Roy Chambers, Jr. v. Georgia Department of Corrections, et al.

District Court, S.D. Georgia·Decided July 23, 2026·No. 4:24-cv-00184·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION ROY CHAMBERS, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV424-184 ) GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF ) CORRECTIONS, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Plaintiff Roy Chambers filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDC”), Coastal State Prison (“CSP”), Georgia Diagnostic Prison (“GDP), as well as nine individual Defendants, alleging claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Eighth Amendment violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claims for medical malpractice. See generally doc. 1. His claims were twofold: (1) he was housed in a cell where he was injured by inhaling secondhand smoke, presumably from other inmates who openly smoked despite it being a smoke free area; and (2) he was transported in a van that was not ADA compliant and was forced to crawl up and down the steps of the van upon entry and exit. Doc. 9 at 2-3. The undersigned screened his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and, after analyzing his

allegations in this case and his prior litigation history in this Court, recommended it be dismissed. Id. at 3-13.

The Report and Recommendation entered on September 5, 2025. Doc. 9. Therefore, Chambers’ objections were due no later than September 22, 2025. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). After

that deadline expired, on September 24, 2025, the District Judge conducted a de novo review and adopted the Report and Recommendation, to which no objections had been timely filed. Doc. 10.

Judgment entered that same day. Doc. 11. One day later, on September 25, 2026, Chambers filed his objections. Doc. 12. Chambers has now filed a Motion to Reconsider and Vacate Judgment. Doc. 13. A review of the

substance of his Motion shows that he asks the Court to consider his untimely objections. See generally id. He cites Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) and argues his delay in submitting his

objections was a result of excusable neglect. Id. at 2-3. A motion for reconsideration, or a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion, is “an extraordinary remedy, to be employed sparingly.” Smith ex rel. Smith v. Augusta-Richmond County, 2012 WL 1355575, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2012) (internal citation omitted). “A movant must

set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “The only

grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are newly[ ]discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Intern., Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116,

1119 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal punctuation omitted)). “A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of

judgment.” Id. (quoting Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005) (alterations omitted)). The Eleventh Circuit has considered a similar situation, where a

plaintiff failed to object to a Report and Recommendation and it was subsequently adopted. Greene v. Alabama Dep't of Pub. Health, 715 F. App'x 916, 919 (11th Cir. 2017). The appellate court found that the

plaintiff’s argument “could have been raised—indeed, should have been raised—as an objection to the R&R before judgment was entered.” Id. So too, here. Because Chambers could have raised the arguments he now presents prior to the order and entry of judgment, he is “ineligible for relief under Rule 59(e).” Id. His Motion for Reconsideration under Rule

59(e) should be DENIED. Doc. 13, in part. Chambers also moves for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).

Doc. 13 at 2. Under Rule 60, the Court may relieve a party of a final judgment or order for: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that could not previously have been discovered with reasonable diligence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) a void judgment; (5) a judgment that has been satisfied, released or discharged, that is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated, or that it would no longer be equitable to apply prospectively; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. Jones v. Thomas, 605 F. App'x 813, 815 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)). “Rule 60(b)(6) motions must demonstrate ‘that the circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to warrant relief. Even then, whether to grant the requested relief is a matter for the district court's sound discretion.’” Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006) (alteration omitted) (quoting Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000)). Chambers argues the delay in the Court receiving his objections was “entirely beyond [his] control and should be considered excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). Doc. 13 at 2. He claims he mailed his objection “within the 14 day timeframe required by law of him,” but also

explains he mailed it “on the 13th day, using the United States Postal Service.” Id. “When papers are mailed to the clerk's office, filing is

complete when the papers are received by the clerk,” and any papers which “arriv[e] after a deadline are untimely even if mailed before the deadline.” See Strickland v. Wayne Farms-Southland Hatchery, 132 F.

Supp. 2d 1331, 1333 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (quotations omitted) (citations omitted); see also Joye v. Sec'y Dep't of Navy, 736 F. App'x 861, 864 (11th Cir. 2018) (dismissing an action brought by a pro se plaintiff when the

pro se plaintiff mailed her complaint to the clerk's office within the time allotted but the clerk's office did not receive it until the day after the deadline expired).

Chambers references the Court’s “prior treatment of his filings as timely, based on his history in this same court with a different judge.” Doc. 13 at 2. He may be referencing the application of the “prison mailbox

rule” on his filings submitted when he was incarcerated. See, e.g., Chambers v. Benton, 4:21-cv-002, doc. 1 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2021). “Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner's court filing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations

and citation omitted). Chambers was not incarcerated when he initiated this case, see doc.

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Roy Chambers, Jr. v. Georgia Department of Corrections, et al., (S.D. Ga. 2026).

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