Roy Alton Shaw v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided December 3, 2008·No. 10-07-00043-CR·Published

Opinion

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-07-00043-CR

ROY ALTON SHAW, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

From the 18th District Court Johnson County, Texas

Trial Court No. F40536

O P I N I O N

After his eight-year-old niece made an outcry to her mother that her great-uncle, Appellant Roy Shaw, had inappropriately touched her, an investigation brought forth allegations by three other female relatives that Shaw had committed sexual offenses against them as well. Shaw was eventually charged by indictment with nineteen felony counts. A jury found him guilty on Counts Two and Nineteen, each of which alleged indecency with a child by contact, and not guilty on the remaining counts. The jury assessed a three-year prison sentence and a $5,000 fine on Count Two; on Count

Nineteen, the jury assessed a ten-year sentence and a $10,000 fine but recommended that the sentence and fine be probated. Shaw appeals, asserting three issues. We will affirm.

Sufficiency of the Evidence We begin with Shaw’s second and third issues, which respectively challenge the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence on both indecency-by-contact convictions. A person commits the offense of indecency with a child “if, with a child younger than 17 years and not the person’s spouse, . . . the person . . . engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in sexual contact.” TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). Sexual contact means the following, if committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person: “any touching of any part of the body of a child, including touching through clothing, with the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a person.” Id. § 21.11(c)(2).

Standards of Review

When reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to establish the elements of a penal offense, we must determine whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We do not resolve any conflict of fact or assign credibility to the witnesses, as this was the function of the trier of fact. See Dewberry v. Shaw v. State Page 2

State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Instead, our duty is to determine if the findings of the trier of fact are rational by viewing all of the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict. Adelman, 828 S.W.2d at 422. In so doing, any inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

In a factual sufficiency review, we ask whether a neutral review of all the evidence, though legally sufficient, demonstrates either that the proof of guilt is so weak or that conflicting evidence is so strong as to render the factfinder’s verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d. 404, 414-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “The court reviews the evidence weighed by the jury that tends to prove the existence of the elemental fact in dispute and compares it with the evidence that tends to disprove that fact.” Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7 (quoting Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). The appellate court “does not indulge in inferences or confine its view to evidence favoring one side of the case. Rather, it looks at all the evidence on both sides and then makes a predominantly intuitive judgment. . . .” Id. (quoting William Powers and Jack Ratliff, Another Look at “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence,” 69 TEXAS L. REV. 515, 519 (1991)). The nature of a factual sufficiency review authorizes an appellate court, although to a very limited degree, to act as the so-called “thirteenth juror” to review the factfinder’s weighing of the evidence and disagree with the factfinder’s determination. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 416-17. Shaw v. State Page 3

Count Two Evidence In Count Two, Shaw was charged with committing the offense of indecency with a child by contact against “JoAnn,”1 Shaw’s grand-niece who was around eight years old at the time of the offense. JoAnn, a nine-year-old fourth grader at the time of trial, testified that she and her two siblings had previously lived with Roy and Brenda Shaw, her aunt and uncle who lived “down the street.” She said that while her brother and sister were cleaning a bedroom on the opposite end of the Shaws’ trailer and Brenda had gone to the store, Shaw took her into his bedroom and had her take her clothes off and get on the bed. Shaw, while holding her down and dressed only in pants, then touched her with his hand on the outside of her private parts (her “tee-tee” and her “hiney bo”). On that occasion, she was probably in the second grade and it happened after Christmas; she was either six, seven, or eight years old. She also said that Shaw did the same thing to her “a few more times.” Shaw’s touching her made her feel “bad” and he told her that if she told anyone about it, he would whip her. JoAnn repeated several times that the things that Shaw had done to her really happened, and she said that no one, including her mother, had told her to say things about Shaw that were not true.

JoAnn’s videotaped interview was shown to the jury. JoAnn admitted that in her videotaped interview she said that Shaw’s fingers went inside her, but she does not remember that happening.

1The indictments used pseudonyms for the four victims. We have added a pseudonym for the minor victims’ mother, “Brooke,” to further protect their anonymity and also because Brooke alleged at trial that Shaw had molested her when she was a child.

Shaw v. State Page 4

The first person whom JoAnn told about Shaw’s conduct was her mother, “Brooke.” JoAnn admitted that Brenda approached her once and that she told Brenda that she was lying about what she had said Shaw had done to her, but JoAnn testified that she was lying to Brenda. JoAnn also told her grandmother and another aunt (Janice) that she was lying when Brenda had approached her and got her to say that she had lied about what Shaw had done. JoAnn denied telling Brenda that Brooke had asked her to lie about Shaw: “My mom didn’t tell me to lie about Roy.”

“Janice,” Brooke’s half-sister, recounted JoAnn’s encounter with Brenda, saying that it happened at her mother’s house. Brenda showed up, came storming in without knocking, and said she needed to talk to JoAnn. Brenda sat with JoAnn on the couch and talked to her and then brought JoAnn in the kitchen. JoAnn was crying, and Brenda told her to say to Debbie (Brenda’s sister and Janice’s mother) what she had just said. JoAnn said, “I lied.” Brenda said, “Well, that’s all I need. I’m going to talk to my lawyer now.” Janice then talked to JoAnn, who was still crying, and told her that Shaw had done the same thing to her when she was a child and had spent the night at the Shaws’ house. (Shaw’s alleged offenses against Janice were Counts Thirteen, Fourteen, and Fifteen, asserting indecency with a child by contact. He was acquitted on those counts.) Janice asked JoAnn why she just said that she had lied, and she said that Brenda had told her to do so. Janice said that JoAnn then confirmed that Shaw had touched her.

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