Rossiris Patricia Arias Hernandez v. Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States, in her official capacity, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 15, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03320
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ROSSIRIS PATRICIA ARIAS Case No.: 25cv3320-LL-DEB HERNANDEZ, 11

Petitioner, 12 ORDER GRANTING IN PART v. PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR 13 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of 14 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241 the United States, in her official capacity, [ECF No. 1]; 15 et al.,

16 Respondents. ORDER DENYING AS MOOT PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR A 17 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 18 ORDER [ECF No. 2]

20 21 Pending before the Court are Petitioner Rossiris Patricia Arias Hernandez’s Verified 22 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.”) [ECF No. 1] and 23 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) [ECF No. 2]. Respondents filed an 24 Opposition [ECF No. 9], and Petitioner filed a Reply [ECF No. 12]. For the following 25 reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Petition and DENIES AS MOOT the 26 Application for Temporary Restraining Order. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner Rossiris Patricia Arias Hernandez is a Colombian national who came to 3 the United States on November 23, 2023 seeking safety from years of physical and sexual 4 abuse by Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia members. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 23–24. She 5 was issued a Notice to Appear and released on her own recognizance. Id. Petitioner has an 6 asylum petition pending. Id. ¶¶ 27, 37–39. On July 7, 2025, after Petitioner appeared at the 7 San Diego Immigration Court for a master calendar hearing, she was taken into 8 Immigration and Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) custody and subsequently detained at 9 Otay Mesa Detention Center, where she remains. Id. ¶¶ 31–33. On August 14, 2025, 10 Petitioner filed a Motion for Custody Redetermination Hearing, which the immigration 11 judge denied on August 22, 2025. Oppo. at 3 (citing Exhibit 7 to the Oppo.) The 12 immigration judge denied the request for a change in custody status on the basis that: 13 Respondent was detained upon entering the country and released on parole and the parole was subsequently revoked. The Court find[s] that it does not 14 have jurisdiction pursuant to the Matter of Q Li, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025). 15 The Court found an alternative finding of a bond of $7,500 and ATD if the court were to have jurisdiction. 16

17 ECF No. 9-2 at 21; see also Pet. ¶¶ 35-36. 18 ICE charged Petitioner with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as 19 being present in the United States without admission or parole and under 8 U.S.C. § 20 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an immigrant not in possession of a valid entry document. Oppo. at 21 4 (citing Exhibit 8). Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 22 Oppo. at 4. On October 27, 2025, Petitioner filed an application for relief from removal, 23 which remains pending. Pet. ¶ 39. On November 20, 2025, Respondents moved to 24 “pretermit” Petitioner’s asylum claim so that she can be removed to Honduras, pursuant to 25 the Asylum Cooperative Agreement between the United States and Honduras. Id. ¶ 40. 26 Petitioner’s counsel prepared an objection to the government’s motion to pretermit (Id. ¶ 27 41), and the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (“OPLA) trial attorney withdrew the 28 motion to permit on December 5, 2025. ECF No. 12-1, Supplemental Decl. of Andreana 1 Sarkis filed in support of Reply (“Sarkis Decl.”) at ¶¶ 2-3. The Immigration Judge set a 2 hearing and a deadline for filing all remaining briefing and evidence on Petitioner’s asylum 3 claim for January 27, 2026, and a date for the merits hearing will likely be after that. Sarkis 4 Decl. ¶ 4. 5 In the instant Petition, Petitioner alleges the following claims for relief: (1) violation 6 of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (substantive due process); (2) violation 7 of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (procedural due process); (3) unlawful 8 application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); (4) violation of the Administrative Procedure Act; and 9 (5) release pending adjudication. Id. ¶¶ 61–86. 10 Petitioner’s Petition and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order both seek (1) her 11 immediate release from custody and an order that enjoins Respondents from re-detaining 12 Petitioner absent a pre-deprivation hearing before this Court, where Respondents must 13 show, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the 14 community such that her physical custody is required; (2) alternatively, an individualized 15 bond hearing before an immigration judge; and (3) an order prohibiting Respondents from 16 transferring Petitioner out of this district or the United States until, at least, these habeas 17 proceedings have concluded. Pet. at 20; ECF No. 2-1 at 23. Petitioner’s counsel also seeks 18 “attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act.” Pet. at 20. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when a petitioner “is in custody 21 in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 22 § 2241(c); Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28 U.S.C. § 2241 23 expressly permits the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens when those 24 aliens are ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 25 States.’”). In federal habeas proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his case 26 by a preponderance of evidence. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16 27 (9th Cir. 2004); Bellew v. Gunn, 532 F.2d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). 28 / / / 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 A. Jurisdiction 3 Respondents argue that as a threshold matter, Petitioner’s claims are jurisdictionally 4 barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Oppo. 5 at 10-13. 6 1. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) 7 Section 1252(g) states that “[e]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding 8 any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, 9 or any other habeas corpus provision, . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause 10 or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney 11 General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any 12 alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). 13 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are barred because her detention arises 14 from the “Attorney General’s decision to commence proceedings” against her, which 15 removes district court jurisdiction. ECF No. 9 at 12. Petitioner opposes, arguing that § 16 1252(g) does not apply because she is not challenging the decision to “commence removal 17 proceedings” but is instead challenging “Respondents’ decision to continue detaining her 18 without affording a bond hearing and DHS’s misclassification of her detention as 19 mandatory under § 1225(b).” Oppo. at 13. 20 The Court finds § 1252(g) does not bar its jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims. The 21 Supreme Court has explained that § 1252(g) does not bar jurisdiction for the “universe of 22 deportation claims” but instead “applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney 23 General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or 24 execute removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 25 482 (1999); see also Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631, 2025 WL 2461663, at *2 26 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (“The Supreme Court has instructed that we should read § 1252(g) 27 narrowly.”). The Supreme Court later reiterated this narrow application of § 1252(g): “We 28 did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise 1 from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language to 2 refer to just those three specific actions themselves.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 3 294 (2018) (citation omitted). Petitioner is not challenging the commencement of removal 4 proceedings but is instead claiming a lack of legal authority to subject her to mandatory 5 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) during proceedings. See Ibarra-Perez, 2025 WL 6 2461663, at *2 (noting that a claim based on a lack of legal authority to execute a removal 7 order due to a violation of a court order, the Constitution, INA, or international law, does 8 not challenge the decision or action to execute a removal order). Therefore, 9 § 1252(g) does not limit the Court’s jurisdiction in this matter. 10 2. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) 11 Section 1252(b)(9) states that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact, 12 including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising 13 from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States 14 under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this 15 section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). Section 1252(a)(5) adds that “a petition for review filed 16 with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and 17 exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any 18 provision of this chapter,” except for certain actions challenging orders under § 1225(b)(1). 19 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), (e). 20 Respondents argue that § 1252(b)(9) and § 1252(a)(5) apply here because they 21 remove the Court’s jurisdiction “to review both direct and indirect challenges to removal 22 orders, including decisions to detain for purposes of removal or for proceedings.” ECF 23 No. 9 at 12. 24 The Court finds § 1252(b)(9) and § 1252(a)(5) do not apply to Petitioner’s claims. 25 The Supreme Court has explained that “§ 1252(b)(9) ‘does not present a jurisdictional bar’ 26 where those bringing suit ‘are not asking for review of an order of removal,’ ‘the decision 27 . . . to seek removal,’ or ‘the process by which . . . removability will be determined.’” Dep’t 28 of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) 1 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294–95). The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that “claims 2 that are independent of or collateral to the removal process do not fall within the scope of 3 § 1252(b)(9).” J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016). Petitioner is 4 claiming a lack of legal authority to subject her to mandatory detention under § 1225 5 instead of detention with a bond hearing under § 1226(a), which is not a review for an order 6 of removal, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability will be 7 determined. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 292–95 (finding that § 1252(b)(9) did not deprive 8 the Court of jurisdiction to determine whether § 1225 and § 1226 require detention without 9 a bond hearing). Accordingly, § 1252(b)(9), and by extension § 1252(a)(5), does not bar 10 the Court from jurisdiction in this case. 11 The Court turns now to the merits of the Petition. 12 B. Merits 13 Petitioner argues that her detention without a bond hearing is unlawful because (1) 14 she is wrongfully held under the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2); (2) it 15 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, both substantive and procedural; 16 and (3) it is arbitrary and capricious and thus violates the Administrative Procedure Act. 17 Pet. ¶¶ 61-82. 18 The Court will first address Petitioner’s claim for relief that she is wrongfully held 19 under the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2), which requires interpreting the 20 relevant statutes. 21 Noncitizens are detained during removal proceedings under two statutes: 8 U.S.C. 22 §§ 1225 and 1226. Section 1225 is titled “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited 23 removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing” and concerns “applicants for 24 admission” who are defined for purposes of § 1225 as an “alien present in the United States 25 who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” § 1225(a)(1). An applicant 26 for admission “seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States” 27 is inspected by immigration officers. § 1225(a)(3). After inspection, certain applicants for 28 admission who are deemed to be inadmissible shall be subject to expedited removal— 1 “without further hearing or review”—unless they indicate an intention to apply for asylum 2 or a fear of persecution, in which case they will be referred for a credible fear interview by 3 an asylum officer. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii); see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. 4 Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 109 (2020). For the other applicants for admission, “if the 5 examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly 6 and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained” for a proceeding 7 under the regular removal process of § 1229a. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Applicants for admission 8 detained under either prong of § 1225(b) are subject to mandatory detention until removal 9 proceedings have concluded, but may be paroled into the United States by DHS “for urgent 10 humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 11 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 300, 302 (finding that parole is the only statutory provision for release 12 from detention under § 1225(b) during removal proceedings). There is no statutory right to 13 a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under § 1225(b). See Jennings, 583 U.S. 14 at 296–97. 15 Section 1226 is titled “Apprehension and detention of aliens” and provides that “[o]n 16 a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a 17 decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” § 1226(a). The 18 government may then “continue to detain the arrested alien” or release the alien on bond 19 or conditional parole. § 1226(a)(1)-(2). After the initial decision is made to either detain or 20 release the noncitizen, the noncitizen may request a bond hearing (i.e., custody 21 redetermination) before an immigration judge. § C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1). However, 22 § 1226(c) “carves out a statutory category of aliens who may not be released under 23 § 1226(a).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. Section 1226(c) specifies that noncitizens who are 24 inadmissible or deportable because of certain crimes are ineligible to be released on bond 25 or parole, unless it is deemed necessary for witness-protection purposes. §§ 1226(a), (c). 26 Petitioner and Respondents interpret § 1225 and § 1226 differently. Petitioner 27 contends that “for decades, the detention of noncitizens who entered the United States 28 without inspection has been governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226 [and not 1225].” Reply at 14. 1 Petitioner states that “since May 2025, Respondents have shifted their interpretation of the 2 statute,” and have more broadly interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1225 to find that an “applicant for 3 admission” includes all noncitizens who entered without admission or inspection, thereby 4 subjecting them to mandatory detention.” Id. at 15. Petitioner argues that § 1226(a) applies 5 to Petitioner’s detention based on the “statutory scheme and relevant facts of this case.” Id. 6 at 17. Petitioner states that “all the documentation that Respondents have provided Ms. 7 Arias Hernandez indicates that her detention is governed by § 1226 because she was 8 already in the country.” Id. Respondents oppose, arguing that Petitioner is an “applicant 9 for admission” per the plain language of the statue and subject to the mandatory detention 10 provisions of § 1225(b)(2). ECF No. 9 at 13. 11 “The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its language.” Cmty. 12 for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (citation omitted). “We must 13 enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language according to its terms.” Hardt v. 14 Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010) (citations omitted). “But 15 oftentimes the meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become 16 evident when placed in context.” