Roth v. Brownell

117 F. Supp. 362, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4269
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedDecember 15, 1953
DocketCiv. No. 3943
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 117 F. Supp. 362 (Roth v. Brownell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roth v. Brownell, 117 F. Supp. 362, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4269 (D.D.C. 1953).

Opinion

KEECH, District Judge.

This case is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment.

The plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring that his separation from his position in the Department of Justice was unlawful and void because in violation of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 37 Stat. 555 (1912), as amended 62 Stat. 354 (1948), 5 U.S.C.A. § 652(a)1 and not in conformity with § 9.102 of the Civil Service Regulations, 5 C.F.R. § 9.1022, and directing [364]*364the defendants to restore him to his position'as Trial Attorney GS-14 in the Department.

Plaintiff acquired a competitive civil service status on April 15, 1943, under the Ramspeck Act, 54 Stat. 1211 (1940), as amended 59 Stat. 666 (1945), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 631a and 631b and Exec.Order No.8743 of April 23, 1941, 6 F.R. 2117.

On May 1, 1947, by Exec.Order No. 9830, 12 F.R. 1259, U.S.Code Cong. Service 1947, p. 1972, all attorney positions in the government service were placed on Schedule A as, excepted from the competitive service. That order provided, however, that whenever such a position was occupied by a person having a competitive status, he should be separated from his position only in accordance with the Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Under the provisions of Exec.Order No.9973 of June 28, 1948, 13 F.R. 3600, U.S.Code Cong.Service 1948, p. 2658, and Exec.Order No.10440 of March 31, 1953; 18 F.R. 1823, U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News 1953, p. 1000, it was specifically provided that the Civil Service Rules and Regulations should apply to removals from Schedule A positions, not of a primarily confidential or policy-making character, of persons who had competitive status. On June 25, 1953, by Exec.Order No.10463, 18 F.R. 3655, U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News 1953, p. 1026, § 6.4 of the Civil Service Regulations was amended to provide that the Civil Service Rules and Regulations shall not apply to removals from positions listed in Schedule A.3

On June 29, 1953, the defendants, the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General of the United States, notified plaintiff that his employment in the Department of Justice would be terminated . as of July 31, 1953. This termination was effected without giving plaintiff a statement of the reasons for his removal or a hearing.

[365]*365The defendants contend that plaintiff’s separation from his position was in conformity with Exec.Order No.10463, now in effect. It is the defendant’s position that Exec.Order No.10463, in so far as it conflicts with Civil Service Regulation § 9.102 in its application to incumbents of Schedule A jobs who have competitive status, supplants § 9.102, and that 5 U.S.C.A. § 652(a) is not a statutory bar to the executive action taken in Exec. Order No.10463.

Plaintiff argues that his position did not become a Schedule A job on adoption of Exec.Order No.9830 of May 1, 1947, which placed attorney jobs within the Schedule A exception from the classified civil service, because this would have in effect removed him from the classified civil service without compliance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C.A. § 652(a). Although plaintiff concedes that civil service employees have no vested rights to their positions, he urges that a competitive status employee in a classified position acquires a statutory right to the removal procedures prescribed in 5 U.S.C.A. § 652(a), which cannot be divested by changing the classification of his position to a Schedule A excepted status.

The court does not construe 5 U.S.C.A. § 652(a) as vesting any such right. That statute accords the removal procedures there prescribed to persons in the “classified civil service of the United States.” As stated by the Court of Appeals of this District in Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 248, 255, 182 F.2d 46, 53, “Status and service are different terms in civil service parlance, -x- * -x- ^ person is jn the classified civil service when he has a competitive status and occupies a classified position in the executive branch of the Government.” Under 5 U.S.C.A. § 631, R.S. § 1753, the President is given authority “to prescribe such regulations for the admission of persons into the civil service of the United States as may best promote the efficiency thereof.” Under this general grant of authority he may determine whether positions shall be included or excepted from the classified civil service. There is no express limitation on this power. To hold that, although the President has authority to change positions from classified to excepted, such action cannot, by reason of § 652, affect any position occupied by an incumbent with competitive status, is to imply a limitation which would withdraw from the President’s power to reclassify as excepted every position in the government occupied by a competitive status employee until the present incumbent resigned, retired, died, or was removed under charges pursuant to 5 U.S.C.A. § 652(a). Such a result is not warranted by the language of 5 U.S.C.A. § 652(a).

The court holds, therefore, that there is no statutory bar to reclassifying positions

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Related

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153 Ct. Cl. 407 (Court of Claims, 1961)

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Bluebook (online)
117 F. Supp. 362, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4269, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roth-v-brownell-dcd-1953.