IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Royal R. Davis, Jr., FILED Aug 20 2026, 9:02 am
Appellant-Defendant
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
v. and Tax Court
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
August 20, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-2433
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Judge Trial Court Cause No.
02D05-2309-MR-20
Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas
Judge Felix concurs.
Judge Bradford concurs in part and concurs in result in part with separate opinion.
Tavitas, Chief Judge.
Case Summary [1] Following a jury trial, Royal Davis, Jr., was convicted of felony murder and
found to have used a firearm during the commission of the crime. Davis also pleaded guilty to resisting law enforcement. The trial court sentenced Davis to an aggregate sentence of seventy-seven years. Davis appeals, and we affirm.
Issues [2] Davis presents three issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court clearly erred by allowing the State to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike prospective juror 101 (“Juror 101”).
II. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Davis’ conviction for felony murder.
III. Whether Davis’ sentence is inappropriate.
Facts [3] On the evening of September 14, 2023, Jessica Fuentes contacted her friend,
Secret McKinney, because Fuentes needed to purchase some “Ice,” meaning Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2433 | August 20, 2026 Page 2 of 26 methamphetamine, for her live-in boyfriend, Davis. Tr. Vol. III p. 177. Both Fuentes and Davis were active methamphetamine users at the time. Fuentes drove Davis’ Hyundai Santa Fe to McKinney’s apartment, but McKinney did not have the drug Fuentes wanted. McKinney’s friend, Robert Ward, who was present at the apartment, told Fuentes that he knew another source, Travis Gilbert.
[4] Fuentes called Davis and discussed meeting Gilbert to buy methamphetamine. Davis stated, “No, f**k that. Come pick me up.” Id. at 179. Fuentes drove McKinney and Ward back to the apartment she shared with Davis and picked up Davis. The four drove to a gas station, which was the final agreed-upon location for the purchase from Gilbert.
[5] Davis gave Ward $300 to purchase the methamphetamine. Gilbert arrived in the passenger seat of a blue sedan. Ward entered Gilbert’s car, gave him the money, and received a package wrapped in a t-shirt. Gilbert mentioned that he was headed to a nearby strip club.
[6] The group returned to Davis and Fuentes’ apartment, where Fuentes discovered that the package contained rock salt rather than methamphetamine. Davis directed Ward to call Gilbert and correct the situation, but Ward’s repeated calls went unanswered. The four then set out to find Gilbert. Before leaving, Davis directed Fuentes to leave her cell phone behind and left his own behind as well. Davis rode a moped, while the other three followed in Davis’ Santa Fe, driven by Fuentes. The group eventually proceeded to the strip club, where they located Gilbert’s blue sedan. They waited, and when Gilbert and the driver left the club and drove away, they followed them to a residence.
[7] As Gilbert exited his car at the residence, Davis confronted him and demanded his money back; Fuentes reiterated the demand. Davis carried a .45-caliber handgun, and Fuentes carried a pink 9-millimeter handgun. 1 Gilbert said he had to go inside to get the money, and Davis and Fuentes accompanied him. The three entered through the back door, passing through the kitchen toward the living room, where Gilbert’s father, Steve Gilbert (“Steve”), and his girlfriend, Melinda Hooper, had fallen asleep. Davis was wearing a helmet, Fuentes was wearing a ski mask, and both had their guns pointed at Gilbert.
