Roy Day, Jr. v. Scott David Edmonds, Shea Stubbs Edmonds, and Romain Stubbs

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 31, 2005
• Docket: 11-04-00135-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

                                                             11th Court of Appeals

                                                                  Eastland, Texas

                                                             Memorandum Opinion

Roy Day, Jr.

Appellant

Vs.                   No. 11-04-00135-CV -- Appeal from Knox County

Scott David Edmonds, Shea Stubbs Edmonds, and Romain Stubbs      

Appellees

Roy Day, Jr. proceeding pro se, filed this suit against Scott David Edmonds, Shea Stubbs Edmonds, and Romain Stubbs.  Day sought to set aside a March 20, 1995, general warranty deed from his wife, Tina Escobedo Day, to Scott David Edmonds and Shea Stubbs Edmonds.  The deed conveyed title to property located in Knox County.  The property was known as the Rock House Property.  Day alleged that he owned the Rock House Property as his homestead and that appellees obtained the deed from Tina Escobedo Day by fraud and undue influence.

Day filed this action on October 14, 2003.  Appellees moved for summary judgment on the ground that Day=s claims were barred by limitations.  The trial court granted summary judgment to appellees.  In three appellate issues, Day argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.  We affirm.

                                                        Summary Judgment Evidence

The summary judgment evidence established that Tina Escobedo Day deeded the Rock House Property to Scott David Edmonds and Shea Stubbs Edmonds on March 20, 1995.  Later, Day left a note at the Rock House Property stating, AStay out of my house.@  On April 3, 1995, Scott David Edmonds and Shea Stubbs Edmonds wrote a letter to Day stating that they had purchased the Rock House Property.  Shea Stubbs Edmonds filed a sworn complaint for forcible detainer of the Rock House Property against Day.  Day had filed for bankruptcy on March 6, 1995.  Day told his bankruptcy lawyer that Shea Stubbs Edmonds and Romain Stubbs were asserting a claim to the Rock House Property.  On April 14, 1995, Day=s lawyer wrote a letter to Shea Stubbs Edmonds and Romain Stubbs, among others, stating that the Rock House Property belonged to Day.  The letter demanded that Shea Stubbs Edmonds and Romain Stubbs deliver quitclaim deeds to the property to Day.  On April 18, 1995, Shea Stubbs Edmonds=s lawyer wrote a letter to Day=s lawyer in response to the April 14, 1995, letter.  He explained that Shea Stubbs Edmonds had purchased the Rock House Property from Tina Escobedo Day.

Day filed a suggestion of bankruptcy in the forcible detainer action in order to stay the proceeding.  On June 21, 1995, the bankruptcy court entered an order granting Shea Stubbs Edmonds relief from the bankruptcy stay, thereby permitting her to proceed with her forcible detainer action against Day.  Day abandoned his pursuit of title and possession to the Rock House Property in 1995.

The summary judgment evidence also established that Scott David Edmonds and Shea Stubbs Edmonds occupied the Rock House Property as their homestead after  purchasing it in 1995.  They paid all property taxes on the property for the years 1996 through 2002.

                                                               Standard of Review

This appeal involves the review of a traditional motion for summary judgment.  We will apply the well-recognized standard of review for traditional summary judgments.  We must consider the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, and determine whether the movant proved that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Company, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.1985); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1979).  A defendant is entitled to summary judgment if it either disproves an element of each of the plaintiff=s causes of action or establishes an affirmative defense on each of the plaintiff=s causes of action as a matter of law. American To-bacco Company, Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex.1997); Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.1997).

                                                     Limitations Issues

Day did not file this suit until October 14, 2003, more than eight years after Tina Escobedo Day deeded the subject property to appellees, Scott David Edmonds and Shea Stubbs Edmonds.  Day alleged that appellees committed fraud and undue influence in connection with the deed transaction.

Day=s fraud and undue influence claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ' 16.004(a)(4) (Vernon 2002).  In general, a cause of action accrues for limitations purposes when a wrongful act causes some legal injury to the plaintiff even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later and even if all resulting damages have not occurred. Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tex.1997); S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.1996). The discovery rule is a limited exception to the general accrual rule. Murphy v. Campbell, supra.  If applicable, the discovery rule defers the accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knows, or by exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to the claims.  Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 734 (Tex.2001);  Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex.1994).  The discovery rule applies to cases involving fraud and fraudulent concealment.  Murphy v. Campbell, supra.  However, a party seeking to avail itself of the discovery rule must plead the rule in response to a defendant=s claim that the statute of limitations bars the party=s claims.  Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.1988).  Day neither pleaded the discovery rule nor raised it in his response to appellees= motion for summary judgment.  Day did not file suit until more than eight years after the alleged fraud and undue influence.  Therefore, his claims are barred by the four-year statute of limitations.

