Ross v. Sterling Drug Store

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Ross v. Sterling Drug Store

34 S.E.2d 64, 225 N.C. 226, 1945 N.C. LEXIS 293

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedMay 23, 1945

StatusPublished

Cited by17 cases

This text of 34 S.E.2d 64 (Ross v. Sterling Drug Store) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ross v. Sterling Drug Store, 34 S.E.2d 64, 225 N.C. 226, 1945 N.C. LEXIS 293 (N.C. 1945).

Pincite

Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

In addition to tbe allegations of negligence in respect of tbe condition of tbe doorway and tbe operation of tbe door in question, it is specifically alleged tbat tbe defendants “negligently failed to give any warning thereof.”

Tbe court instructed tbe jury tbat tbe defendant Drug Company owed to tbe plaintiff, a customer and invitee, “tbe duty to exercise due care to keep tbe premises in a reasonably safe condition and to give warning of any bidden peril. Tbat duty to use due care, to keep tbe premises in a reasonably safe condition, extends to any doors, door-checks and instru-mentalities used to facilitate entry into and exit from tbe drug store.”

Near tbe end of tbe charge, tbe jury was told tbat if tbe plaintiff bad satisfied them from tbe evidence and by its greater weight, “tbe defendant was negligent, in tbe manner set forth in tbe complaint,” and tbat such negligence was tbe proximate cause of tbe injury, tbe issue of negligence should be answered in favor of tbe plaintiff.

Thus, tbe defendant says, tbe duty to warn tbe plaintiff of any bidden peril was made absolute, whether known to tbe defendant or discoverable in tbe exercise of reasonable inspection and supervision. Tbe record is *228 susceptible of this interpretation. We cannot say the jury did not so understand it.

The proprietor of a store is not an insurer of the safety of customers while on the premises. Rut he does owe to them the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and “to give warning of hidden perils or unsafe conditions in so far as can be ascertained by reasonable inspection and supervision.” Watkins v. Taylor Furnishing Co., 224 N. C., 674; Griggs v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 N. C., 166, 10 S. E. (2d), 623; Williams v. Stores Co., 209 N. C., 591, 184 S. E., 496; Bowden v. Kress, 198 N. C., 559, 152 S. E., 625.

The duty imposed on the defendant, “to give warning of any hidden peril,” period, appears to be in excess of the legal requirement. It doubtless prejudiced the defendant as it was reasonably calculated to do. Hence, a new trial seems necessary. It is so ordered.

New trial.

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Stacy, C. J.

In addition to tbe allegations of negligence in respect of tbe condition of tbe doorway and tbe operation of tbe door in question, it is specifically alleged tbat tbe defendants “negligently failed to give any warning thereof.”

Tbe court instructed tbe jury tbat tbe defendant Drug Company owed to tbe plaintiff, a customer and invitee, “tbe duty to exercise due care to keep tbe premises in a reasonably safe condition and to give warning of any bidden peril. Tbat duty to use due care, to keep tbe premises in a reasonably safe condition, extends to any doors, door-checks and instru-mentalities used to facilitate entry into and exit from tbe drug store.”

Near tbe end of tbe charge, tbe jury was told tbat if tbe plaintiff bad satisfied them from tbe evidence and by its greater weight, “tbe defendant was negligent, in tbe manner set forth in tbe complaint,” and tbat such negligence was tbe proximate cause of tbe injury, tbe issue of negligence should be answered in favor of tbe plaintiff.

Thus, tbe defendant says, tbe duty to warn tbe plaintiff of any bidden peril was made absolute, whether known to tbe defendant or discoverable in tbe exercise of reasonable inspection and supervision. Tbe record is *228 susceptible of this interpretation. We cannot say the jury did not so understand it.

The proprietor of a store is not an insurer of the safety of customers while on the premises. Rut he does owe to them the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and “to give warning of hidden perils or unsafe conditions in so far as can be ascertained by reasonable inspection and supervision.” Watkins v. Taylor Furnishing Co., 224 N. C., 674; Griggs v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 N. C., 166, 10 S. E. (2d), 623; Williams v. Stores Co., 209 N. C., 591, 184 S. E., 496; Bowden v. Kress, 198 N. C., 559, 152 S. E., 625.

The duty imposed on the defendant, “to give warning of any hidden peril,” period, appears to be in excess of the legal requirement. It doubtless prejudiced the defendant as it was reasonably calculated to do. Hence, a new trial seems necessary. It is so ordered.

New trial.

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34 S.E.2d 64, 225 N.C. 226, 1945 N.C. LEXIS 293, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ross-v-sterling-drug-store-nc-1945.

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