Ohio App.3d 123, 129, 640 N.E.2d 265; LLE Corp. v. Mitsubishi Corp. (May 24,
1995), Tuscarawas App. No. 94AP110078. A determination to disqualify or not
disqualify counsel is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Sarbey v. National
City Bank, Akron (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 18, 583 N.E.2d 392. In order to find an abuse
of discretion, we must determine that the trial court's decision was unreasonable,
arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v.
Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140. However, disqualification “is a
drastic measure which should not be imposed unless absolutely necessary.”
Waliszewski v. Caravona Builders, Inc. (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 429, 433 (additional
citations and internal quotations omitted).
{¶9} The trial court in the case sub judice, in its decision to disqualify Attorney
Eyster, relied chiefly on R.C. 102.03(A)(1), which states:
{¶10} “No present or former public official or employee shall, during public
employment or service or for twelve months thereafter, represent a client or act in a
representative capacity for any person on any matter in which the public official or
employee personally participated as a public official or employee through decision,
approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation, or other
substantial exercise of administrative discretion.”
{¶11} Furthermore, pursuant to 102.03(A)(5), the term “matter,” for purposes of
division (A)(1) of this section of the statute, “includes any case, proceeding, application,
determination, issue, or question, but does not include the proposal, consideration, or
enactment of statutes, rules, ordinances, resolutions, or charter or constitutional
amendments.” Richland County, Case No. 13 CA 71 5
{¶12} The trial court further indicated in its order of July 25, 2013 that Attorney
Eyster was “probably also precluded” from representing appellant under these
circumstances by Prof.Cond.R. 1.11(d)(2)(ii), which states: “Except as law may
otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee
*** shall not *** negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a
party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally
and substantially ***.”
{¶13} Appellant herein has argued, both in her response to the disqualification
motion in the trial court and in her present brief, that at minimum an evidentiary hearing
is warranted in this matter. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a court must hold an
evidentiary hearing on a motion for disqualification in the specific situation where an
attorney has left a law firm that represents one party to an action and has joined a firm
that represents an opposing party. See Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., Inc.
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[Cite as Royer v. Dillow, 2014-Ohio-53.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIANE ROYER, Individually and as JUDGES: Administrator and Representative of the Hon. William B. Hoffman, P. J. Estate and Next of Kin of DANIEL Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. LEFEBVRE, Deceased Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Plaintiff-Appellant
-vs- Case No. 13 CA 71
RAY DILLOW, et al.
Defendants-Appellees OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 12 CV 1425
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 9, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee ArcelorMittal
GORDON M. EYSTER ROBERT J. HANNEN MCKOWN & MCKOWN DANIEL TOMASSETTI 10 Mansfield Avenue 1001 Corporate Drive, Suite 200 Shelby, Ohio 44875 Canonsburg PA 15317
For Defendants-Appellees Dillow, Crouse Trucking and Mark Crouse
AUDREY E. VARWIG JOSEPH J. GOLIAN DICKIE, MCCAMEY & CHILCOTE 2109 Stella Court Columbus, Ohio 43215 Richland County, Case No. 13 CA 71 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Diane Royer, individually and as administrator and
representative of the estate and next of kin of Daniel Lefebvre, appeals from the
decision of the Court of Common Pleas, Richland County, which disqualified her trial
counsel, on the basis of conflict of interest, during the pendency of a wrongful-death
lawsuit against Defendants-Appellees Ray Dillow, et al. The relevant procedural facts
leading to this appeal are as follows.
{¶2} On November 27, 2012, appellant, individually and as administrator of the
estate and next of kin of Daniel Lefebvre, filed a lawsuit in the Richland County Court of
Common Pleas, alleging that on November 29, 2010, Appellee Ray Dillow had struck
Daniel with a tractor-trailer in the parking lot of ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Shelby,
Inc. in Shelby, Ohio, causing Daniel’s death. Appellant was represented in the suit by
Attorney Gordon Eyster, who maintains a civil law practice in addition to serving as the
part-time law director for the city of Shelby, Ohio, a position he has held since January
1, 2012. At the time Attorney Eyster took office, a criminal case against Dillow was
purportedly pending in the municipal court. It appears that Dillow entered a plea of
either guilty or no contest to vehicular homicide and/or vehicular manslaughter in that
case.
{¶3} On May 20, 2013, in the aforesaid civil case, ArcelorMittal filed a written
motion requesting the disqualification of Attorney Eyster as counsel for appellant,
alleging a conflict of interest under Prof.Cond.R. 1.11(c) and 1.11(d)(2)(ii), as well as
R.C. 102.03(A)(1). Richland County, Case No. 13 CA 71 3
{¶4} On July 25, 2013, the trial court issued a judgment entry ordering that
Attorney Eyster was precluded from representing appellant in the pending lawsuit. The
trial court found, inter alia, that “Gordon Eyster acted as law director of [the city of]
Shelby [Ohio] in the prosecution of Ray Dillow for causing the death of Daniel Lefebvre.”
Order on Defendant ArcelorMittal’s Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel, at 2. The
trial court therein relied on R.C. 102.03(A)(1), as further discussed infra, although the
court also found Attorney Eyster “is probably also precluded from that representation in
these circumstances by the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct Rule 1.11(d)(2)(ii).” Id.
at 3.
