Rothfeld v. Bachar

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: March 9, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-4066
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TZVI DOV ROTHFELD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-04066 (UNA) ) EDEN BIEN BACHAR, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter, brought pro se, is before the Court on its initial review of the Complaint

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons explained below, it denies Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and it

dismisses this matter without prejudice.

At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s IFP Application is unsigned, in contravention

of Federal Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); therefore, it is denied. The Complaint, which is

also unsigned, fares no better, procedurally or substantively. “A complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact” is frivolous, Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and Plaintiff’s Complaint falls squarely into this category.

Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen currently residing in Israel, sues an individual, Eden Bien Bachar,

who also resides in Israel. See Compl. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that on April 4, 2023, he “sent the

Defendant a message: ‘What is your request and what is your question? Up to half the kingdom

shall be granted to you,” and that because “of this message, which was sent from the city of

London, a cause of action arose[.]” Id. at 1. Plaintiff construed this exchange, among other similar exchanges, as a “threat to his life and unlawful harm to his body,” causing him “fear of walking in

public,” and inability to sleep restfully. See id. at 1–2. He demands $70 million in damages. See

id. at 2.

As here, the Court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (“Over the years, this Court has repeatedly held

that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if

they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’”) (quoting

Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)); Tooley v. Napolitano, 586

F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent insubstantiality,”

including where the plaintiff allegedly “was subjected to a campaign of surveillance and

harassment deriving from uncertain origins.”). Indeed, a court is obligated to dismiss a complaint

as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992), or “postulat[e] events and circumstances of a wholly

fanciful kind,” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

Accordingly, the Complaint, ECF No. 1, and this case, are dismissed without prejudice. A

separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: March 9, 2026

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge