IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2021-KA-01263-COA
ROY L. JONES A/K/A ROY LEE JONES APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/04/2021 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. TOMIKA HARRIS IRVING COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: CLAIBORNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ALISON O’NEAL McMINN CATHERINE LEIGH PETTIS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: DANIELLA M. SHORTER NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 01/17/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ.
SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A Claiborne County Circuit Court jury convicted Roy Jones of capital murder for the
homicide of Rosetta Ellis during the commission of a robbery. The Claiborne County Circuit
Court sentenced Jones as a habitual offender to life imprisonment in the custody of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) without eligibility for parole. On appeal
from his conviction and sentence, Jones raises the following arguments: (1) the circuit court
erroneously denied his motion for a mistrial; (2) insufficient evidence supported the
underlying felony of robbery for his capital-murder conviction; (3) his conviction was against
the overwhelming weight of the evidence; and (4) his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm Jones’s conviction and sentence.
FACTS
¶2. Bobby Claiborne worked as a deputy for the Claiborne County Sheriff’s Department
at the time of Ellis’s murder. Around noon on June 24, 2018, the sheriff’s department
received a phone call about a possible fire at Ellis’s mobile home located at 1030 William
Camphor Drive in Port Gibson, Mississippi. When Deputy Claiborne arrived at the scene
around 12:18 p.m., he saw that Keon Brandon from the Claiborne County Fire Department
had already arrived and was attempting to extinguish the fire. Deputy Claiborne assisted
Brandon for about thirty minutes until the two men successfully got the fire under control.
Once the men were able to enter the mobile home, they found Ellis’s body in the back
bedroom. Ellis was lying face down on her bed with a blanket covering her body. Brandon
testified that Ellis’s bed had been set on fire, and the men noticed burns to both Ellis’s back
and legs. When the men turned over Ellis’s body, they observed bruises on her face and a
considerable amount of blood coming from her nose and mouth. Brandon testified that the
back door of the mobile home had been open when he first arrived but that he had seen no
signs of forced entry. Brandon further testified that the inside of Ellis’s home had appeared
“kind of ransacked” with items strewn everywhere.
¶3. J.W. Mallett, the Claiborne County Coroner, provided further testimony about the
condition of Ellis’s body. Much like Brandon and Deputy Claiborne, Mallett observed “[a]
lot of blood” at the crime scene. Mallett stated that Ellis had blood coming from her nose
and mouth and appeared to have injuries consistent with some type of head trauma. In
2 addition, although Ellis’s body was discovered on a hot day in June, Mallett observed a scarf
wrapped around her neck. Once the blanket was removed from around Ellis’s body, Mallett
also observed a purse underneath her.
¶4. Kevin Martin, a deputy fire marshal with the Mississippi State Fire Marshal, testified
that he investigated fires to determine their causes and origins. During his investigation of
the fire at Ellis’s residence, Martin discovered three separate areas of origin for the fire: the
living room, the master bedroom, and the hallway to a second bedroom. On the living room
floor, Martin found paper towels that had been set on fire next to the couch. In the master
bedroom, Martin observed that the bedding on the master bed had been set on fire. And on
the opposite side of the trailer from the master bedroom, in the hallway leading to a second
bedroom, Martin discovered grass clippings that had been used as the third origin point for
the fire.
¶5. After eliminating accidental causes for the fire’s origin points, Martin concluded that
the fire had been deliberately started. Martin explained that Ellis’s kitchen had separated the
master bedroom and the living room, which were two areas of origin for the fire. Despite
finding that paper towels had been spread across the kitchen floor and that the stove’s knobs
had been turned to the highest heat setting, Martin testified the stove did not sustain any
actual fire damage to indicate that it had been an origin point for the fire. Based on these
observations and others made during his investigation, Martin determined that one area of
origin had not caused the other two and that each area of origin had resulted from a
completely separate and intentional act. Martin also stated his investigation had revealed that
3 the three origin points for the fire were “set relatively close” in time to one another.