[8] Steve was awakened by the commotion and found two armed intruders flanking his son. Steve asked Davis what he wanted, and Davis replied that “he wanted [$]500.” Tr. Vol. II p. 225. 2 When Gilbert protested that the amount “was supposed to be [$]300,” Davis grew angry, threatened to kill Gilbert and his family, and struck Gilbert in the head with the barrel of his gun. Id. at 225-
1 The testimony conflicted regarding when Davis armed himself. Ward testified that Davis was pointing a firearm when he first confronted Gilbert. Fuentes, however, testified that Davis initially confronted Gilbert unarmed and directed her to retrieve the two handguns from the Santa Fe’s glove box and that she handed Davis the .45-caliber handgun during the confrontation. Ward further testified that Fuentes made her initial demand from inside the Santa Fe while pointing her handgun out the passenger window. 2 Davis testified that he gave Ward $500 for two ounces, having upgraded from an original $300, one-ounce order. The State’s $300 figure, by contrast, is corroborated by both cooperating witnesses: Fuentes saw Davis hand Ward the money and identified it as $300, and Ward testified that he gave Gilbert that same $300 for the package. This figure is also consistent with Fuentes having set out that evening with exactly $300. Davis’ contrary account is uncorroborated. Davis also directly testified that when Fuentes first went to see McKinney, he handed her “$300.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 184.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2433 | August 20, 2026 Page 4 of 26 26. Davis hit Gilbert so hard that Steve “could hear it crack.” Id. at 226. The blow knocked Gilbert to the floor and also knocked the gun out of Davis’ hand. Davis lost his footing, and his helmet came off. Davis and Steve struggled for the dropped .45, and as they struggled, Fuentes fired at Steve, striking him in the leg. Steve gained control of the gun, and Davis and Fuentes retreated toward the kitchen. Steve fired at the pair from the living room with Davis’ .45, and Davis returned fire from the kitchen using Fuentes’ 9-millimeter. 3
[9] Fuentes fled the house during the exchange of gunfire, and Davis followed. As Davis exited the door, Ward saw him stumble and fire two more shots. Near the same time, Gilbert followed Davis and Fuentes toward the door; Steve heard a couple of gunshots; and Gilbert then retreated inside. Davis and Fuentes ran across the street and were picked up by McKinney and Ward, who were waiting in the Santa Fe. At Davis and Fuentes’ apartment, Davis told the others that he knew “he got” Gilbert but was unsure “how well,” and that he would return and “do it again” if the matter was not resolved. Tr. Vol. III pp. 116-17.
[10] Back inside the house, Gilbert sat down on the stairs, and a bullet wound in his chest began to bleed heavily. Hooper called 911, but Gilbert died before help arrived. The forensic evidence established that Gilbert died from a single bullet
3 Davis testified to the contrary, stating that, once he lost control of the .45, he never struggled with Steve for the gun and sought only to escape; that he never handled the 9-millimeter inside the home; and that Fuentes alone did the shooting.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2433 | August 20, 2026 Page 5 of 26 that entered the back of his arm, passed through his lung, and exited the front of his chest. Seventeen cartridge cases were recovered from the crime scene, nine of which were fired from the .45-caliber handgun Davis carried, and eight from the 9-millimeter handgun Fuentes carried. 4
[11] Police identified Davis as a suspect after a fingerprint on the helmet left at the house matched him; police identified Fuentes as Davis’ girlfriend; and police identified Ward through Facebook messages between Ward and Gilbert found on Gilbert’s phone. On September 15, 2023, law enforcement officers located Davis and Fuentes at their apartment as they packed their belongings and prepared to leave. When the officers attempted a traffic stop, Davis fled and led police on a high-speed chase that ended when he rear-ended another vehicle. Davis, Fuentes, and Ward were subsequently arrested and charged. 5
[12] On September 21, 2023, the State charged Davis with: Count I, felony murder; Count II, attempted robbery, a Level 2 felony; Count III, battery, a Level 5 felony; Count IV, resisting law enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle, a Level 6 felony; and Count V, resisting law enforcement by force resulting in bodily
4 One of the .45-caliber bullets was recovered from beneath Gilbert’s body. Crime-scene examiner, Alan Garriott, testified that this bullet could not have been the round that killed Gilbert because it had been flattened by ricocheting off a wall and “would not have enough velocity left” to make that type of wound. Tr. Vol. IV p. 7. 5 Both Ward and Fuentes testified at trial pursuant to plea agreements. Ward agreed to testify in exchange for an executed sentence capped at nine years for aiding in robbery, a Level 3 felony. Fuentes, originally charged with murder, felony murder, attempted murder, attempted robbery, and criminal recklessness, agreed to testify in exchange for the dismissal of the murder, felony murder, attempted robbery, and criminal recklessness charges and a twenty-five-year cap on the executed portion of her sentence for the attempted murder of Steve.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2433 | August 20, 2026 Page 6 of 26 injury, a Level 6 felony. On April 5, 2024, the State moved to amend the charging information to add Count VI, a firearm enhancement. On June 12, 2025, the State moved to dismiss Count V, and the trial court granted the motion. Davis later entered a plea of guilty to Count IV, resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony.
