Roughton v. State

92 So. 3d 284, 2012 WL 2864380, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 11396
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJuly 13, 2012
DocketNo. 5D11-652
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 92 So. 3d 284 (Roughton v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roughton v. State, 92 So. 3d 284, 2012 WL 2864380, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 11396 (Fla. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

ORFINGER, C.J.

James Roughton appeals his convictions for sexual battery on a person under twelve years of age and lewd or lascivious molestation of a victim less than twelve years of age. Mr. Roughton asserts that because his convictions for sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation arise from the same criminal act, they violate his constitutional protections against double jeopardy.1 The State concedes that the convictions were based on the same act, but argues that the convictions do not violate double jeopardy. We affirm both convictions.2

“Determining whether double jeopardy is violated based on undisputed facts is a purely legal determination, so the standard of review is de novo.” Binns v. State, 979 So.2d 439, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). “The prevailing standard for determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions for offenses arising from the same criminal transaction is whether the Legislature ‘intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes.’ ” Valdes v. State, 3 So.3d 1067, 1070 (Fla.2009) (quoting M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996)). Absent clear legislative intent to authorize separate punishments, courts employ the Blockburger3 “same elements” test, ie., “whether each offense has an element that the other does not,” codified at section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2008).4 If each of the offenses has an element that the other does not, the court must then determine if one of the excep[286]*286tions set forth in section 775.021(4)(b)5 applies to preclude separate convictions and sentences. Valdes, 3 So.3d at 1070.

Florida courts have reached differing conclusions about whether sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation have different elements. The Fourth District Court holds that the offenses of lewd or lascivious molestation and sexual battery each contain an element that the other does not. As a result, that court concluded that a conviction of both, arising from the same underlying act, is not a violation of double jeopardy. See, e.g., Darville v. State, 995 So.2d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“We have no difficulty in ascertaining that the lewd and lascivious molestation offense contains an element not found in the sexual battery conviction, and vice versa.”). Conversely, the First and Second District Courts both hold that convictions of sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation arising from the same criminal act are barred by double jeopardy. See, e.g., Berlin v. State, 72 So.3d 284, 284-85 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Smith v. State, 41 So.3d 1041, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“Lewd or lascivious molestation requires proof of an intentional touching of certain body parts, and sexual battery requires proof of penetration or union with those same body parts. The criminal act under both section 794.011(2)(a) and section 800.04(5) is an intentional touching of the type prohibited by the respective statutes. Under the Blockburger test, the two charged offenses arise from a single criminal act and constitute the same offense.”); Robinson v. State, 919 So.2d 623, 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding double jeopardy principles preclude convictions for both sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation based on one act); Johnson v. State, 913 So.2d 1291, 1291 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

Here, there is no specific statement of legislative intent to have sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation punished separately when the two crimes arise from a single act. However, section 775.021(4)(a) establishes the general legislative intent to punish separate offenses that arise from the same act. Thus, we must utilize the Blockburger “same elements” analysis. Roberts v. State, 39 So.3d 372, 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Comparing the lewd or lascivious and sexual battery statutes demonstrates that their elements are different. Lewd or lascivious molestation requires a specific lewd or lascivious intent, which sexual battery does not. Admittedly, lewd or lascivious intent is often associated with sexual battery, however, it is not an element of that crime, and may be committed without the intent for sexual satisfaction.6 Surace v. State, 378 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding intent to obtain sexual gratification not essential element of sexual battery); see [287]*287State v. Wiley, 181 Vt. 300, 917 A.2d 501, 505 (2007) (distinguishing sexual assault from lewd or lascivious conduct for double jeopardy purposes based upon intent).

In addition, the anatomy protected by the statutes is, or may be, different. For example, touching the buttocks of a child in a lewd manner would constitute a lewd or lascivious molestation, but would not constitute a sexual battery. Instead, sexual battery requires either penetration or oral, anal or vaginal union with the sexual organ of another, neither of which are elements of lewd or lascivious molestation. Further, the two offenses are not subject to any of the three exceptions set out in section 775.021(4)(b) in that they do not require identical elements of proof, are not degrees of the same offense as provided by statute, nor is one subsumed by the other. Hence, because they are separate statutory offenses not subject to any of the enumerated exceptions, convictions of lewd or lascivious molestation and sexual battery arising from the same act do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

For these reasons, we affirm Mr. Roughton’s convictions. In doing so, we certify direct and express conflict with Berlin v. State, 72 So.3d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Smith v. State, 41 So.3d 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Robinson v. State, 919 So.2d 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); and Johnson v. State, 913 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).7

AFFIRMED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.

PALMER and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)
92 So. 3d 284, 2012 WL 2864380, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 11396, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roughton-v-state-fladistctapp-2012.