¶6. Ellis’s neighbor, Donald Reed, testified that he arrived home around noon on June 24,
2018, and noticed the fire at Ellis’s mobile home. Reed stated that he knew Ellis personally
and had worked with her for about ten years. Upon discovering that the back door of Ellis’s
home was unlocked, Reed opened the door and tried to enter the residence. As he attempted
to peer into the mobile home through all the smoke, Reed observed clothes strewn across the
floor of Ellis’s residence. According to Reed, the state of Ellis’s home was uncharacteristic
because Ellis usually kept her home neat.
¶7. Another neighbor, Betty Minor, testified that she lived about three houses down from
Ellis and had been friends with her. Immediately before observing the fire at Ellis’s home
on June 24, 2018, Minor was eating a meal inside her own residence. After finishing her
meal, Minor went to her front door and looked outside. Minor testified that she saw Jones,
whom she identified in court, walking along the pathway outside her home. Referring to
Ellis’s residence, Jones told Minor “that the lady’s house was on fire.” Jones then proceeded
to his own mobile home, and Minor ran to Ellis’s home. Minor testified that at the time
Jones told her about the fire, she did not see anyone else in the vicinity until she reached
Ellis’s home, where she spotted Reed. Minor further testified that Jones was the only person
she saw using the pathway on the day of the fire. Minor explained that the pathway Jones
was walking on led to an abandoned mobile home that previously had burned down. When
asked whether someone could get to Ellis’s residence from the pathway, Minor confirmed
that access was possible if the person went behind the abandoned mobile home.
4 ¶8. Claude Long, the division director of electronic monitoring and registered sex
offenders for MDOC, testified that on the day of Ellis’s death his department was monitoring
Jones’s movements via an electronic ankle monitor. Director Long explained that an ankle
monitor “works similar[ly] to a cell phone GPS” by using satellite and cell towers to provide
“real[-]time data of time and day where a person is located, their movement, if they’re in a
vehicle, how fast they travel, [and] where they’re at throughout the day.” Director Long
further explained that “every three minutes the GPS will ping a signal and find out the
location of the offender” and that the monitoring system for Jones’s ankle monitor was
accurate to within about “200 feet or less of an area . . . .”
¶9. The GPS records for Jones’s ankle monitor on June 24, 2018, indicated that at 9:13
a.m., Jones was by 1029 William Camphor Drive. Investigator James Jefferson, who worked
for the Claiborne County Sheriff’s Department at the time in question, testified that 1029
William Camphor Drive was close to and in the general vicinity of Ellis’s home, which was
located at 1030 William Camphor Drive. As Director Long affirmatively testified, Jones
remained in the vicinity of 1029 William Camphor Drive until 12:17 p.m.
¶10. Three days after Ellis’s body was discovered, law enforcement officers interviewed
Jones about Ellis’s murder and the fire at her home. After the circuit court admitted the
recording of Jones’s interview into evidence without any objection, the State played the
recording for the jury. Investigator Jefferson testified that he had looked into the statements
Jones made during the interview and had learned Jones “was not being truthful about his
whereabouts at the time of the fire.” Investigator Jefferson testified that Jones had stated
5 during the interview that around 8:30 a.m. on the day of the fire, he had been going to a
particular store when he “turned around and came back across several other alleys and came
back in the area to his house” because “he forgot his wallet or something.” Investigator
Jefferson asked MDOC to check the GPS records from Jones’s ankle monitor, and the
records indicated that Jones remained in the vicinity of 1029 William Camphor Drive on the
morning of the fire at Ellis’s home.