[13] On July 8, 2025, the case proceeded to a jury trial on felony murder, attempted robbery, battery, and the firearm enhancement. Davis was represented by Attorney Stanley Campbell and Attorney Timothy Stucky for his trial. Three rounds of voir dire were conducted to select the jury. During the first round, the trial court asked the jurors, “[i]s there anything going on in your personal or your professional lives that’s so pressing that you cannot give us your undivided attention?” Tr. Vol. II p. 35. Prospective juror 138 (“Juror 138”) answered, “I don’t have a sitter for my child,” and “[s]ummer care ends at five o’clock.” Id. at 36. When the jurors were asked whether they could be “fair and impartial,” Juror 138 responded that she had experienced the “killing of [her] sibling,” and she was “not entirely sure” about how the experience was going to impact her impartiality in this case. Id. at 47-48. After this round, the State struck Juror 138 using a peremptory challenge, and she was excused by the trial court.
[14] During the third round of voir dire, the State asked the jurors: “[d]oes anybody have any reason that they haven’t talked about yet that would not make them a good juror for this case?” Tr. Vol. II p. 100. Juror 101, who was sitting in seat 12, answered that he was “not sure” about the question. Id. Juror 101 then explained that he had “a family member that was [a] victim of crimes.” Id. He stated, however, that this experience would not affect his thoughts on this case because the family member was also a person who “commit[s] crimes,” including a “similar homicide” in the past. Id. When the State asked whether this might keep him from being “a good juror,” he answered, “[i]t’s possible.” Id. at 100-01.
[15] The State and Davis’ attorneys proceeded to a sidebar conference after the questioning to finalize the jury panel. The State first tried to strike Juror 101 for cause based on Juror 101’s statements about whether he was capable of being a good juror. The trial court denied the strike of Juror 101 for cause. The State then used a peremptory challenge to strike Juror 101. Attorney Campbell did not object to the strike of Juror 101 but made an “observation” that “he’s the only [B]lack person in the panel.” Tr. Vol. II p. 117. When the Deputy Prosecutor pushed back, Attorney Campbell added, “Well, that’s just my observation.” Id. The trial court accepted the “race-neutral reason” given by the Deputy Prosecutor. Id. Both parties signed the jury strike sheets.
[16] After the jury panel of twelve jurors and two alternates were selected, Attorney Stucky informed the court that his client was objecting that “there are no [B]lacks on his jury.” Id. at 118. Davis wanted the record to reflect that his jury was “not a jury of his peers.” Id. at 119. Attorney Stucky added that, if he had heard correctly, the State had used peremptory strikes to remove “the [B]lack person” from both the initial panel and the final panel. Id. The court explained that Juror 138 was removed due to her childcare issues and because she indicated that she could not be fair and impartial due to her experience with law enforcement. The court stated that this was a “race-neutral” reason for striking her, and Attorney Stucky did not dispute the court’s characterization. Id. As to the final panel, the trial court stated that the State had “provided a race-neutral reason” for striking Juror 101, one that would not have supported a challenge for cause, but a race-neutral reason nonetheless. Id.
[17] The State further noted that, even without the peremptory challenge exercised by the State, Juror 101 would not have been reached during the jury selection. The first two rounds of voir dire filled eleven of the twelve juror seats: four jurors were selected in the first round, and seven were selected in the second round. Only three positions, therefore, remained to be filled from the final panel: the twelfth juror and two alternates. The defense struck the prospective jurors in seats 1 through 5, and the State struck the prospective jurors in seats 4, 11, and 12; 6 the prospective juror in seat 6 therefore became the twelfth juror. For the alternates, the defense struck the prospective juror in seat 7, and the prospective jurors in seats 9 and 10 became the alternates. Selection, thus, ended at seat 10, and Juror 101, at seat 12, would not have made it to Davis’ jury panel even absent the State’s peremptory challenge. The trial court agreed with the State’s observation to this effect.
6 The transcript does not expressly state which party struck the prospective juror in seat 8. The record makes clear, however, that Juror 74, who was seated in seat 8 of the final panel, was excused after the parties exercised their peremptory challenges. Because the trial court’s recitation lists seat 4 among both the State’s and Davis’s strikes, the State’s third strike was likely of seat 8, not seat 4. Tr. Vol. II p. 117. The discrepancy, however, is immaterial: under either reading, the jury of twelve was completed at seat 6, the jurors in seats 9 and 10 served as the alternates, and seat 12 would not have been reached.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2433 | August 20, 2026 Page 9 of 26
[18] After the jury was sworn and excused, and outside the presence of the jury, Davis personally addressed the court regarding “the lack of any minorities on his jury.” Id. at 121. Davis claimed that his trial would be “completely prejudiced” because he would be “railroaded with an all-white jury.” Id. at 122-23. Davis added, “This is a racist, prejudiced situation that’s going on in this courtroom.” Id. at 123.
[19] After a four-day trial, on July 11, 2025, the jury found Davis guilty of Count I, felony murder; Count II, attempted robbery, a Level 2 felony; and Count III, battery, a Level 5 felony. In the second phase of the trial, the jury also found that the State had proven the firearm enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court entered judgments of conviction and set the matter for sentencing.
[20] At the sentencing hearing on August 29, 2025, the trial court vacated the attempted robbery and battery convictions on substantive double jeopardy grounds. Davis was sentenced to sixty years for felony murder, enhanced by fifteen years for the firearm enhancement, to be served consecutively to a two- year term for resisting law enforcement, for an aggregate sentence of seventy- seven years executed in the Department of Correction. Davis now appeals.
Discussion and Decision I. The trial court did not clearly err by allowing the State to exercise a peremptory challenge excluding Juror 101.
[21] Davis raises a Batson challenge on appeal and argues that the trial court erred by permitting the State to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike Juror 101, the only Black juror remaining on the venire. Davis contends, moreover, that the strike is significant because the State had also struck Juror 138, another Black juror, earlier during voir dire, and that, as a result, Davis was tried by an all- white jury.
[22] “‘Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.’” Addison v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)). A defendant’s claim of racial discrimination in the State’s use of a peremptory challenge triggers a three-step inquiry. Id.; Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 826-28 (Ind. 2006).
[23] First, the defendant must make a “prima facie showing” of purposeful discrimination. McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1110 (Ind. 2004). At this step, the defendant bears the burden of proving that: (1) the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of a cognizable racial group from the venire; and (2) the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s case raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude venire persons from the jury due to their race. Id. Although the removal of some
Black jurors “does not, by itself, raise an inference of racial discrimination,” the removal of the only Black juror who could have served on the jury does “raise an inference that the juror was excluded on the basis of race.” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1208-09 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[24] Second, if the first step has been satisfied, then the burden shifts to the prosecution to offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror at issue. 7 Id. at 1209.
[25] Third, the trial court evaluates the persuasiveness of the step-two justification and determines whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination. Id. Although the burden of persuasion rests with the party opposing the strike, the third-step determination of purposeful discrimination is the “duty” of the trial court judge, and it is at this step that “implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 1210 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)). Indiana courts have identified several indicia of pretext, such as mischaracterization of voir dire testimony, failure to conduct meaningful voir dire regarding the State’s
7 If the State offers multiple reasons for a strike, mixing permissible and impermissible ones, Indiana and some other states follow the “tainted” approach, under which, if any one reason is facially race-based, the entire strike is tainted regardless of how many neutral reasons accompany it. McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at 1113. Some federal circuits and other states, by contrast, follow “dual motivation” analysis, under which, if the prosecution offers both “legitimate and illegitimate reasons,” it bears the burden of demonstrating that “the strike would have been exercised even in the absence of any discriminatory motivation.” Id. at 1112.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2433 | August 20, 2026 Page 12 of 26 asserted concern, and a proffered reason that applies equally to similarly situated jurors whom the State did not strike. Id. at 1210, 1214-15.
[26] A Batson objection is timely only if it is made immediately after the peremptory challenge is exercised, while the challenged juror and the rest of the venire are still available and the trial court can still remedy the issue. See Chambers v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (“In order for error to be preserved for review, a timely and adequate objection must be raised at trial. The proper time for objection was immediately after the peremptory challenges were made. A timely objection would have allowed the trial court to follow Batson and make a determination regarding the intent of the challenges.”) (citation omitted).
[27] Here, the record shows that, during the sidebar at which the State sought Juror 101’s removal through a peremptory challenge, Attorney Campbell remarked that “the only observation I need to make for the record” was that Juror 101 was “the only [B]lack person in the panel.” Tr. Vol. II p. 117. After the State offered a race-neutral explanation, Attorney Campbell reiterated, “that’s just my observation” without objecting to the State’s reason for striking Juror 101. Id. After the parties signed the jury strike sheets, Attorney Stucky informed the trial court that Davis himself had indicated that “there are no [B]lacks on his jury,” and stated that “it’s not a jury of his peers.” Id. at 118-19. This statement was an observation made after jury selection had concluded rather than an objection to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to strike Juror 101. Thus, because Davis did not make a timely objection, his Batson challenge is waived.