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (internal 17 quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “when deciding whether language is plain, 18 we must read the words in their context and with a view to their place in the overall 19 statutory scheme.” San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Becerra, 53 F.4th 1236, 1240 20 (9th Cir. 2022), aff’d, 602 U.S. 222 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 21 King, 576 U.S. at 486). 22 The Court finds the plain text of § 1225(b)(2) does not support Respondents’ 23 contention that it applies to any noncitizen present in the United States who has not been 24 admitted. The terms, title, and context indicate a narrower application. An “applicant for 25 admission” detained under § 1225(b)(2) requires an “examining immigration officer” to 26 determine that the noncitizen “seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled 27 to be admitted.” § 1225(b)(2)(A). Broadly reading §1225(b)(2) detention to merely require 28 being “applicants for admission”—noncitizens present in the United States who have not 1 been admitted or who arrive in the United States—ignores the other language that also 2 requires them to be “seeking admission” and for the examining officer to determine they 3 are “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” See Shulman v. Kaplan, 4 58 F.4th 404, 410–11 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[A] court ‘must interpret the statute as a whole, 5 giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner 6 that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.’” 7 (citation omitted)); see also Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, No. 25-CV-12664-PBS, 2025 8 WL 2809996, at *6 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES- 9 SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); Garcia v. Noem, No. 10 25-CV-02180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); Lopez 11 Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 12 2025). Furthermore, the title of § 1225 is “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited 13 removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing,” which indicates that this 14 section is limited to people applying for admission when they arrive in the United States 15 or upon recent entry. See Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 120–21 (2023) (“This Court 16 has long considered that the title of a statute and the heading of a section are tools available 17 for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.” (internal quotation marks and 18 citation omitted)). There is no indication that Petitioner was actively “seeking admission” 19 upon arrival or recent entry at the border and that immigration officers inspected Petitioner 20 and determined they she was not entitled to be admitted. 21 Respondents contend that “seeking admission” is simply a characteristic of all 22 “applicants for admission” and not a separate requirement, but the Court is not persuaded. 23 See ECF No. 9 at 13. As other courts have found, the use of the present participle “seeking” 24 “necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” See, e.g., Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, 25 at *5 (quoting Martinez v. Hyde, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6 (D. 26 Mass. July 24, 2025)). The plain text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires a noncitizen present 27 without admission to be actively seeking lawful entry. See id.; Esquivel-Ipina v. LaRose, 28 No. 25-CV-2672 JLS (BLM), 2025 WL 2998361, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (agreeing 1 with other courts in the Ninth Circuit who find that “seeking admission” requires an 2 affirmative act such as entering the United States or applying for status (citing cases)). 3 Respondents’ interpretation would render the term “seeking admission” superfluous. See 4 Shulman, 58 F.4th at 410–11; Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *5 (“The government’s position 5 would make the ‘seeking admission’ language meaningless and violate the rule against 6 surplusage.” (citations omitted)). The Ninth Circuit has already rejected an interpretation 7 of “applicant for admission” that would consider any applicant for admission as someone 8 also “deemed to have made an actual application for admission.” See Torres v. Barr, 976 9 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Echevarria v. Bondi, No. CV-25-03252-PHX-DWL 10 (ESW), 2025 WL 2821282, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025) (citing Torres, 976 F.3d 918). 11 The Court finds Petitioner was not “seeking admission” upon arrival or recent entry at the 12 border pursuant to § 1225(b)(2). 13 Additionally, if Respondents’ argument that all noncitizens present in the country 14 without admission are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) is true, it would 15 render superfluous a recent amendment to § 1226(c). Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *6 16 (collecting cases). Section 1226(a) provides discretionary detention of noncitizens pending 17 a decision on removal, except for certain noncitizens who are inadmissible or deportable 18 due to certain crimes described in § 1226(c). In 2025, the Laken Riley Act added a 19 subsection to § 1226(c)(1), denying bond or parole to any noncitizen who is both (1) 20 inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) as a noncitizen “present without 21 admission or parole,” or without valid entry documents, or who used fraud or 22 misrepresentation to obtain entry documents, and (2) charged with, arrested for, or 23 convicted of certain crimes. Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat 3 (2025); 24 § 1226(c)(1)(E). In other words, if noncitizens are present without admission and they have 25 not committed certain crimes, they are detained under § 1226(a)’s default provisions. See 26 § 1226(a) (providing discretion to release noncitizens on bond or parole “[e]xcept as 27 provided in subsection (c)”); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1256 28 (W.D. Wash. 2025). “As the Supreme Court has recognized, when Congress creates 1 ‘specific exceptions’ to a statute’s applicability, it ‘proves’ that absent those exceptions, 2 the statute generally applies.” Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1256–57 (citing Shady Grove 3 Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010)). Therefore, if—as 4 Respondents urge—all noncitizens present without admission were already subject to 5 mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), there would be no need for an amendment that 6 mandates detention for all noncitizens “present without admission or parole” and who have 7 been charged with certain crimes. See Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *6; Garcia, 2025 WL 8 2549431, at *6. “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its 9 amendment to have real and substantial effect.” Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), 10 abrogated on other grounds by Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190 (2025). The Court will not 11 find that Congress passed the Laken Riley Act to add an amendment that performs the same 12 function as §1225(b)(2). Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-CV-3142 (SRN/SGE), 2025 WL 13 2374411, at *12 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); see also Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 14 371, 386 (2013) (“[T]he canon against surplusage is strongest when an interpretation would 15 render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.”). 16 Accordingly, under the plain language of § 1225 and § 1226, the Court finds, as have 17 many other courts addressing the same issue, that Petitioner’s detention, as a noncitizen 18 present in the United States without being admitted or paroled and who was residing in the 19 country prior to being charged, is governed by the discretionary detention provision of § 20 1226(a) and not the mandatory detention of 21 § 1225(b)(2).1 See, e.g., Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-CV-13073, 2025 WL 22 2952796, at *8 & n.4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025) (collecting cases); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 23 No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 n.3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) 24 (collecting cases). But see Chavez v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02325-CAB-SBC, 2025 WL 25 2730228, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (finding petitioners as noncitizens residing in the 26 27 1 Having reached this conclusion on Petitioner’s first claim for relief, the Court declines to 28 1 country without inspection or parole are “applicants for admission” and properly detained 2 under § 1225(b)(2)). This finding also comports with the Supreme Court’s interpretation 3 that § 1225(b) applies to the detention of “aliens seeking admission into the country” while 4 § 1226 applies to “aliens already in the country” during removal proceedings. See Jennings, 5 583 U.S. at 289. It is also consistent with years of agency practice based on regulations 6 from EOIR in 1997 issued to implement the provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform 7 and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), which includes the detention 8 provisions of § 1225 and § 1226. See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; 9 Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 10 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10312 (Mar. 6, 1997). The agency regulation explained under a section 11 titled “Apprehension, Custody, and Detention of Aliens” that “non-criminal aliens” are 12 subject to “the new $1,500 minimum bond specified by IIRIRA,” and that “[d]espite being 13 applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled 14 (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond 15 and bond redetermination.” Id. at 10323. 16 V. CONCLUSION 17 For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS: 18 1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED IN PART.2 19 Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an 20 immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7) days of the date of this 21 order. At any such hearing, Respondents SHALL NOT deny Petitioner bond on the basis 22 that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) requires mandatory detention. 23 2. Petitioner’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED AS 24 MOOT. 25

26 27 2 Petitioner’s requested relief includes an award of attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and on any other basis justified under 28 l 4. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in Petitioner’s favor and close this 2 || case. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: December 15, 2025 MO 5 Je J 6 Honorable Linda Lopez 5 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28