¶11. Investigator Jefferson also conducted several interviews, including with Ellis’s
neighbor Minor, and with a jailhouse informant named David Claiborne, who gave a
statement regarding admissions Jones made to him about details of the murder that had never
been publicly released. Based on his investigation into Jones’s movements prior to the fire
and his interviews with Minor and Claiborne, Investigator Jefferson sought a warrant for
Jones’s arrest. After Jones’s arrest, Investigator Jefferson observed that Jones had scratches
on his hands, back, and shoulder. As a result, Investigator Jefferson obtained samples of
Jones’s DNA for comparison to evidence collected from the crime scene.
¶12. Investigator Jefferson testified that he subsequently received the results of the DNA
analysis. The report confirmed that DNA evidence collected from inside Ellis’s home was
consistent with Jones’s profile. Investigator Jefferson explained that finding Jones’s DNA
evidence at the crime scene contradicted Jones’s interview claims that “he had not been in
[Ellis’s] house in a long time” and had only “been in the yard.”
¶13. The jury also heard trial testimony from Claiborne, whom Investigator Jefferson had
interviewed during his investigation into Ellis’s death. Claiborne testified that he had been
6 Jones’s friend for over thirty years. Claiborne readily admitted that he was not a stranger to
the deputies in Claiborne County and had been in trouble with law enforcement on more than
one occasion. Although he could not recall the exact date, Claiborne testified that around
9 p.m. one evening Jones came over to his house. According to Claiborne, Jones stated “that
he got himself in trouble. He had choked someone, hit someone in the head . . . .” Claiborne
testified that Jones had refused to give him any additional details about the incident.
Claiborne stated that after spending the night at his home, Jones had gotten up the next
morning and had left around 6 a.m. After Claiborne testified that Jones had never identified
the gender of the person he hit in the head, the State used the transcript of Claiborne’s grand
jury testimony to refresh his memory. After refreshing his recollection with his prior
testimony, Claiborne confirmed that the person Jones had stated he hit in the head was
female.
¶14. Claiborne testified that approximately three weeks after the murder, on July 16, 2018,
he and Jones were in jail together when Jones admitted he had choked Ellis, hit her in the
head, and taken money from her. Claiborne stated that at the time of Jones’s admissions, he
had observed a mark on Jones’s neck. Claiborne testified that while still in custody, he
relayed Jones’s admissions, as well as his observation of the mark on Jones’s neck, to
Investigator Jefferson. Following the defense’s cross-examination of Claiborne, the State
moved on redirect to admit into evidence the video of Claiborne’s prior statement to
Investigator Jefferson. Over the defense’s objection, the circuit court admitted the recording
into evidence; the State then played the recording for the jury.
7 ¶15. In the video recording, Claiborne informed Investigator Jefferson that an acquaintance
named Levy Dorsey dropped Jones off at Claiborne’s home around 10 p.m. on the night of
Ellis’s murder. Claiborne stated that Jones had admitted to getting into some trouble. When
Claiborne asked for further details, Jones had confessed that he hit a woman in the head
while she was lying in her bed, strangled her, and took some money from her home.
Claiborne stated that he had observed scratches on the left side of Jones’s neck and that Jones
had some money with him when he arrived at Claiborne’s home. Claiborne further stated
that Jones had spent the night at his home and then left the following morning. Later that
same morning, Claiborne heard about Ellis’s murder.
¶16. Dr. Mark LeVaughn next testified as an expert in forensic pathology. Following
Ellis’s autopsy, Dr. LeVaughn provided a forensic report on the autopsy’s results. Dr.
LeVaughn testified that Ellis had multiple indications of blunt force trauma to her head,
including blood in her hair, scalp lacerations, and a fractured skull. In addition, Ellis
sustained thermal burns on her buttocks, legs, and clothing consistent with being burned
while lying in her bed. Dr. LeVaughn stated, however, that Ellis’s larynx was free of any
soot. According to Dr. LeVaughn, the lack of soot in Ellis’s larynx indicated either that the
fire in her home was not “enough to produce any soot” or “more likely . . . [that] she was
dead before the fire started . . . .” As Dr. LeVaughn further testified, the autopsy revealed
strangulation as the cause of Ellis’s death. Dr. LeVaughn stated that the scarf tied around
Ellis’s neck had made ligature marks. He also stated that Ellis’s larynx showed
hemorrhaging due to strangulation.