[28] Waiver notwithstanding, Davis’ Batson challenge also fails on the merits. At the first step, the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to strike Juror 101—the only Black juror remaining in the venire—raises an inference that Juror 101 was excluded on the basis of race. Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1208-09; Tr. Vol. II p. 117.
[29] At the second step, the burden shifts to the State to offer a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Although Davis’ untimely “objection” deprived the State of the opportunity to respond to a formal Batson challenge, the record nevertheless contains the State’s contemporaneous explanation. When defense counsel observed that Juror 101 was the only Black member of the panel, the State responded that Juror 101 was “also the only one that said he wasn’t sure if he could be fair and impartial.” Tr. Vol. II p. 117. Juror 101 had disclosed that a family member had been the “victim of crimes” and had committed crimes, including a “similar homicide in the past.” Id. at 100. When the State asked whether his experiences made him think he “might not be a good juror for a case like this,” Juror 101 answered, “It’s possible.” Id. at 100-01.
[30] The second step “does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible”; “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1264 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-68) (internal quotation marks omitted). The explanation, moreover, need not rise to the level required to sustain a challenge for cause. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; Highler, 854 N.E.2d at 827-28 (holding that the prosecutor’s doubt about a juror’s “ability to be fair and impartial to the State” was race-neutral even though the prosecutor conceded it was not “sufficient to strike for cause”). The trial court here recognized this distinction. Although Juror 101’s statements did not support removal for cause, the trial court found that the State established a “race-neutral reason” for its peremptory challenge. Tr. Vol. II p. 117.
[31] At the third step, the trial court evaluates the persuasiveness of the State’s justification. Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1210. “The trial court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s reasons were not pretextual is essentially a finding of fact that turns substantially on credibility. It is therefore accorded great deference.” Highler, 854 N.E.2d at 828. We will not set aside such a finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. Here, the trial court accepted the State’s explanation at the time of the strike and reaffirmed that finding when defense counsel later made a record of Davis’ statement that there were no Black jurors on the jury. The trial court made clear that, although the State’s basis for striking Juror 101 would not support a challenge for cause, the State “provided a race-neutral reason” to support the peremptory challenge. Tr. Vol. II pp. 117, 119.
[32] None of the indicia of pretext identified in Addison are present here. Unlike in Addison, where the State’s proffered reason rested on an inaccurate account of the juror’s testimony and on a concern the State never explored during voir dire, the State’s explanation here tracked Juror 101’s own words in an exchange fully developed on the record. See Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1214-15. Nor does the record reveal a similarly situated prospective juror whom the State accepted. Each prospective juror with some connection to crime who remained on the panel affirmatively stated that the experience would not affect his or her judgment. 8 Tr. Vol. II pp. 92-93, 101.
[33] Finally, none of the statements regarding Juror 101 were proper objections, and none challenged the State’s explanation as pretextual. Attorney Campbell did not object when the State struck Juror 101 but only characterized his remark on the racial composition of the panel as “just my observation.” Tr. Vol. II p. 117. Attorney Stucky’s later statement merely relayed Davis’ assertion that there were “no [B]lacks on his jury,” while noting the State’s strikes of Black persons from two panels. Id. at 118. Davis’ own remarks to the trial court, moreover, expressed only his dissatisfaction with the composition of the jury. None of these statements contended that the State’s explanation for striking Juror 101 was pretextual, identified a similarly-situated juror the State accepted, or pointed to any mischaracterization of Juror 101’s voir dire answers. The State’s explanation rested on Juror 101’s own expressed uncertainty about his ability to serve, not on his race. Waiver notwithstanding, Davis’ Batson challenge, thus, fails on the merits.
8 Prospective juror 29 expressed reservations about his ability to serve and was removed for cause on the agreement of the parties in the first round of jury selection. He answered “[p]robably” when asked whether his experience as the victim of a crime would affect his ability to serve as a juror and, like Juror 101, he was excused. Tr. Vol. II pp. 34, 66. The record does not indicate the race of prospective juror 29.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2433 | August 20, 2026 Page 16 of 26
II. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Davis’ conviction for felony murder.
