1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 CYNTHIA ROYAL, Case No. 21-cv-1612-BAS-LR
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING JOINT 13 v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND EXPENSES (ECF No. 26) 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security 15 Administration 16 Defendant. 17
18 On September 15, 2021, Plaintiff Cynthia Royal (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint 19 against Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security 20 (“Defendant”), seeking judicial review of Defendant’s decision to deny Plaintiff disability 21 insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 423. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff moved for 22 summary judgment on June 24, 2022, seeking a remand for a new hearing and decision. 23 (ECF No. 15.) In response, Defendant cross-moved for summary judgment, requesting 24 that the Court uphold Defendant’s decision. (ECF No. 19.) The Court then referred this 25 matter to United States Magistrate Judge Lupe Rodriguez, Jr., who issued a Report and 26 Recommendation (“R&R”) on January 23, 2023, recommending that Plaintiff’s motion for 27 summary judgment be granted, that Defendant’s cross-motion be denied, and that the 28 1 matter be remanded for further administrative proceedings. (R&R, ECF No. 22.) This 2 Court adopted the R&R in its entirety on February 14, 2023. (Order, ECF No. 24.) 3 Now before the Court is a joint motion to award Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount 4 of $7,900 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), and $402 5 in costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. (Joint Mot., ECF No. 26.) The Joint Motion is brought 6 as a stipulation of a compromise settlement between the parties regarding Plaintiff’s 7 request for attorney fees and costs, and is accordingly unopposed. (Id.) For the foregoing 8 reasons, the Court GRANTS the Joint Motion and awards Plaintiff attorney fees and 9 expenses in the amount of $7,900, as well as costs in the amount of $402. 11 When tasked with assessing a request for an award of attorney fees and costs under 12 the EAJA, courts generally deploy a two-pronged inquiry. First, courts inquire whether 13 the EAJA warrants such an award under the particular facts and circumstances. Assuming 14 an award of fees and costs comports with the EAJA, courts next assess whether the amount 15 of the proposed award is reasonable. See Pham v. Berryhill, No. 15-cv-2107-BAS (DHB), 16 2018 WL 1336282, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2018); Torquato v. Saul, No. 17-cv-2127- 17 BAS-NLS, 2020 WL 2849947, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 2, 2020); Larson v. Kijakazi, No. 20- 18 cv-1926-BAS-AHG, 2022 WL 848317, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2022). 19 A. An Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Comports With the EAJA 20 The EAJA provides that “a court shall award a prevailing party . . . fees and other 21 expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United 22 States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially 23 justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); 24 see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002). Thus, to be eligible for 25 attorney’s fees under the EAJA: (1) the claimant must be a “prevailing party”; (2) the 26 Government’s position must not have been “substantially justified”; and (3) no special 27 circumstances can exist that make an award of attorney’s fees unjust. Comm’r, I.N.S. v. 28 Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990). 1 The Supreme Court has held that a position may be substantially justified “if it has 2 a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2 (1988). 3 When determining whether the Government’s position was substantially justified, the court 4 considers “both the government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action 5 giving rise to the civil action.” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). The 6 Government’s position must be, “as a whole, substantially justified.” Gutierrez v. 7 Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258–59 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). It also “must be 8 substantially justified at each stage of the proceedings.” Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 9 1052 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[D]istrict courts should focus on 10 whether the [G]overnment’s position on the particular issue on which the claimant earned 11 remand was substantially justified, not on whether the government’s ultimate disability 12 determination was substantially justified.” Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th 13 Cir. 2010) (citing Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1990)). “It is the 14 [G]overnment’s burden to show that its position was substantially justified or that special 15 circumstances exist to make an award unjust.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. 