ROXANNE EILEEN EADIE vs ADAM DANIEL GILLIS

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: November 18, 2022
• Docket: 21-3054
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

ROXANNE EILEEN EADIE,

Appellant, Case No. 5D21-3054 v. LT Case No. 35-2019-DR-000621-A-X

ADAM DANIEL GILLIS,

Appellee. ________________________________/

Opinion filed November 18, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County, Dan R. Mosley, Judge.

Mary C. Fleming and Robert T. Smith, of Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP, and Sasha Drobnick, of Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project, Washingon, D.C., for Appellant.

Richard Alan McKinley, of McKinley Law Firm, P.A., Bartow, for Appellee.

TRAVER, J.

Roxanne Eileen Eadie appeals the trial court’s final judgment

dissolving her marriage to Adam Daniel Gillis. Eadie raises four issues for

our consideration, only two of which merit discussion. The trial court abused its discretion when it imputed income to Eadie at a level at which she had

never earned. It also erred when it incorporated a charging lien on all of

Eadie’s assets, including her homestead property, into the amended final

judgment.

Eadie last worked in 2016 at a sales job in a company operated by

Gillis’ family. At that time, she made $65,000 per year. She has since

focused her attention on child care; she also completed one year of law

school and wishes to become an attorney. At trial, Gillis called a vocational

expert who testified that Eadie could earn more in sales than as a starting

lawyer. Based on this testimony, the trial court imputed $80,000 per year to

Eadie.

We review the trial court’s imputation of income for an abuse of

discretion. See Hudson-McCann v. McCann, 50 So. 3d 735, 737 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2010). Here, the trial court abused its discretion because, subject to

exceptions inapplicable here, Florida law precludes imputation of income at

a level higher than a party has ever earned in the past. See § 61.30(2)(b)2.b.,

Fla. Stat. (2021). We remand for proper recalculation of Eadie’s income.

The trial court also erred by imposing a charging lien that attached to,

among other property, Eadie’s homestead. We review de novo homestead-

related issues. See JBK Assocs. v. Sill Bros., Inc., 191 So. 3d 879, 881 (Fla.

2 2016). Eadie consented to this provision of the charging lien when her

previous attorney withdrew from the case. But her consent does not matter

because a homeowner cannot waive her homestead exemption rights in an

unsecured agreement. See Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So. 2d 850, 861 (Fla.

2007); Quiroga v. Citizens Prop. Ins., 34 So. 3d 101, 102 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

We therefore remand for the trial court to strike that portion of the charging

lien incorporated into the final judgment to the extent it attaches to Eadie’s

homestead.

AFFIRMED in Part; REVERSED in Part; and REMANDED with

INSTRUCTIONS.

EVANDER, J., concurs. COHEN, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

3 Case No. 5D21-3054 LT Case No. 2019-DR-000621-A-X

COHEN, J., concurring specially with opinion.

I write to address an issue raised by Roxanne Eadie (“Former Wife”)

on appeal: the trial court’s virtually verbatim adoption of Adam Gillis’ (“Former

Husband”) proposed final judgment, which resulted in a conspicuously one-

sided final judgment. Former Wife argues that the trial court entered the

proposed judgment without meaningful independent thought or analysis.

As we observed in Saario v. Tiller, 333 So. 3d 315, 319 (Fla. 5th DCA

2022), a trial court’s verbatim entry of a proposed final judgment submitted

by a party is not, per se, improper. See Strand v. Escambia Cnty., 992 So.

2d 150, 155 (Fla. 2008) (“In Perlow, we did not hold that a trial court’s

adoption of a proposed final judgment verbatim is improper per se.”). In order

to determine whether the trial court exercised its independent judgment,

courts evaluate the following factors: 1) the timing of the final order relative

to the submission of the proposals; 2) the opportunity for a party to review

and object to the opposing party’s proposal; 3) the extent to which the court

made substantive changes to the proposed order; 4) the extent to which the

court participated in the trial; 5) the presence of errors or omissions in the

4 final order; and 6) the presence or absence of oral findings on the record.

D.R. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 236 So. 3d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

Former Wife relies on the seminal case for this issue, Perlow v. Berg-

Perlow, 875 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2004), where the court held that the verbatim

adoption of the former wife’s proposed final judgment constituted reversible

error, but the facts of Perlow are distinguishable. First, the former husband,

who appeared pro se, had no opportunity to submit his own proposed

judgment—in fact, the trial court actively discouraged him from doing so—or

to object to the former wife’s proposed judgment. Id. at 388. Second, the trial

court in Perlow signed the former wife’s 25-page order within two hours after

closing arguments. Id. at 387.

At trial, the court’s thorough questioning of Former Wife demonstrated

an independent evaluation and analysis of the critical issues to be resolved.

Clearly the trial court had concerns about Former Wife’s conduct leading up

to the trial as well as her future plans, and the impact of those factors on the

children’s best interests. Specifically, and taking the evidence in the light

most favorable to the appellee, as we must do, Former Wife’s interference

with the ability of Former Husband to form or maintain a relationship with the

children was pivotal. The court was also troubled by the actions of Former

Wife in terms of the children’s education. Furthermore, Former Wife’s

5 lifestyle was being funded by the largesse of others, and it became clear that

her financial plan for the future was at best ill-conceived and at worst non-

existent. The court’s questioning indicated concern about her failure to

understand the prospect of a potential financial collapse, which would

adversely impact the stability of the children.1 The trial court’s focus on those

issues does not reflect an absence of independent judgment.

There can be many reasons for a trial court to invite the submission of

proposed final judgments. It can be a function of caseload or as a means of

ensuring that all the issues raised and tried are covered in the final judgment.

It is not surprising that Former Husband’s lawyer prepared a final judgment

that rendered virtually every finding adverse to Former Wife; nor is it

surprising that Former Wife’s counsel did the same—particularly when the

trial court rendered no oral findings of fact or conclusions of law that the

parties could reduce to writing. But it is incumbent upon the trial court to

carefully review both proposed judgments, not from the perspective of each

advocate but from the viewpoint of a neutral arbiter. Wholesale acceptance

1 Issues involving financial inequity, such as whether Former Husband had voluntarily reduced his income immediately prior to the divorce, were not preserved for appeal by virtue of the parties entering a settlement agreement on all financial matters other than child support.

6 of a final judgment, particularly one as lopsided as the one entered in this

case, raises serious concerns and should be avoided.

Trial courts would be well advised to indicate findings of fact and

conclusions of law on the record when possible and, if desired, direct

submission of a final judgment in accordance with those findings.2 See

Perlow, 875 So. 2d at 384.

2 There is no best practice in the manner in which a court enters a final judgment so long as the statutorily mandated findings are made and the judgment reflects independent consideration.