Royer v. Coupe

29 F. 358
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts
DecidedOctober 15, 1886
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 29 F. 358 (Royer v. Coupe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Royer v. Coupe, 29 F. 358 (circtdma 1886).

Opinion

Carpenter, J.,

(charging jury.) It may be useful for you to understand, in a general way, what is the nature of these rights that are called patent-rights, and of which this claim which is brought here is one. You know to how large an extent the progress of the country has depended upon new and useful inventions in the mechanical and other useful arts, and the attention of the congress was early turned, in pursuance of the constitution, to the consideration of what methods ought to be ado¡3ted, in the first place, to protect the rights of inventors, and, in the second place,—which is equally important,—to protect the rights of the public. In order to accomplish these two results, the patent law's have been enacted, which provide, in general terms, as follows: He who has invented a new and improved process or machine may, if he sees fit, retain within his own breast the knowledge of the thing; or, if he constructs machinery for the purpose of illustrating his invention, and puts it into use, or, if he carries on the process which he has invented, he may choose to carry it on secretly, and, if he is able to preserve the secret from the depredations of others, he may thus retain a perpetual monopoly,—a perpetual, exclusive use of the invention,—and may thus, as it were, perpetually levy tribute upon the public for the use of it. The provision of the law, however, is that if ho will make public the machine or the process which he has invented,—if he will put down upon paper a clear, distinct, and intelligible description of it,—then the government will give him the exclusive right, for a definite number of years, (under the present condition of the law, for 17 years,) to use that improvement; the consideration for that grant being, of course, that he has made it known to the public, so that when the 17 years shall have expired the public will not only have the right, but they will also be able, to exercise this art for their own profit and advantage. So that you see on one side is a special grant made by the government to the inventor, that he shall have the exclusive use of his invention for a certain time; and there is, on the other hand, a consideration given for it by the inventor; that is to say, the disclosure of his invention, so that the public may afterwards have the benefit of it.

Now, this grant which is thus made to an inventor constitutes property to which he is entitled, and, as in the case of all other property, the law forbids any encroachment or infringement upon this right. That is to [361]*361say, just as the law forbids any man to take and carry off the physical property, as the book, or the knife, or the tool, employed by another in his work, so it prohibits any person from using or practicing the invention in respect of which this patent has been issued; and, in case any such infraction of the law should occur, the patentee has a right to bring his action against the person who has so interfered with his rights, and recover from him such reasonable damages, or such other relief, as the forms of law permit. He is allowed, and for a long number of years in the past he has been allowed, to bring his action either on the law side, as it is phrased, or on the equity side, of the court. That is to say, he may cause his dispute to bo brought for determination before a jury, as in ibis ease, or before the court, as in an equity case; and he is allowed free liberty of choice between these different remedies, choosing, of course, that one which, according to his judgment and the best advice that he can get, will be the most advantageous to him. If the patent has expired, as in this case, he is compelled by the law to bring his action before a jury, and the attitude in which he stands is this: He has no longer an exclusive right to this invention. That is to say, it is competent for any person in the community, notwithstanding the patent which wo have here produced, at this present time, and to-day, to make the machine described in his patent. During the period of time, however, when the patent was in force, it was not lawful for any person to make such a machine. Therefore, if during that time, as is here alleged, the defendants have made a machine which contains the invention patented by him, supposing you find that to be a practical and valid invention,their Ms right now to recover such damages as he may have suffered is perfect and complete.

The provision of law that no person shall take, or use, or infringe the rights of a patentee does not depend upon the knowledge on the part of the public of the patent itself; that is to say, an actual knowledge. The patent is public, and is accessible to any person who may conceive that Ms business interests will be subserved by his finding out what his rights are and what they are not; but, whether he reads the patent or not, he is nevertheless bound by it. Tie cannot excuse himself by alleging, or by proving even, if he can prove it, that he was not aware of the rights of the patentee. A patentee’s rights are derived from the grant of the government, and are complete from the time when the patent is sealed and delivered to him, and it is the business of every person in the community to avoid infringements, at his own risk. Nor is it necessary, gentlemen, before bringing the action, that the patentee should notify or inform the defendant that he conceives there is an infringement of his patent. If it were necessary, for example, that notice should be given, then the conversation which took place between one of the plaintiffs, Herman Eoyer, and one of the defendants, Coupe, at the shop of the defendants, in Attleboro, in 1880, as that conversation is detailed by Coupe himself, throwing out of the account the statements made by Eoyer, would have been sufficient to put the defendants on their guard, and to notify them that a claim was or might be made against them. [362]*362But in this case it is not necessary to show any notice. The plaintiff may produce his patent, which is the evidence óf his right, and if he shows that it has, in point of fact, been infringed, then it will be no defense to his action if the defendant either prove that he did not know of the existence of the patent, or that the plaintiff neglected to notify him. He was bound to know, and the plaintiff was not bound to assist his information or knowledge by notifying him.

I shall now give you, gentlemen, as briefly as may be, a statement of the different defenses which are set up against this action, and a statement of the principles by which you must be guided in determining the issue. You will understand that it is undisputed that here is a patent issued in regular form of law, after the proper application, accompanied by the proper affidavits, and on the performance of all those acts and things which are required by the statute to the valid issue of a patent. If that were all, the right of the plaintiff would be clear beyond a question, because the patent itself, unaccompanied by other evidence, is to be taken by you as sufficient evidence of its own validity, and of the propriety of the act of the government in issuing it. There axe certain defenses here made, however, all of which you must take into account, and I shall, as I have said, briefly state them to you.

In the first place, the defendants plead the statute of limitations. That is to say, they plead that, as to the claim which is brought against them, part of it is based upon actions performed by them more than six years before the date of the writ.

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Bluebook (online)
29 F. 358, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/royer-v-coupe-circtdma-1886.