Even if Day had raised the discovery rule, his claims would have been barred by the four-year statute of limitations.  In the summary judgment context, the defendant has the burden to negate the discovery rule by proving as a matter of law that no issue of material fact exists concerning when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to the claims. Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., supra at 518; Weaver v. Witt, 561 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex.1977); Janis v. Melvin Simon Associates, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi 1999, pet=n den=d).  The summary judgment evidence established that Day knew about the deed and appellees= ownership claims to the Rock House Property in April 1995.  Day left a note at the property saying to A[s]tay out of my house.@  In the April 3, 1995, letter, Scott David Edmonds and Shea Stubbs Edmonds told Day that they had purchased the Rock House Property.  In the April 14, 1995, letter, Day took the position that the property belonged to him and demanded that appellees provide quitclaim deeds to the property to him.  The lawyer for Shea Stubbs Edmonds responded to Day=s claim in the April 18, 1995, letter.  He explained that Shea Stubbs Edmonds had purchased the property from Tina Escobedo Day and referenced the deed.  Scott David Edmonds and Shea Stubbs Edmonds occupied the property as their homestead after they purchased it.  Day abandoned his claim to the property in 1995.  This evidence established that Day knew or should have known in 1995 of the facts giving rise to his claims.  Appellees summary judgment evidence negated the discovery rule.

Day argues that appellees= alleged representations and conduct should estop them from relying on a limitations defense.  However, the summary judgment evidence negated an estoppel claim.  Day cites cases standing for the proposition that, in the limitations context, estoppel may arise when one party engages in conduct that causes the other party to delay filing suit until after the applicable limitations period expires.  See Underwood v. Woods, 406 F.2d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 1969); Bergeron v. Mansour, 152 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1945); Baker-Matthews Mfg. Co. v. Grayling Lum-ber Co., 203 S.W. 1021 (Ark.1918).  In this case, appellees did not engage in any conduct that delayed or prevented Day from filing suit within the limitations period.

Day also relies on cases holding that estoppel may arise when a party has defrauded another party into signing a deed where the other party did not know that the instrument signed was a deed.  See Maeberry v. Gayle, 955 S.W.2d 875 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi 1997, no pet=n); Barrera v. Ruiz, 308 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Civ.App. - Fort Worth 1957, no writ).  In Maeberry, an uncle told his nephew that he was signing legal papers relating to a guardianship when the nephew was actually signing a property deed.  The nephew did not discover that he had a possible claim against his uncle until about 10 years later.  Maeberry v. Gayle, supra at 877.  The court held that the uncle=s fraud prevented the running of the adverse possession statutes.  Maeberry v. Gayle, supra at 882.  In Barrera, a nephew told his aunts that they were signing a permit to build a fence when, in fact, they were signing a property deed.  The aunts did not learn that the instrument was a deed until 19 years later.  The court held that the nephew was estopped to plead limitations as a defense.  Barrera v. Ruiz, supra at 580.

In this case, Tina Escobedo Day signed the deed on March 20, 1995.  The summary judgment evidence established that Day knew about the deed in early April 1995.  Appellees did nothing to hide the existence of the deed.  The facts do not give rise to an estoppel claim.

Day also contends that the Rock House Property was his homestead.  He asserts that Tina Escobedo Day did not have the authority to transfer title to his homestead property without his consent and that, therefore, the subject deed was void.  Consequently, Day contends that the statute of limitations does not apply to his claims.  However, a conveyance of homestead property by one spouse not joined by the other spouse is not void but is merely inoperative while the property continues to be a homestead or until such time as the homestead may be abandoned or the deed ratified in accordance with the law. Grissom v. Anderson, 79 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.1935); Zable v. Henry, 649 S.W.2d 136, 137 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1983, no writ).  The summary judgment evidence established that Scott David Edmonds and Shea Stubbs Edmonds lived in the Rock House Property as their homestead since 1995 and that Day abandoned his claim to the property in 1995.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment.  Day=s claims are barred by the four-year statute of limitations.  Day=s appellate issues are overruled.

                                                                This Court=s Ruling

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.                      

PER CURIAM

August 31, 2005

Not designated for publication.  See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(a).

Panel consists of: Wright, J., and McCall, J.^[1]

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     ^[1]W. G. Arnot, III, Chief Justice, retired effective July 31, 2005.  The chief justice position is vacant.