Rowe v. Google LLC

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 22, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-08655
StatusUnknown

This text of Rowe v. Google LLC (Rowe v. Google LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rowe v. Google LLC, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

in this Court's Individual Rules. parties shall also file a joint letter by April 27, 2020, explaining (1) the discovery that has been completed; (2) discovery that is remaining; and (3) how the remaining discovery is affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

April 22, 2020 New York, New York LORNA G. SCHOFIEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Re: Ulku Rowe vy. Google LLC, Case No. 19-cv-08655 (LGS)\(GWG) Dear Judge Schofield: We represent Plaintiff Ulku Rowe in the above-referenced matter. We write pursuant to Rule Section III.C.3 of Your Honor’s Individual Practices and Local Rule 37.2 to request a pre-motion conference in anticipation of Plaintiff's motion to compel the production of discovery relating to (1) comparator evidence; (2) complaints of discrimination; and (3) electronically stored information (“ESI”). In addition, the Parties jointly request an extension of the discovery schedule. Plaintiff served requests for production of documents on January 21, 2020, see Exhibit 1, and her First Set of Interrogatories on February 11, 2020, see Exhibit 2. Defendant served its Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs discovery requests on February 28, 2019, see Exhibit 3, and its Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories on March 12, 2020, see Exhibit 4. The Parties met and conferred regarding outstanding discovery issues via telephone on March 3, 2020. On March 25, 2020, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant describing 1n detail numerous deficiencies in Defendant’s discovery responses and production. See Exhibit 5. Defendant responded by letter on April 16, 2020, see Exhibit 6, and on April 20, 2020, the Parties met and conferred via telephone. The following issues remain unresolved. Comparator Information Plaintiff seeks discovery that will enable her to properly identify comparators and establish her equal pay, discrimination, and retaliation claims. See Request Nos. 6, 10-14, 17, 19, and 21 and Interrogatory 1. While Defendant has produced some information related to four male comparators, Defendant has not identified and produced al/ responsive information for a// comparators with whom Plaintiff is similarly situated. In connection with her New York Equal Pay Law claims, Plaintiff is entitled to discovery on men who performed equal work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working condition, see N.Y. Labor Law § 194 (1), while under the New York City Human Rights Law, Plaintiff is entitled to discovery related to a broader group: men who were treated more favorably than Plaintiff in the terms and conditions of employment. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8—107(1)(a); see also Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting in the Title VII discrimination context, employees “need not be identical to that of another for the two to be similarly situated” and “[w]hether two employees are similarly situated New York 685 Third Avenue 25th Floor New York, NY 10017 Tel (212) 245-1000. Fax (646) 509-2060 Chicago 161 N Clark Street Suite 1600 Chicago, IL 60601 Tel (812) 809-7010 Fax (812) 809-7011 San Francisco One Embarcadero Center 38th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 Tel (415) 638-8800 Fax (415) 638-8810

ordinarily presents a question of fact for the jury.”); McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2001) (“A plaintiff is not obligated to show disparate treatment of an identically situated employee.”). Defendant objected to the comparator requests claiming Plaintiff has not demonstrated that these individuals are true comparators. See Exhibit 6. Defendant misunderstands the purpose of discovery: “the purpose of discovery here is, in part, to help identify the universe of proper comparators.” Vuona v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6529, 2011 WL 5553709, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011); see also Bobo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 741, 753 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The refusal of a defendant to disclose requested comparator information denies plaintiff the opportunity to determine whether the evidence actually reveals comparator status and different treatment, critical elements of the claim that the trier of fact must determine.”). Plaintiff requests that the Court compel Defendant to identify and produce responsive information for all potential comparators. Complaints of Discrimination Plaintiff requested production of documents and information related to any internal or external complaints of gender discrimination, including pay or promotion discrimination, and/or retaliation. See Request No. 19. Defendant has unreasonably narrowed its response to only complaints against two of Plaintiff’s managers. Further, Defendant has refused to conduct a search for documents related to Plaintiff’s own complaints that may exist outside of its internal HR systems. This Circuit has repeatedly found that complaints of the same or similar type of discrimination alleged by plaintiffs are relevant to an individual plaintiff’s prima facie case of disparate treatment. See Sasikumar v. Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., No. 09 Civ. 5632, 2011 WL 1642585, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011) (“[C]ourts in this circuit have repeatedly found similar complaints of discrimination by corporate employers to be relevant and discoverable”); Louison v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Greater New York, No. 9 Civ. 1820, 1990 WL 108347, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 1990) (granting plaintiff’s request for other complaint of discrimination); Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). Complaints of gender discrimination against high-level decision makers within Google are probative as to whether individuals involved in the leveling, hiring and promotion decision possessed any discriminatory intent. In addition, evidence of complaints or investigations conducted is relevant to Google’s knowledge of and failure to remedy on-going gender discrimination concerns, which substantiate Plaintiff’s claim of willfulness and her request for damages. See Ri Sau Chan v. N.Y. Downtown Hosp., No. 03 Civ. 3003, 2004 WL 1886009, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2004) (“Evidence relating to company-wide practices may reveal patterns of discrimination against a group of employees, increasing the likelihood that an employer’s offered explanation for an employment decision regarding a particular individual masks a discriminatory motive”); see also Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding evidence of knowledge of disparity and failure to remedy sufficient to support the jury’s finding of a willful violation of the Equal Pay Act). Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court order Defendant to produce information regarding internal and external complaints of gender discrimination, as well as Plaintiff’s own complaints of discrimination, and timely produce a privilege log, if privilege is asserted.1 1 Because Defendant has not produced a privilege log, though it has indicated its intent to do so, Plaintiff respectfully reserves her right to challenge the withholding of any documents identified on the privilege log. April 21, 2020 Page 3 of 3 ESI Searches Plaintiff proposed a tailored list of ESI search terms and custodians, designed to identify information responsive to Plaintiff's requests (see Attachment to Exhibit 5), but Defendant has thus far refused to conduct an ESI search of custodians.

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Rowe v. Google LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rowe-v-google-llc-nysd-2020.