8 ¶17. A forensic serologist screened clippings taken from Ellis’s fingernails and the outside
of her purse for the possible presence of blood. Both the fingernail clippings and the exterior
purse clipping screened positively for the possible presence of blood. To leave sufficient
sample sizes of the clippings for DNA testing, the serologist performed no further analysis
to absolutely confirm the presence of blood on the clippings.
¶18. A DNA analyst next performed tests on the fingernail clippings taken from Ellis’s left
hand, the clippings taken from inside her purse, and four DNA swabs collected from Jones.
With regard to Ellis’s lefthand fingernail clippings, the DNA analyst performed a secondary
test known as “Yfiler testing,” which specifically tested “for the Y chromosome, male
DNA.” The DNA analyst stated that the Yfiler testing on Ellis’s fingernail clippings
“produced a partial profile with results at six loci” that was consistent with Jones’s Y profile.
As a result, the DNA analyst explained that “Jones and all male individuals within his
biological paternal lineage [could not] be excluded as a donor of the male DNA in that
profile.” The DNA analyst further testified that “test results for the cuttings from inside
[Ellis’s] purse produced a mixture [of DNA], which [wa]s consistent with the reference
samples of the victim and the suspect, Roy Lee Jones.” Therefore, the DNA analyst stated
that Ellis and Jones could not “be excluded as . . . possible contributor[s] to that sample.”
Upon further questioning, the DNA analyst reiterated that with regard to the clippings
collected from Ellis’s lefthand fingernails and inside her purse, Jones “could not be excluded
from the [DNA] mixture” tested.
¶19. After the State rested its case-in-chief, the defense moved for a directed verdict.
9 Following the circuit court’s denial of the motion, the defense called Dorsey as its first and
only witness. Dorsey testified that he lived “right behind where the fire started” at Ellis’s
residence and had known both Jones and Claiborne for many years. Dorsey testified that he
and Jones often went over to Claiborne’s residence, but he denied that he had ever left Jones
at Claiborne’s home as Claiborne had earlier testified. After Dorsey’s testimony, the defense
rested.
¶20. The jury found Jones guilty of capital murder with the underlying felony of robbery,
and the circuit court sentenced Jones as a habitual offender to life imprisonment in MDOC’s
custody without eligibility for parole. Jones filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit
court denied as untimely. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, Jones appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for a Mistrial
¶21. During voir dire, the State asked whether any of the potential jurors would be unable
to return a guilty verdict even if the State met its burden to prove Jones’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. In response, one potential juror, who was Jones’s former sister-in-law,
indicated that she would not be able to find Jones guilty. When asked to explain, Jones’s
former sister-in-law stated, “Like I say, he’s been my brother-in-law for many, many years[,]
and he ha[s] done wrong in the past, but—.” The circuit court immediately halted the
response and granted the defense’s motion to strike the response. During a bench proceeding
outside the jury’s hearing, the defense argued the comment about Jones’s alleged past
wrongdoing had tainted the jury pool. After the circuit court denied the defense’s motion for
10 a mistrial, voir dire resumed. On appeal, Jones renews his argument that the comment by his
former sister-in-law was prejudicial and tainted the jury pool. He therefore asserts that the
circuit court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial.
¶22. We review the circuit court’s denial of Jones’s mistrial motion for abuse of discretion.