16 There is no doubt Plaintiff is the prevailing party: she demonstrated the 17 Administrative Law Judge committed legal error in evaluating the medical opinion 18 evidence available in the administrative record and, therefore, successfully moved to 19 remand the instant matter to the Social Security Administration for further development of 20 the record. (See R&R at 12.) Nor does Defendant carry its burden in demonstrating either 21 that its position was “substantially justified” or an award of attorney fees under the 22 circumstances would be “unjust.” See Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258 (holding burden rests 23 with Government to demonstrate an award under the EAJA is unwarranted). Indeed, 24 Defendant effectively concedes its position had no reasonable basis in law and fact, and 25 that there no special circumstances exist that would make the award of attorney’s fees and 26 costs here unjust. Therefore, an award of attorney fees and costs under the EAJA is 27 appropriate in this case. 28 1 B. The Amount Sought is Reasonable 2 In assessing the reasonableness of attorney fees, courts should apply the lodestar 3 method. Costa v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012). The 4 court calculates the number of hours reasonably expended on the case—cutting any 5 excessive, redundant, or unnecessary hours—and multiplies those hours by a reasonable 6 hourly rate. Id. Generally, the court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional 7 judgment as to how much time was required for the case. Id.: Moreno v. City of 8 Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]fter all, [the winning lawyer] won, 9 and might not have, had he [or she] been more of a slacker.”). 10 Here, the parties also have reached an agreement as to the amount of fees, and 11 presumably stipulate to the fees’ reasonableness. The Court agrees.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 CYNTHIA ROYAL, Case No. 21-cv-1612-BAS-LR
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING JOINT 13 v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND EXPENSES (ECF No. 26) 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security 15 Administration 16 Defendant. 17
18 On September 15, 2021, Plaintiff Cynthia Royal (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint 19 against Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security 20 (“Defendant”), seeking judicial review of Defendant’s decision to deny Plaintiff disability 21 insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 423. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff moved for 22 summary judgment on June 24, 2022, seeking a remand for a new hearing and decision. 23 (ECF No. 15.) In response, Defendant cross-moved for summary judgment, requesting 24 that the Court uphold Defendant’s decision. (ECF No. 19.) The Court then referred this 25 matter to United States Magistrate Judge Lupe Rodriguez, Jr., who issued a Report and 26 Recommendation (“R&R”) on January 23, 2023, recommending that Plaintiff’s motion for 27 summary judgment be granted, that Defendant’s cross-motion be denied, and that the 28 1 matter be remanded for further administrative proceedings. (R&R, ECF No. 22.) This 2 Court adopted the R&R in its entirety on February 14, 2023. (Order, ECF No. 24.) 3 Now before the Court is a joint motion to award Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount 4 of $7,900 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), and $402 5 in costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. (Joint Mot., ECF No. 26.) The Joint Motion is brought 6 as a stipulation of a compromise settlement between the parties regarding Plaintiff’s 7 request for attorney fees and costs, and is accordingly unopposed. (Id.) For the foregoing 8 reasons, the Court GRANTS the Joint Motion and awards Plaintiff attorney fees and 9 expenses in the amount of $7,900, as well as costs in the amount of $402. 11 When tasked with assessing a request for an award of attorney fees and costs under 12 the EAJA, courts generally deploy a two-pronged inquiry. First, courts inquire whether 13 the EAJA warrants such an award under the particular facts and circumstances. Assuming 14 an award of fees and costs comports with the EAJA, courts next assess whether the amount 15 of the proposed award is reasonable. See Pham v. Berryhill, No. 15-cv-2107-BAS (DHB), 16 2018 WL 1336282, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2018); Torquato v. Saul, No. 17-cv-2127- 17 BAS-NLS, 2020 WL 2849947, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 2, 2020); Larson v. Kijakazi, No. 20- 18 cv-1926-BAS-AHG, 2022 WL 848317, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2022). 19 A. An Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Comports With the EAJA 20 The EAJA provides that “a court shall award a prevailing party . . . fees and other 21 expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United 22 States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially 23 justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); 24 see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002). Thus, to be eligible for 25 attorney’s fees under the EAJA: (1) the claimant must be a “prevailing party”; (2) the 26 Government’s position must not have been “substantially justified”; and (3) no special 27 circumstances can exist that make an award of attorney’s fees unjust. Comm’r, I.N.S. v. 28 Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990). 