{¶5} On August 20, 2013, appellant filed a notice of appeal. She herein raises
the following sole Assignment of Error:
{¶6} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISQUALIFYING ATTORNEY
EYSTER WHEN BASING THE RULING ON AN INCORRECT ASSUMPTION – THAT
ATTORNEY EYSTER HAD PREVIOUSLY REPRESENTED THE VICTIMS IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE AND THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
MATTERS SIMULTANEOUSLY.”
I.
{¶7} In her sole Assignment of Error, appellant argues the trial court erred in
disqualifying her trial counsel, Attorney Gordon Eyster. We agree, to the extent that the
trial court should have conducted a hearing under these circumstances before deciding
the issue of disqualification.
{¶8} A trial court’s disqualification of counsel is an order that affects a
substantial right and is final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02. Ross v. Ross (1994), Richland County, Case No. 13 CA 71 4
94 Ohio App.3d 123, 129, 640 N.E.2d 265; LLE Corp. v. Mitsubishi Corp. (May 24,
1995), Tuscarawas App. No. 94AP110078. A determination to disqualify or not
disqualify counsel is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Sarbey v. National
City Bank, Akron (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 18, 583 N.E.2d 392. In order to find an abuse
of discretion, we must determine that the trial court's decision was unreasonable,
arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v.
Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140. However, disqualification “is a
drastic measure which should not be imposed unless absolutely necessary.”
Waliszewski v. Caravona Builders, Inc. (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 429, 433 (additional
citations and internal quotations omitted).
{¶9} The trial court in the case sub judice, in its decision to disqualify Attorney
Eyster, relied chiefly on R.C. 102.03(A)(1), which states:
{¶10} “No present or former public official or employee shall, during public
employment or service or for twelve months thereafter, represent a client or act in a
representative capacity for any person on any matter in which the public official or
employee personally participated as a public official or employee through decision,
approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation, or other
substantial exercise of administrative discretion.”
{¶11} Furthermore, pursuant to 102.03(A)(5), the term “matter,” for purposes of
division (A)(1) of this section of the statute, “includes any case, proceeding, application,
determination, issue, or question, but does not include the proposal, consideration, or
enactment of statutes, rules, ordinances, resolutions, or charter or constitutional
amendments.” Richland County, Case No. 13 CA 71 5
{¶12} The trial court further indicated in its order of July 25, 2013 that Attorney
Eyster was “probably also precluded” from representing appellant under these
circumstances by Prof.Cond.R. 1.11(d)(2)(ii), which states: “Except as law may
otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee
*** shall not *** negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a
party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally
and substantially ***.”
{¶13} Appellant herein has argued, both in her response to the disqualification
motion in the trial court and in her present brief, that at minimum an evidentiary hearing
is warranted in this matter. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a court must hold an
evidentiary hearing on a motion for disqualification in the specific situation where an
attorney has left a law firm that represents one party to an action and has joined a firm
that represents an opposing party. See Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., Inc.
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258, syllabus. However, the Ohio Supreme Court
has “never held that a court must hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on every
motion for disqualification.” Dayton Bar Assoc. v. Parisi, 131 Ohio St.3d 345, 965
N.E.2d 268, 2012-Ohio-879, ¶ 15. We have likewise held that an evidentiary hearing,
where the parties may examine and cross-examine witnesses, is not necessary on all
motions for disqualification. See Shawnee Assocs., L.P. v. Shawnee Hills, 5th Dist.
Delaware No. 07CAE050022, 2008–Ohio–461, ¶ 34.
{¶14} Nonetheless, a review of the present record on appeal reveals that both
appellees’ motion to disqualify and appellant’s response, although quite competently
presented, have no documentation or affidavits attached, except for an unauthenticated Richland County, Case No. 13 CA 71 6
copy of a partial police report. It is unfeasible for this Court to determine, from the
limited record, Attorney Eyster’s level of involvement in the criminal case in his capacity
as law director, to ascertain the timing of Attorney Eyster’s attorney-client relationship
with appellant, or other pertinent facts pertaining to a conflict of interest. Under these
circumstances, this Court should not take on the task of issuing an appellate decision
on an important issue involving attorney ethics and professional conduct without a
sound factual record as a foundation.
{¶15} We therefore sustain, in part, appellant’s sole Assignment of Error, and
order this matter remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the motion to
disqualify Attorney Gordon Eyster as appellant’s trial counsel.
{¶16} For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the Court
of Common Pleas, Richland County, Ohio, is hereby reversed and remanded with
directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion to disqualify.
By: Wise, J.
Farmer, J., concurs.
Hoffman, P. J., dissents. Richland County, Case No. 13 CA 71 7
Hoffman, P.J., dissenting
{¶17} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
{¶18} I find additional documentation or affidavits and an evidentiary hearing are
not necessary based upon the undisputed facts concerning Appellant’s dual
representation. The trial court properly interpreted and applied R.C. 102.03(A)(1). I find
no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s disqualification order and would affirm its
judgment.