Rowe v. William Powell Co. (In Re Computrex International, Inc.)

336 B.R. 305, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 68, 2006 WL 164895
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedJanuary 20, 2006
Docket19-50066
StatusPublished

This text of 336 B.R. 305 (Rowe v. William Powell Co. (In Re Computrex International, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rowe v. William Powell Co. (In Re Computrex International, Inc.), 336 B.R. 305, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 68, 2006 WL 164895 (Ky. 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

DAVID T. STOSBERG, Bankruptcy Judge.

This adversary proceeding comes before the Court on the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and the plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the motions, the supporting documentation, and the record in this case, the Court grants summary judgment and overrules the motion for extension.

I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and it is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a) as this proceeding arises *306 in and relates to the debtor’s Chapter 7 case pending in this District.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Court can render summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record taken as a whole, and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden initially of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party may rely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. Id. When a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, summary judgment should be granted. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

Once the moving party has made a proper motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party may not rely upon mere allegations to rebut the motion, but instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The nonmov-ing party must produce more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence to support its claim, once a properly supported motion for summary judgment has been made.

III. FACTS

On August 13, 2002, the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky. On November 4, 2002, the case converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding and the Court ordered the appointment of a trustee. Gordon A. Rowe, Jr., the plaintiff, was appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee.

On August 9, 2004, the trustee initiated this adversary against The William Powell Co., the defendant, alleging that the defendant was indebted to the bankruptcy estate in the amount of $277,840.60 for services provided by the debtor to the defendant. The defendant answered on October 12, 2004, denying the material allegations and asserting set-off and re-coupment as an affirmative defense.

On March 14, 2005, the defendant filed a motion for additional time to complete discovery. The motion was based in part upon the plaintiffs failure to respond to its discovery requests. The Court granted this motion by order entered on March 28, 2005. The defendant filed a second motion for extension on June 21, 2005, again citing a failure by the plaintiff to respond to its discovery requests. The Court granted this motion by order entered June 23, 2005. On August 19, 2005, the defendant filed a third motion for extension, again citing the plaintiffs failure to cooperate with discovery as a basis for the extension. On August 31, 2005, the Court entered an order granting this third motion for extension.

On October 26, 2005, the defendant filed its motion for summary judgment currently before the Court. This motion was supported by affidavits and exhibits showing that the defendant had recoupment rights in excess of $290,000, significantly more than the amount claimed by the *307 plaintiff in his complaint. Defendant’s affidavits and exhibits further showed that at most only $170,951.24 was owed to the debtor and not the $277,840.60 claimed by the plaintiff.

On November 15, 2005, the Court entered an order giving the plaintiff until December 5, 2005 to respond to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On December 6, 2005, a day after the deadline set by the Court, the plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to respond to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff cited a turnover of counsel as the primary basis for the motion. The defendant opposed this motion for extension citing the untimely nature of the motion, and the general failure of the plaintiff to cooperate with its discovery requests.

With great reluctance the Court granted the plaintiffs motion for extension. In the order dated December 9, 2005, the Court specifically held as follows:

The Court agrees with the Defendant in that this case has moved at a staggeringly slow pace mostly due to the Trustee’s actions or, more appropriately, inactions. However, considering the circumstances, the Court has determined to grant this one last short extension. The Trustee is put on notice that should he fail to respond by the new December 20, 2005 deadline, summary judgment will be granted in favor of the Defendant. The Trustee is further put on notice that no further continuances will be granted absent truly extraordinary circumstances.

Despite the Court’s warnings, the plaintiff failed to respond by the new December 20, 2005 deadline and on December 30, 2005, filed another motion for extension of time to respond to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff again cited turnover of counsel as the basis for the motion. The plaintiffs sought an additional 14 days, or until January 13, 2006, to respond to the motion. As before, the defendant objected to this second motion for extension. The defendant recited the language of the Court’s prior order and concluded that the plaintiffs motion should be overruled.

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Related

First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co.
391 U.S. 253 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.
526 U.S. 795 (Supreme Court, 1999)

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Bluebook (online)
336 B.R. 305, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 68, 2006 WL 164895, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rowe-v-william-powell-co-in-re-computrex-international-inc-kywb-2006.