Roy v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co.

86 S.E. 328, 17 Ga. App. 34, 1915 Ga. App. LEXIS 242
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedSeptember 9, 1915
Docket6041
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 86 S.E. 328 (Roy v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roy v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 86 S.E. 328, 17 Ga. App. 34, 1915 Ga. App. LEXIS 242 (Ga. Ct. App. 1915).

Opinion

Broyles, J. I.

The suit against ¿11 the defendant railroad companies was properly brought in Morgan county. The injury having occurred in that county, and the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company having [35]*35an office and agency there, that company was suable in that county only, and any judgment rendered against it in any other county would have been utterly void. Civil Code (1910), § 2798; Brooke v. L. & N. R. Co., 3 Ga. App. 492 (60 S. E. 218), and eases therein cited. The non-resident defendants being suable in Georgia, the suit against, them was properly brought in Morgan county, service being perfected on them by second originals. See Coakley v. Southern Ry. Co., 120 Ga. 960 (48 S. E. 372); Reeves v. Southern Ry. Co., 121 Ga. 561 (49 S. E. 674, 70 L. R. A. 513, 2 Ann. Cas. 207); Southern Ry. Co. v. Grizzle, 124 Ga. 735 (53 S. E. 244, 110 Am. St. R. 191); Georgia Railroad Co. v. Bennefield, 138 Ga. 670 (75 S. E. 981); Bracewell v. Southern Ry. Co., 134 Ga. 537 (68 S. E. 98). Under the decisions cited above, the fact that some of the defendant companies had no railroad and no agent in Morgan county is immaterial.

2. A railroad company which is a common carrier, if either the initial or the ultimate carrier, transporting a ear containing freight, owes a duty to the consignee or his servant, when either the consignee or his servant is engaged in the business of unloading the car after it has arrived at its destination. This duty is to see that the car and its devices for unloading it are reasonably safe for such purpose. This is true although the journey of the car is ended and it has been switched upon a side-track belonging to the consignee. S. F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Booth, 98 Ga. 20 (25 S. E. 928); Sykes v. St. Louis Railroad, 178 Mo. 693 (77 S. W. 723).

(o) The duty of an initial carrier which receives freight to be ultimately delivered by other connecting carriers to a consignee whose servants are to unload the car is to exercise ordinary care to see that the car and its appliances for unloading it are in a reasonably safe condition, so that such servants, while themselves exercising ordinary care, can proceed with the work of unloading the car with reasonable safety. Sykes v. St. Louis Railroad, supra.

(6) It is the duty of the ultimate carrier to inspect such a car and ascertain whether it and its unloading devices are in .a reasonably safe condition, and if, on examination, the car or any part of its unloading appliances is found to be dangerously defective, it is its duty to make the necessary repairs, or to notify the consignee of such dangerous defects. In this case, though one of the dangerous defects of the car — the “bent link” — was covered over and concealed by the coal in the car, thus making it difficult for the ultimate carrier to discover it, the other dangerous defect — the worn and defective ratchet — was not so concealed, and it seems reasonable that its condition could have been discovered by the ultimate carrier, in the exercise of ordinary care. Sykes v. St. Louis Railroad, supra.

(c) The duty of an intermediate carrier is to inspect the ear received by it from another road, and to see that the car is in a reasonably safe condition to be received, transported, and delivered by it to the next connecting carrier; but it owes no duty to the consignee or his servant which would render it liable for an injury to either, caused by a defective car. Sykes v. St. Louis Railroad, supra; Ladd v. N. W. Rail[36]*36road Co., 193 Mass. 359 (79 N. E. 742, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874, 9 Ann. Cas. 988, and note (d) on page 990). The mere fact that the defective cal-is owned by an intermediate carrier, which furnished it to another carrier, which latter carrier loaded the car and started it on its journey to the consignee, does not necessarily make the owner of the ear liable for the injury to the consignee or his servant. Sykes v. St. Louis Railroad, supra. Where, however, as appears from the amendment in the instant case, the “car was originally put in traffic and furnished by the defendant Southern Railway Company [the owner of the car] on the occasion in question" (italics ours), it became the duty of that company (just as in the case of the initial carrier) to exercise ordinary care to see that the car and its unloading appliances were in a reasonably safe condition to be used by the consignee or his servants while unloading the car.

Decided September 9, 1915. Action for damages; from city court of Madison — Judge Anderson. October 10, 1914. The action was against the Georgia Bai'lroad and Banking Company, the Seaboard Air-Line Railway, the Southern Railway Company, and the Virginia and Southwestern Railway Company. Each defendant demurred generally and specially, and the court sustained the demurrers and dismissed the petition.

[36]*363. While some of the defendant companies may have been negligent in the discharge of the duties they owed to the deceased (a servant of the consignee), yet if the deceased neglected such precautions as common prudence demanded under all the circumstances, he was guilty of contributory negligence. It was his duty to exercise reasonable care, for his own protection and safety, in ascertaining for himself the condition of the car before he attempted to -unload it; but whether he did exercise such care at the time of his injury was a question for the jury to determine. See Roddy v. Railroad Co., 104 Mo. 234 (15 S. W. 1112, 12 L. R. A. 746, 24 Am. St. R. 333).

4. In this case there is no presumption of negligence against the defendant companies. In fact, if there is any presumption at all, it is that the defendant companies are free from negligence until the contrary is shown. Likewise, however, the deceased is presumed to have been innocent of contributory negligence until the contrary is established. Sykes v. St. Louis Railroad, and Roddy v. Railroad Co., supra. Unless the petition shows upon its face that the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence, the petition upon this point is good as against general demurrer.

5. The petition did not set forth a cause of .action against the Seaboard Air-Line Railway, an intermediate carrier, and the general demurrer filed by that defendant was properly sustained.

6. The petition set forth a cause of action against the Southern Railway Company, for the reasons stated above in paragraph 2 (c). A cause of action was also shown against the Virginia & Southwestern Railway Company and the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company, the initial and the ultimate carriers respectively, and the court erred in sustaining the general demurrers filed by these three defendants.

Judgment affirmed in part, and reversed in part.

The petition alleged: The Georgia Railroad and Banking Company is a corporation of this State, owning a railroad running from Atlanta to Augusta therein, and passing through the county of Morgan, wherein it has an agency and agent and place of business. The other defendants are railroad corporations chartered in other States, but each having an agency, an agent, and a place of doing business in Eulton county of this State. Petitioner is the mother of J. A. Roy, who was killed on September 11, 1913, at the age of-thirty years.

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Bluebook (online)
86 S.E. 328, 17 Ga. App. 34, 1915 Ga. App. LEXIS 242, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roy-v-georgia-railroad-banking-co-gactapp-1915.