1 The Supreme Court has held that a position may be substantially justified “if it has 2 a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2 (1988). 3 When determining whether the Government’s position was substantially justified, the court 4 considers “both the government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action 5 giving rise to the civil action.” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). The 6 Government’s position must be, “as a whole, substantially justified.” Gutierrez v. 7 Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258–59 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). It also “must be 8 substantially justified at each stage of the proceedings.” Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 9 1052 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[D]istrict courts should focus on 10 whether the [G]overnment’s position on the particular issue on which the claimant earned 11 remand was substantially justified, not on whether the government’s ultimate disability 12 determination was substantially justified.” Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th 13 Cir. 2010) (citing Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1990)). “It is the 14 [G]overnment’s burden to show that its position was substantially justified or that special 15 circumstances exist to make an award unjust.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. 16 There is no doubt Plaintiff is the prevailing party: she demonstrated the 17 Administrative Law Judge committed legal error in evaluating the medical opinion 18 evidence available in the administrative record and, therefore, successfully moved to 19 remand the instant matter to the Social Security Administration for further development of 20 the record. (See R&R at 12.) Nor does Defendant carry its burden in demonstrating either 21 that its position was “substantially justified” or an award of attorney fees under the 22 circumstances would be “unjust.” See Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258 (holding burden rests 23 with Government to demonstrate an award under the EAJA is unwarranted). Indeed, 24 Defendant effectively concedes its position had no reasonable basis in law and fact, and 25 that there no special circumstances exist that would make the award of attorney’s fees and 26 costs here unjust. Therefore, an award of attorney fees and costs under the EAJA is 27 appropriate in this case. 28 1 B. The Amount Sought is Reasonable 2 In assessing the reasonableness of attorney fees, courts should apply the lodestar 3 method. Costa v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012). The 4 court calculates the number of hours reasonably expended on the case—cutting any 5 excessive, redundant, or unnecessary hours—and multiplies those hours by a reasonable 6 hourly rate. Id. Generally, the court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional 7 judgment as to how much time was required for the case. Id.: Moreno v. City of 8 Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]fter all, [the winning lawyer] won, 9 and might not have, had he [or she] been more of a slacker.”). 10 Here, the parties also have reached an agreement as to the amount of fees, and 11 presumably stipulate to the fees’ reasonableness. The Court agrees. Per Plaintiff’s 12 retention agreement, Plaintiff’s attorney was to receive up to twenty-five percent of 13 Plaintiff’s past due benefits, if Plaintiff’s case was successful. (ECF No. 26-2.) In light of 14 these considerations, the agreed-upon $7,900 in attorney fees and expenses, $400.00 in 15 costs, appears reasonable. The Joint Motion provides additional terms regarding making 16 the fees payable to Plaintiff to be assigned to her attorney and addresses offsets allowed 17 under the United States Department of the Treasury’s Offset Program. Additionally, the 18 Joint Motion states, “Fees and expenses shall be made payable to Plaintiff, but if the 19 Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, then the 20 Government shall cause the payment of fees and expenses to be made directly to Plaintiff’s 21 counsel, pursuant to the assignment executed by Plaintiff.” (Joint Mot. at 3.) Given the 22 parties have compromised to come to these terms, the Court finds these additional terms 23 reasonable. 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 2 The Court finds Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, is entitled to fees in this case and 3 || that the requested fees and terms are reasonable. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Joint 4 Motion (ECF No. 26), and awards Plaintiff attorney fees and expenses in the amount of 5 $7,900.00, and costs in the amount of $402.00. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. / , 7 || DATED: March 15, 2023 Lin A (Lyohaa 6 g United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28