Rountree v. State Milk Commission

36 S.E.2d 613, 184 Va. 777, 1946 Va. LEXIS 141
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedJanuary 14, 1946
DocketRecord No. 2949
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 36 S.E.2d 613 (Rountree v. State Milk Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rountree v. State Milk Commission, 36 S.E.2d 613, 184 Va. 777, 1946 Va. LEXIS 141 (Va. 1946).

Opinions

Browning, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The parties to this controversy will be referred to by the names by which they are known and operate.

Victoria Rountree, trading as Rountree Dairy,, filed application on May 21, 1943, for a license as a producer-distributor in the Suffolk, Virginia, area. The Greenfield Dairy filed an application for a distributor license on May 24, 1943, which was favorably acted upon and issued on May 28, 1943. As to the Rountree application this statement is made by the Commission in its opinion filed and made a part of the record: “The Commission delayed action pending an investigation of conditions on the Suffolk market.”

This application was refused on June 17, 1943. On July 2, 1943, B. L. Rountree, representing the Rountree' Dairy, asked the Commission to reconsider its action. The Commission, before acting thereon, directed its secretary, E. C. C. Woods, and a member of the Commission, Mr. Mark Turner, to go to Suffolk and make an investigation on July 9, 1943. The report of this investigation included this state[779]*779ment: “The market was thoroughly covered and anyone who desired to buy milk could do so either retail or wholesale unless in case of any retail customer whose credit rating was not up to par.”

It appears-that an investigation was also had on May 27, 1943, and the Commission stated that after these investigations and the meetings with B. L. Rountree, personally, and again with his attorney, it declined to change its decision of June 17, 1943. The law controlling the Milk Commission is embraced in Sections iziix, et seq., of the Code of Virginia 1942 (Michie).

In Reynolds v. Milk Comm., 163 Va. 957, 179 S. E. 507, in enumerating the powers of the Milk Commission, under the statute, this court said this: “To investigate all matters pertaining to the production, processing, storage, transportation, distribution and sale of milk in the state; to supervise, regulate and control the production, transportation, processing, storage, distribution, delivery and sale of milk for consumption in the state; to act as arbiter in disputes, between the producers and distributors; to examine into the business, books and accounts of any producer or distributor, to issue subpoenas to the producers and distributors and require them to produce their records. The Commission is. empowered to make, adopt and enforce all rules, regulations, and orders necessary to carry out the purposes of the act, * * * A license may be required of producers and distributors, and the Commission may grant or decline a license or revoke any already granted, after due notice and a hearing-”

Section i2iibb contains this provision:

“(a) Any person or persons aggrieved by an order of the Commission refusing a license, to re-issue or revoke or suspend a license, to a distributor or producer-distributor, or to transfer a license from one person to another, and any other order of the Commission applying only to a person or persons, and, not otherwise specifically provided for, may be reviewed upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals. Any person or persons aggrieved by an order of the Com[780]*780mission fixing, revising or amending the price at or the terms upon which milk may be bought or sold, or by any other general action, rule or regulation or order of the Commission, may, within forty (40) days after the effective date of such action, rule, regulation or order, appeal therefrom to the Circuit Court of the city of Richmond.” Subsequent sub-sections of this statute provide for the steps to be taken in perfecting the appeal to the Circuit Court of the city of Richmond and the sub-section (f) concludes as follows:

“Upon the hearing, the court shall determine whether the order appealed is within the discretion vested in the Commission by law, and if so, whether the Commission has exercised a reasonable discretion or the order is unreasonable and capricious. If the Commission is found to be without authority of law to enter the order complained of, or that it was unreasonable and capricious, the court shall enter an order declaring the order of the Commission null and void. Where the appeal is from a finding of fact, the order of the Commission shall be given the weight of a jury on a fact found. If the court finds that the findings of fact are not sustained by the evidence, the court may either declare such finding of fact void or remand the cause to the Commission for future proceedings.”

It will be observed that these statutory provisions relating to appeal apply in terms only to proceedings in the Circuit Court of the city of Richmond.

The Attorney General makes this statement in his brief filed for the Commission:

“It will be seen that no specific standards or rules are laid down upon an appeal to this court (The Supreme Court of Appeals); presumably they are to be governed by the same general rules for other appeals.”

Why the statute makes this distinction between the course to be pursued in the case of one appeal and the other and states the effect of the Commission’s findings of fact in the one case and is silent as to it in the other, is not necessary to enquire, as will presently be seen.

[781]*781At this point it seems desirable to make a statement of the local conditions and happenings which antedate the incidents which we have detailed. Let us bear in mind that the license which was applied for and refused was upon the application of Victoria Rountree, not B. L. Rountree, her son, though he was active in the interest of his mother.

The Rountree farm, about three and one-half miles from the city of Suffolk, and lying along the Nansemond river, owned by Mrs. Rountree, contains about seven hundred acres. It has been and is in a high state of fertility. Three hundred acres are in cultivation and the same number of acres in pasture land, and about one hundred acres are woodland. A portion of the pasture is marsh land, which affords a succulent and desirable type of grazing, especially when uplands are impaired by the heat and droughts usual in summer. It supports some 225 head of milk stock, of which from 140 to 150 are cows, consisting mostly of pure bred Guernseys. As far back as 1935 and to 1942, the Rountree Dairy was operating in the Suffolk area as a producer-distributor under a license from the State Milk Commission. In 1942, it was invited to Join the Nansemond Cooperative Dairy, Inc. It became a member of that organization, its equipment and its capacity adding material strength thereto. At that time B. L. Rountree was the active person in the Rountree Dairy enterprise and his was what might be termed the directing voice. Mrs. G. G. Coulbourn, who owned the Greenfield Dairy, was also a member of the organization, and her interests were cared for by her son, Edwin D. Coulbourn, a Suffolk lawyer.

Several local producers were also members of the cooperative organization. It was an industrial family, as it were, and as unhappily is frequently the case, with members of that social unit, known as the family, the homogeneity did not last through the vicissitudes of time. Two of the principal members, as we shall see, were later to become antagonists of more than usual virulence.

The war came on and with it the nascency of what became known as the OPA. This Federal agency fixed the [782]*782maximum ceiling price of milk and the Milk Commission fixed the minimum price for the area with which we are concerned.

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129 S.E.2d 35 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1963)
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60 S.E.2d 35 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1950)

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Bluebook (online)
36 S.E.2d 613, 184 Va. 777, 1946 Va. LEXIS 141, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rountree-v-state-milk-commission-va-1946.