Ross v. Pacific Maritime Association

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided July 2, 2020·No. 2:19-cv-01676·Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 MARLENA ROSS, 8 Plaintiff, 9 v. C19-1676 TSZ 10 PACIFIC MARITIME MINUTE ORDER ASSOCIATION, et al., 11 Defendants. 12

13 The following Minute Order is made by direction of the Court, the Honorable Thomas S. Zilly, United States District Judge: 14 (1) To the extent Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, docket no. 61, or any opposition contains a motion to amend the Second Amended Complaint to 15 include a disability claim, that motion is DENIED. Plaintiff had three prior opportunities to properly amend her complaint to include such a claim yet did not do so. Plaintiff’s 16 contention that “this claim is being raised and litigated sufficiently now by consent” is contradicted by the record. Plaintiff’s Reply, docket no. 88-1 at 7. Defendants 17 strenuously object to any new disability accommodation claim as an impermissible “pivot.” See PMA’s Opposition, docket no. 73 at 20. Any stand alone disability claim is 18 not properly before the Court. 19 (2) SSA’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, docket no. 44, is DENIED in part and DEFERRED in part as follows: 20 (a) SSA’s motion is DENIED as to the Washington Healthy Starts Act 21 (“HSA”), RCW 43.10, et seq., portion. The Court has already ruled that the HSA included a right to lactation accommodations when it went into effect in July 2017. 22 See docket no. 37 at 3. Whether SSA was responsible for a delay in the provision 1 of lactation accommodations or the inadequate provision of those accommodations in violation of the HSA (under Claim III) involves disputed issues of material fact. 2 Compare Bohm Decl., docket no. 86 at ¶ 3 and Ex. 3 to Lentini Decl., docket no. 45-3 at 25-26 with Ex. 9 to Heidelberg Decl., docket no. 62-1 at 71. 3 (b) SSA’s motion is DENIED as to the Fair Labor Standards Act 4 (“FLSA”) portion. Plaintiff asserts a private right of action under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“Any employer who violates the provisions of section . . . 207 of 5 this title shall be liable to the employee … affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and 6 in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”); Lico v. TD Bank, 2015 WL 3467159, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2015) (“[T]he penalty provision explicitly 7 provides a private right of action for all violations of Section Seven, which obviously includes § 207(r). The entitlement to a private right of action could not 8 be more clearly stated in the provision”). Whether SSA retaliated against Ross in violation of the FLSA involves disputed issues of material fact. 9 (c) The Court’s ruling on the Hostile Work Environment (under Claim II) and Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (under Claims 10 IV & V) portions of the Motion is DEFERRED. 11 (3) PMA’s Renewed Threshold Motion for Summary Judgment, docket no. 51, is DENIED as follows: 12 (a) PMA contends that it is not Ross’ employer pursuant to the FLSA. 13 The FLSA defines employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). This 14 definition is “given an expansive interpretation in order to effectuate the FLSA’s broad remedial purposes.” Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welf. Agency, 704 F.2d 15 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Whether an employer-employee 16 relationship exists under the FLSA does not depend on “isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity” and whether an employer exerted 17 control over an employee. Id. This determination focuses on whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees; (2) supervised and 18 controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate and method of pay; and (4) maintained employment records. Id. at 1470. 19 The Department of Labor essentially adopted the Bonnette factors at 29 C.F.R. § 791.2. 20 PMA’s status as Ross’ joint employer is a question of law determined by the 21 Court. Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1469. To meet this test, an “employer” need not meet every factor, rather, the potential joint employer must “actually exercise-- 22 1 directly or indirectly--one or more of these indicia of control to be jointly liable under the Act.” See 85 Fed. Reg. 2820, 2821 (Jan. 16, 2020). 2 (b) The Court previously concluded that there were material issues of 3 fact precluding the Court from determining whether, as a matter of law, PMA could be responsible as Ross’ joint employer pursuant to the FLSA.1 Several 4 entities played a necessary role in processing Ross’ request for a lactation accommodation, which was required before she could return to work. Ross’ 5 request began “exclusively and appropriately only with her union,” Local 19. PMA’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion, docket no. 73 at 11. The JPLRC, of which 6 PMA and Local 19 are a part, then “review[ed] and decide[d] upon” Ross’ temporary accommodation request. Ex. 2 to Second Nziramasanga Decl., docket 7 no. 93; Pick Decl., docket no. 19 at ¶¶ 5, 12. PMA, as the employer representative of the JPLRC, then processed and communicated the request to the employer. Ex. 8 1 to Second Heidelberg Decl., docket no. 81 at 6-7; Ex. 2 to Second Heidelberg Decl., docket no. 81 at 10-11. Ross therefore could not work unless and until 9 Local 19, PMA, and the JPLRC each acted on her lactation room accommodation request. Each entity “supervised and controlled [Ross’] work schedule[] or 10 conditions of employment.” Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470. PMA’s Threshold Motion is therefore DENIED as to the FLSA claim. Now, with the benefit of a 11 developed record and after considering all the briefing on the issue, the Court, sua sponte, finds and concludes as a matter of law that PMA is an employer pursuant 12 to the FLSA for the purpose of processing Ross’ lactation accommodation request because PMA jointly exercised control over conditions of Ross’ employment 13 before she set foot on the docks. (c) PMA also contends that it is not Ross’ employer pursuant to the 14 WLAD. In support of this argument, PMA primarily relies on Anderson v. Pacific Maritime Ass’n, 336 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2003), in which the Ninth Circuit found 15 that PMA was not an employer pursuant to Title VII and the WLAD for events that occurred on PMA-member docks. Anderson is materially distinguishable 16 from this case. The Anderson court held that PMA had “no direct role” in the allegedly racially hostile work environment on its member’s docks. Id. at 926. 17

18 1 PMA contends that it is not Ross’ employer because it does not have the power to hire 19 and fire dockworkers (Weber Decl., docket no. 54 at ¶ 7), does not supervise dockworkers (id. at ¶¶ 7, 17), and assists in negotiating dockworkers’ pay rates merely as an intermediary (id. at ¶ 5). 20 PMA also contends that, while it does keep employee data for its member companies, that factor is not dispositive on its own. Ross’ allegations regarding PMA, JPLRC, and Local 19, relate, however, to the work conditions, hiring, and dispatching before she even set foot in an SSA 21 terminal and not to the lactation accommodations at SSA’s terminals.

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