Dorsey v. State, 310 So. 3d 1238, 1249 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). As we have previously
explained,
a trial judge is best suited to determine the prejudicial effect of an objectionable remark and is given considerable discretion in deciding whether the remark is so prejudicial as to merit a mistrial. Unless serious and irreparable damage results from an improper comment, the judge should admonish the jury then and there to disregard the improper comment.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶23. In previously addressing a similar situation that arose from a prospective juror’s voir
dire response, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the isolated remark failed to warrant
a mistrial. Grayson v. State, 806 So. 2d 241, 253 (¶32) (Miss. 2001). In Grayson, the jurors
were asked whether they would be willing to consider mitigating evidence if the State proved
the defendant was guilty of capital murder or whether they automatically would be inclined
to give the death penalty. Id. at (¶30). One potential juror indicated that he would not be
willing to consider mitigating evidence under those circumstances. Id. In explaining his
answer, the potential juror characterized the defendant as “mentally off.” Id. The circuit
court in Grayson immediately interrupted the potential juror’s response, but “the other jurors
were neither questioned about the statement nor admonished to disregard it.” Id. at (¶¶30-
31). The circuit court did, however, later question the prospective jurors about their ability
11 to be fair, and they answered affirmatively. Id. at (¶31). On appeal, the supreme court
concluded “[t]hat fact, combined with the brief nature of the comment, suggest[ed] that it
was not so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial . . . .” Id. at (¶32).
¶24. More recently, this Court reached a similar determination where a trial witness
mentioned that the defendant had been previously arrested, and the circuit court sustained the
defense’s objection but denied its mistrial motion. Murshid v. State, 326 So. 3d 489, 499
(¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). Upon review, we found in Murshid that the defense “objected
to the remark before [the witness] revealed the nature of the prior charge” and that there was
no evidence of substantial or irreparable prejudice due to the single reference about the prior
arrest for an undisclosed charge. Id. at 500 (¶33). In addition, we noted the following: (1)
at the close of the trial, the circuit court properly instructed the jurors to disregard any
inadmissible statements that lacked a basis in the evidence, and (2) our caselaw presumes that
jurors follow a court’s instructions. Id.
¶25. Similarly to the proceedings in Grayson, the jurors here were not asked whether they
could disregard the comment by Jones’s former sister-in-law, nor were they admonished to
do so. The circuit court did, however, immediately interrupt the response. Thus, as in
Murshid, Jones’s former sister-in-law revealed no details whatsoever about the alleged past
wrongdoing, including whether the undisclosed act was even criminal in nature. The circuit
court also granted the timely motion by Jones’s attorney to strike the comment from the
record. And throughout the remainder of voir dire, the prospective jurors were repeatedly
questioned about their ability to remain fair and impartial. As also occurred in Murshid, the
12 circuit court here properly instructed the jurors at the conclusion of Jones’s trial about their
duty to consider only admissible testimony and evidence and to disregard any remarks the
court had excluded.
¶26. Based upon our review of the record and relevant caselaw, we conclude that the
isolated and vague nature of the voir dire comment, when coupled with the actions of the
circuit court, did not result in such irreparable harm or prejudice to Jones so as to warrant a
mistrial. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s denial of Jones’s
motion for a mistrial.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶27. Jones asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the underlying felony of
robbery for his capital-murder conviction. Specifically, he argues that “the record is devoid
of any evidence to support robbery” and that “[t]he only evidence offered to show [he]
committed a robbery was through David Claiborne’s inconsistent testimony.” Jones also
asserts there was no testimony to establish he was at Ellis’s residence on the day she died or
that any evidence demonstrated his “plan or intent to take property from Ellis.”
¶28. As we have previously explained,
[i]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and decides if rational jurors could have found the State proved each element of the crime. The reviewing court must accept as true all credible evidence consistent with guilt and give the State the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Reversal may occur when, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty.
13 Booker v. State, 303 So. 3d 1133, 1137-38 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
¶29. Here, the jury convicted Jones of capital murder involving a robbery. “The killing of
a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be capital
murder . . . [w]hen done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged
in the commission of the crime of . . . robbery . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Supp.
2017). “[U]nlike other sections of the capital[-]murder statute, subsection 2(e) does not
require the prosecution to prove the elements of murder, only that the killing took place while
the accused was ‘engaged in the commission’ of the enumerated felonies.” Booker, 303 So.
3d at 1138 (¶18) (quoting Layne v. State, 542 So. 2d 237, 243 (Miss. 1989)). Relevant to
Jones’s case, the essential elements of the underlying felony of robbery include “(1) felonious
intent, (2) force or putting in fear as a means of effectuating the intent, and (3) by that means
taking and carrying away the property of another from [her] person or in [her] presence.”
Gary v. State, 237 So. 3d 140, 147 (¶34) (Miss. 2018) (quoting Veazy v. State, 113 So. 3d
1226, 1229 (¶11) (Miss. 2013)).
¶30. With regard to Jones’s argument that the State presented no evidence of his plan or
intent to rob Ellis, we recognize the following:
Mississippi follows the one-continuous-transaction rule for determining whether the evidence establishes the requisite nexus between the killing and the underlying felony to constitute capital murder. Where the two crimes e.g., murder and robbery[,] are connected in a chain of events and occur as part of the res gestae, the crime of capital murder is sustained. Regarding the underlying felony of robbery, if the intervening time between the time of the murder and the time of taking of the property formed a continuous chain of events, the fact that the victim was dead when he took the property cannot
14 absolve the defendant from the crime of robbery. The State need not prove the defendant had the intent to rob prior to the killing. Rather, the State has the burden to prove that the two crimes are connected in a chain of events and occur as part of the res gestae.
Batiste v. State, 121 So. 3d 808, 831-32 (¶33) (Miss. 2013) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
¶31. Here, the jury heard both Claiborne’s trial testimony and his recorded pretrial
statement to Investigator Jefferson regarding Jones’s admissions about Ellis’s death and
taking money from her. Investigator Jefferson testified that Claiborne knew details about
Ellis’s death that had not been publicly released. Claiborne stated in both his recorded
pretrial statement to Investigator Jefferson and his trial testimony that Jones came to his
house one evening following Ellis’s murder and admitted that he (Jones) had gotten himself
in trouble. Claiborne further stated that Jones admitted to choking Ellis, hitting her in the
head, and taking money from her. At trial, Claiborne testified that he observed a mark on
Jones’s neck. In his recorded pretrial statement, Claiborne more specifically described the
mark on Jones’s neck as scratches. And consistent with Claiborne’s statements, Investigator
Jefferson testified at trial that he also personally observed scratches on Jones’s hand, back,
and shoulder.
¶32. On appeal, Jones asserts that Claiborne’s testimony was inconsistent and was
insufficient to establish that he actually robbed Ellis. Our caselaw holds, however, that “a
single witness’s uncorroborated testimony” can prove “sufficient to support a conviction.”
Manning v. State, 269 So. 3d 216, 221 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Cousar v. State,
855 So. 2d 993, 998-99 (¶16) (Miss. 2003)). In addition, this Court does not make witness-
15 credibility determinations. Rainey v. State, 334 So. 3d 1124, 1132 (¶¶28-30) (Miss. 2022).
Rather, the jury, in acting as the sole factfinder, “determines the weight and credibility to
give witness testimony and other evidence.” Id. at (¶30) (quoting Manning, 269 So. 3d at
221 (¶19)). Thus, the jury was free to consider whether any inconsistencies existed in
Claiborne’s testimony and to choose which portions of his testimony to accept or reject. Id.
at (¶28).
¶33. In addition to Claiborne’s testimony that Jones admitted to choking and robbing Ellis,
the State presented evidence that Ellis died from strangulation rather than smoke inhalation
and that Ellis’s home appeared uncharacteristically messy following her death, almost as
though it had been ransacked. The jury also heard testimony from Ellis’s neighbor, Minor,
that Jones was in the vicinity of Ellis’s residence around the time of her murder and was the
only person Minor saw using the nearby pathway on that day. Moreover, contrary to Jones’s
statement to Investigator Jefferson, his ankle monitor confirmed that he was in the vicinity
of Ellis’s residence both before and near the time of her death.
