Rosser v. Rosser

86 N.E.2d 794, 55 Ohio Law. Abs. 161
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 21, 1949
DocketNo. 661
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 86 N.E.2d 794 (Rosser v. Rosser) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rosser v. Rosser, 86 N.E.2d 794, 55 Ohio Law. Abs. 161 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).

Opinion

OPINION

By THE COURT:

The appeal is on questions of law and fact from a judgment setting aside and cancelling a certain deed from Winfield Scott Rosser to the defendant, Waldo Rank, and ordering partition of the premises described in the petition among the heirs at law of said Winfield S. Rosser, deceased.

The issue joined was upon the averment of the petition,

“That the defendant, Waldo Rank, on the 10th day of August, 1945, by undue persuasion, duress and by exercising undue influence over said decedent at which time said Win-field S. Rosser was mentally ill and had not sufficient mental capacity to be able to understand the nature of the transaction, obtained and procured said deed to Waldo Rank, as Grantee, * * *. That, at said time, Winfield S. Rosser was 87 years of age and afflicted with arterio sclerosis and senile dementia, and said Waldo Rank knew of said affliction and [162]*162the mental incapacity of Winfield S. Rosser, and obtained said purported deed or conveyance without consideration therefor.”

Because of the nature of the appeal, it is our obligation to determine the issues joined as if the case had originated in this Court, to weigh the facts, test the credibility of the witnesses and apply the law as a trial court of first instance.

The record is voluminous, consisting of almost a thousand pages and many exhibits. We have read every line of the testimony, as well as the briefs of the parties. The conflict in the testimony is marked. The statements and conclusions of the witnesses for the parties are utterly irreconcilable. On the one hand, Mr. Rosser was, from 1944 until the time of his death, presented as a doddering old man, utterly incapable of carrying on ordinary business transactions, without mental capacity to appreciate his relation to the natural objects of his bounty and with little or no concept of what was going on currently about him. On the other hand, he was portrayed as a man of exceptional intellect, a brilliant conversationalist, keenly aware of all that was taking place about him and maintaining a lively interest, not only in past events but in those occurring during the years of ’44 and ’45, and with special interest in matters in which during much of his lifetime he had been intimately concerned.

It is probable that some of the testimony is colored and shaped, in a degree, at least, by the interest of the witnesses in the outcome of the suit. Proper determination of the issues must therefore be made largely from the probabilities from facts that are either not in dispute at all or as to which there is little dispute.

It appears that Winfield S. Rosser, whom we will hereinafter refer to as Rosser, had been engaged in business in Darke County for many years. Some sixteen years before his death he met with an unfortunate accident in which, while standing on the sidewalk, he was struck by an automobile, as a result of which he suffered an injury to his legs. After his injury he never regained the ability to walk without difficulty and for several years prior to his death had remained very closely at his home, leaving only at infrequent intervals. In 1937 he lost his wife and from that time on, it is evident that -his mode of living was materially changed. He had no children and was dependent for assistance either upon neighbors or hired help. Because of his infirmity and difficulty in maintaining his household in proper manner, it gradually became dirty and dusty and he, likewise, was neglected, with the result that he was not cleanly. For [163]*163several years prior to 1944, he had been cared for indifferently and, it is agreed, was in a deplorable condition as to the cleanliness of his person, his bed and his household. He had been irregular in his habits and had not had the proper food nor was it served to him regularly.

In January, 1944, Mr. S. E. Mote, Rosser’s attorney, contacted Rank to hire him to fire Rosser’s furnace. When the result of the conference was made known to Rosser he sent for Rank and as a result Rank took over the care and attention of Rosser at his home.

Rank lived several squares from Rosser, his wife was an invalid confined to a wheel chair but notwithstanding her infirmity she prepared the meals for Rosser and her husband carried them to the home of Rosser. Rank also fired the furnace, acted as nurse, bought the groceries and supplies for the house and generally took over the minor management of the household. There is no question but that he did a good job. The meals were served on time. They were palatable and enjoyed by Rosser. He was bathed and cleaned, two women were brought in to clean the house and there was a complete change in his situation. It was entirely satisfactory to Rosser and afforded him that which he had been denied for many years.

It is contended by plaintiffs that Rank was to have $25.00 per week for his services. He denies this and says that there was no understanding as to what he was to receive. The inference from his testimony is that because of the deplorable condition in which he found Rosser he started to attend to him as a matter of sympathy. Mr. Mote says that Rank was engaged for his services at $25.00 per week. As a matter of fact, although Mrs. Macci, who had sued Rosser for more than $5,000.00, had provided him some meals over a period of more than six years prior to Rank’s coming, as far as we can tell from the record, she had and claimed no specific contract as to what she should be paid. There is nothing in the record other than the testimony of Mr. Mote from which it may be definitely inferred that Rank was drawing $25.00 per week.

Although Rank testified that he kept an account in ’44 and ’45, he does not have the account for ’44. * This is unfortunate and has weighed heavily against him with us. However, he does produce what purports to be an account for ’45, showing all the money that he had received. If this account is at all accurate, if the total of $25.00 per week had been taken from the amount of money with which he charges himself, there would have been an inadequate sum left to meet the probable demands of maintaining Rosser. There is [164]*164set up by plaintiffs a statement of the total amount of money which Rosser had in the years of ’44 and ’45 until he died. Charging all of this to Rank, it discloses that he would have had $49.22 per week in ’44 and $41.56 per week in ’45. Manifestly, the record does not trace all of this money into Rank’s possession. Had it done so, if it had all been expended on Rosser’s needs, it would not have been excessive for the demands of a man in his condition, maintaining a 12-room house, during the period under consideration. Probably, many of the groceries that were used in preparing Rosser’s meals also were properly used by Rank’s family. Rosser must have understood this would be done because he first proposed that Rank and his family move in with him.

It is urged that Rank prevailed on Rosser to make the deed upon the claim that by so doing he would prevent Mrs. Macci securing the property on her claim. Rank denies this and gives a very reasonable explanation of Rosser’s view of the matter to the effect that he had ample to take care of Mrs. Macci without respect to the outcome of her claim. Mrs. Macci, of course, was not a creditor at the time the deed was made. Had she been, and had Rank and Rosser, by collusion intending to defeat Mrs. Macci, knowingly participated in the making and receiving of the deed, Rosser could not be heard in any court to demand a return of the property.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
86 N.E.2d 794, 55 Ohio Law. Abs. 161, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosser-v-rosser-ohioctapp-1949.