[34] Davis next argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for felony murder. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury’s determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).
[35] Davis was convicted of felony murder pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-42- 1-1(2), which provides: “A person who: kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit . . . robbery . . . commits murder, a felony.” The predicate offense of robbery is defined by Indiana Code Section 35-42-5-1, which provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who knowingly or intentionally takes property from another person or from the presence of another person:
(1) by using or threatening the use of force on any person;
or
(2) by putting any person in fear;
commits robbery, a Level 5 felony. However, the offense is a Level 3 felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon or results in bodily injury to any person other than a defendant, and a Level 2 felony if it results in serious bodily injury to any person other than a defendant.
[36] The State alleged that Davis, while acting in concert with other individuals, killed Gilbert while committing or attempting to commit robbery. Felony murder does not require the State to prove that the defendant personally killed the victim. Our Supreme Court has held that the statutory language “kills another human being while committing” a felony does not restrict the felony murder provision “only to instances in which the felon is the killer” but applies equally when, “in committing any of the designated felonies, the felon contributes to the death of any person.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; Palmer v. State, 704 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 1999).
[37] First, Davis contends that no attempted robbery occurred because he was merely attempting to recover money that Gilbert swindled from him in the fake- drug transaction, but such a contention does not negate the criminal intent element of robbery. “[T]he law does not sanction the use of self-help with firearms as a debt collection device.” Sheckles v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ind. 1986). Here, Davis followed Gilbert to Steve’s house, struck Gilbert in the head, and threatened to kill Gilbert and his family if he did not get his money back. Whether Gilbert owed money to Davis is immaterial; the jury could reasonably find that Davis intended to take property from Gilbert by using or threatening force and by putting Gilbert and his family in fear and, thus, that Davis committed attempted robbery.
[38] Second, Davis contends that his conduct was not the immediate cause of Gilbert’s death because neither he nor Fuentes engaged in “dangerously violent or threatening conduct” and Steve’s armed response was not reasonably foreseeable. Appellant’s Br. pp. 31-33. A defendant need not fire the fatal shot to be liable for felony murder; it is sufficient that the defendant “reasonably should have . . . foreseen that the commission of or attempt to commit the contemplated felony would create a situation which would expose another to the danger of death.” Palmer, 704 N.E.2d at 126 (quoting Sheckles v. State, 684 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied). When a defendant “engage[s] in dangerously violent and threatening conduct” and thereby “create[s] a situation that expose[s] persons present to the danger of death at the hands of a non-participant who might resist or respond to the conduct,” a resulting death is foreseeable. Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 271 (Ind. 2000).
[39] Davis’ reliance on Layman v. State, 42 N.E.3d 972 (Ind. 2015), is unavailing. In Layman, unarmed juveniles broke into a house believed to be unoccupied and were not engaged in dangerously violent or threatening conduct before the homeowner shot one of them. Id. at 974, 979. Here, by contrast, Davis entered an occupied home armed, held Gilbert at gunpoint, demanded money, threatened to kill the occupants, and pistol-whipped Gilbert. This is precisely the “dangerously violent and threatening conduct” that makes an armed response by a non-participant foreseeable. See Jenkins, 726 N.E.2d at 271; see also Dalton v. State, 56 N.E.3d 644, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
[40] Davis, finally, contends that, even if he attempted a robbery, he abandoned the attempt before Gilbert’s death, and the State failed to disprove abandonment. Davis’ abandonment argument fails. Abandonment is not a defense to felony murder “when death occurs during the attempted commission of a felony.” Sheckles, 501 N.E.2d at 1056. To constitute a defense, moreover, an abandonment must be voluntary. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-10 (“[w]ith respect to a charge under IC 35-41-2-4, IC 35-41-5-1, or IC 35-41-5-2, it is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct voluntarily abandoned his effort to commit the underlying crime and voluntarily prevented its commission.”) (emphasis added). The abandonment, thus, must originate with the accused and not because of “extrinsic factors” that make the accomplishment of the crime more difficult. Smith v. State, 636 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ind. 1994). Here, the attempted robbery failed only after Davis lost his grip on his firearm in the struggle with Steve and came under fire; the shots that struck Gilbert occurred during Davis’ flight from the house. Tr. Vol. II pp. 226-27, 233-35. A retreat compelled by armed resistance is not a voluntary abandonment.