¶34. The State also presented DNA evidence to refute Jones’s pretrial interview claims that
“he had not been in [Ellis’s] house in a long time” and had only “been in the yard.” As
previously stated, analysis performed on fingernail clippings from Ellis’s left hand produced
a partial DNA profile that was consistent with Jones’s DNA sample. As the DNA analyst
explained, the result meant that “Jones and all male individuals within his biological paternal
lineage [could not] be excluded as a donor of the male DNA” retrieved from Ellis’s
fingernail clippings. When the DNA analyst tested clippings taken from inside Ellis’s purse,
16 which was discovered under her body, the analyst stated that the results “produced a mixture
[of DNA that] was consistent with the reference samples” taken from Ellis and Jones.
¶35. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find there was
sufficient evidence for a rational juror to conclude that the State proved each element of
robbery. We further conclude in light of our applicable standard of review that the State
presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to convict Jones of capital murder with
the underlying felony of robbery.
III. Weight of the Evidence
¶36. Jones alternatively contends that the verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight
of the evidence. In reviewing Jones’s challenge to the weight of the evidence, this Court
views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict.” McNair v. State, 346 So. 3d
512, 518 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Grace v. State, 281 So. 3d 986, 992 (¶18)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2019)). We “will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an
unconscionable injustice.” Id. (quoting Grace, 281 So. 3d at 992 (¶18)).
¶37. In raising his weight-of-the-evidence argument, Jones reiterates his assertion that
Claiborne’s trial testimony was inconsistent. In addition, he questions the time gap contained
in the GPS records for his ankle monitor and attacks the conclusiveness of the State’s DNA
evidence against him. It is well established, however, that this Court does “not reweigh
evidence. We do not assess the witnesses’ credibility. And we do not resolve conflicts
between evidence. Those decisions belong solely to the jury.” Id. (quoting Thompson v.
17 State, 302 So. 3d 1230, 1234 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)).
¶38. The jury weighed the testimony and evidence that Jones now challenges on appeal and
clearly settled questions of both weight and credibility in favor of the State. And viewing all
the State’s evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we cannot say that the
verdict “is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand
would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Id. We therefore find no error.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶39. Finally, Jones argues that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to (1) reasonably investigate the GPS report for Jones’s ankle monitor and (2)
properly review and object to the video recording of Claiborne’s pretrial statement to
Investigator Jefferson. According to Jones, if his trial attorney had properly reviewed and
investigated these items of evidence, the outcome of his trial would have been substantially
different.
¶40. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims often are “more appropriately brought during
post-conviction proceedings” rather than on direct appeal. Nalls v. State, 344 So. 3d 310,
317 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Stevens v. State, 312 So. 3d 1205, 1210-11 (¶13)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2021)). Nonetheless, we will address an ineffective-assistance claim on
direct appeal under the following circumstances: (1) “the record affirmatively shows
ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions”; or (2) “the parties stipulate that the record is
adequate and the Court determines that the findings of fact by a trial judge able to consider
the demeanor of witnesses, etc., are not needed.” Id. (quoting Stevens, 312 So. 3d at 1211
18 (¶13)). “[W]e [also] may address such ‘claims on direct appeal when the record affirmatively
shows that the claims are without merit.’” Id.
¶41. Here, we find the record does not affirmatively show ineffectiveness of constitutional
dimensions or lack of merit. In addition, the State has not stipulated that the record is
adequate for appellate review of Jones’s claims on direct appeal. Because we find that we
cannot appropriately address Jones’s ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal, we deny
this issue without prejudice so that Jones may raise his claims in a properly filed motion for
post-conviction collateral relief. Id. at (¶24).
CONCLUSION
¶42. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm Jones’s conviction and sentence.
¶43. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.