[41] Gilbert’s death occurred during the attempted robbery. Furthermore, Davis’ arguments are merely a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The jury could reasonably have found that Davis killed Gilbert while committing or attempting to commit robbery. Sufficient evidence supports Davis’ conviction for felony murder.
III. Davis’ sentence is not inappropriate.
[42] Next, Davis argues that his sentence is inappropriate. The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Deference to the trial court’s sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant’s character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant revision; “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127 (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).
[43] Additionally, in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
[44] “In considering the nature of the offense we recognize the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025). Davis was convicted of felony murder and resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony, and the jury found the firearm enhancement. Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-3(a) provides: “A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five (55) years.” The firearm enhancement authorizes “an additional fixed term of imprisonment of between five (5) years and twenty (20) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11. Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7(b) provides: “A person who commits a Level 6 felony . . . shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 ½) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” The trial court sentenced Davis to sixty years for the felony murder conviction, enhanced by fifteen years pursuant to the firearm enhancement, and to two years for the resisting law enforcement conviction. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively, for an aggregate term of seventy-seven years—more than ten years below the maximum aggregate sentence available.
Nature of the Offense [45] Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). We consider whether “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality)” exists. Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025).
[46] Davis argues that: (1) the sequence of events began with Gilbert’s fake-drug swindle; (2) he was attempting to leave when the shooting began; and (3) the fatal shot may have been fired from the .45-caliber handgun that Steve wrestled away from him. We, however, find that Davis’ offense was brutal in nature. Over a $300 debt, Davis armed himself and, with Fuentes, pursued Gilbert to Steve’s home; Davis then confronted Gilbert at gunpoint while demanding his money. Davis threatened to kill Gilbert’s family and forcefully struck Gilbert in the head with the barrel of his gun. In the gunfire that followed, Gilbert was killed, and Steve was wounded. Davis later fled from police at a high speed until his car crashed. This sequence of events does not demonstrate any restraint, regard, or lack of brutality and does not portray Davis’ offense in a positive light.
Character of the Offender [47] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant’s qualities, including the defendant’s age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant’s character and an appropriate sentence varies based on the “gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016). “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant’s character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).
[48] Here, Davis was thirty-eight years old at the time of sentencing. His criminal record spans from 2004 to 2025, and includes four juvenile adjudications and, as an adult, six felony convictions and two misdemeanor convictions. All efforts at rehabilitation have failed despite jail sentences, probation, executed time in the Department of Correction, parole, vocational rehabilitation, and an anger management program. Further, Davis committed the instant offenses while on parole. Although the trial court recognized Davis’ guilty plea to the resisting law enforcement count as a mitigating factor, Davis did not show remorse—he stated that he could not “say sorry for something [he] didn’t do.” Tr. Vol. V p. 77.
[49] Davis contends that he is not the “worst of the worst” and that his sentence is an outlier because Ward and Fuentes received lesser sentences under their plea agreements. Appellant’s Br. p. 38. Davis, however, did not receive the maximum sentence. And we are not required to compare a defendant’s sentence with those of his co-defendants. Knight v. State, 930 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ind. 2010). Ward and Fuentes, moreover, pleaded guilty to their charges, and the record supports the trial court’s assessment of Davis’ greater culpability. Davis owned and supplied both firearms and directed the group’s preparations. Davis also confronted Gilbert, struck him, and threatened his family.
[50] Given the brutality of Davis’ offense, his lengthy criminal history, failed rehabilitative efforts, and the commission of these offenses while on parole, we cannot conclude that Davis’ sentence is inappropriate.
Conclusion [51] Davis’ Batson challenge is waived and, waiver notwithstanding, fails on the
merits because the State offered a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike of Juror 101. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Davis’ conviction for felony murder, and Davis’ sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.
[52] Affirmed.
Felix, J., concurs.
Bradford, J., concurs in part and concurs in result in part with separate opinion.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Gregory L. Fumarolo Fort Wayne, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Rebekah D. Bennett Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Bradford, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part.
[53] The majority chooses to address the question of whether Davis waived his Batson challenge, an issue that was neither raised nor briefed by the parties. Under the circumstances, I would not have done so. Because I agree with the majority’s disposition in all other respects, I respectfully concur in part and concur in result.