Ross v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

129 F.2d 310, 29 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 829, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 3346
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJuly 9, 1942
Docket10173
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 129 F.2d 310 (Ross v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ross v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 129 F.2d 310, 29 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 829, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 3346 (5th Cir. 1942).

Opinion

SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.

This case concerns deficiencies in income taxes for the calendar years 1934, 1935 and 1936 of a dissolved corporation, Ross Brothers Horse and Mule Company, assessed against W. R. Ross, its principal stockholder, as transferee. The Company did a large business, averaging nearly a million dollars per year, at Fort Worth, Texas, in selling horses and mules at auction for a commission of $2.50 a head. It rented its stock pens and auction ring, and used its own capital mostly in assisting purchasers and sellers at its auction sales to handle liens against the animals and otherwise temporarily to finance the sales. W. R. Ross indorsed for the Company at the banks to obtain additional money when needed. During the tax years he owned 598 shares of the stock, par value $100 per share, and John C. Hicks and D. H. Per-shall each owned one share. The three, together with Parker Jameson, personally conducted the business, Hicks being the bookkeeper and office man, and Ross and Pershall and Jameson dealing with the customers. There were also hired underlings. The Company paid Ross, Pershall and Jameson each a salary of $6,000 and Hicks $2,400 per year. By agreement they shared the profits of the business, not according to their shares of stock, but as though Ross held 315 shares, Pershall 110 shares, Jameson 110 shares, and Hicks 65 shares. When the corporation was dissolved the assets were distributed 598 shares to Ross, one share each to Pershall and Hicks, showing that the different distribution of the corporate profits was a sort of compensation for services, or bonus, in addition to the fixed salaries.

At the same time Ross, Pershall, Jameson and Hicks, as partners, were carrying on a business of buying horses and mules at the auctions, and sometimes on the outside, and shipping and reselling them mostly into *312 other States. This also was a large business, and during the tax years was profitable. The profits were shared on approximately the same basis as the compensation each got from the Company’s commission business.

The Board of Tax Appeals, sustaining the Commissioner, held the commission business and the buying and selling of animals by the partners was all one business, and all done for the Company, and that the profits should be aggregated and taxed to the Company, resulting in large deficiencies. 43 B.T.A. 1155. There is no conflict in the testimony. The primary facts are undisputed. Only the ultimate inferences and the legal consequences are in contention, so that a mixed question of law and fact is presented on which the Board’s conclusion is nqt final here. Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491, 57 S.Ct. 569, 81 L.Ed. 755. We think the aggregation of the two businesses is not justified, for reasons which follow.

With some changes in the persons engaged, the two businesses have been carried on separately since the Company was incorporated in 1916. W. R. Ross and his two brothers then owned the businesses. Ross was interested in horses and mules, and his brothers in cattle. They then agreed that the corporation should do only a commission business, and that Ross should buy horses and mules on his own account only, but in consideration of his supporting the Company’s auction sales by appearing as a buyer, he should not be charged a commission if he should sell any animal at auction, as he sometimes did. The brothers later sold their interest in the Company and Ross took others in to work with him, but the commission business of the Company was always kept and intended to be separate from the buying and selling ventures of Ross and his associates. Books were kept accordingly, profits separately declared and distributed, and income taxes were returned and paid separately by the corporation and by the partners. In 1933, an examiner of the Revenue Department suggested that the partners ought to file a partnership information return, and it was done in that and subsequent years. No other objection or criticism was then made.

In 1933 and the years immediately preceding, business was not good, and in several of them there was a loss by the corporation and a profit by the partnership, or vice versa, so that had the businesses been aggregated then, as is now attempted, the profit would have been reduced or wiped out by the loss, to the taxpayer’s advantage. It is argued that the Commissioner, having taken the benefit of separate returns then, and ratified them by suggesting a partnership return, is estopped to take the contrary position now, when to do so is disadvantageous to the taxpayer. Reliance is put upon our language in Alamo Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 95 F.2d 622. We do not retract or modify what was there said but do not think it controls here. It was not the Commissioner, but only a revenue agent who in the present case suggested a formal partnership return. Revenue agents have no authority to estop the United States by their suggestions to taxpayers.' No change indeed in the position of these taxpayers was suggested or induced. They had elected to separate the business of the corporation from that which they as individuals were doing, and had so returned the two businesses. The agent simply suggested that a partnership return for information was proper in such a situation. There was nothing done or said that could estop the United States from enquiring then or in a later year whether there was indeed a separate partnership business. That enquiry is in order now.

This corporation could, according to its charter, have bought and sold horses and mules, and even raised them, in addition to the commission business mentioned in the charter. But its owners could of course exercise fewer than all its powers. The evidence is clear here that they chose to do through the corporation only a commission sales business. The Company rented extensive stockyard facilities, and sought by service to its customers and by obtaining good prices at its weekly auctions, to attract a large and profitable commission business. It had between three. and four hundred regular customer’s accounts, and through its own books kept track of each customer’s purchases or sales and made him necessary advances, honoring drafts much as a bank would. The commission was charged only to the seller, and a second commission was not charged if a buyer, regretting his purchase, reoffered for sale. Feeding and like services were also charged for and were a source of profit. Everything was done according to established custom in such commission businesses.

Now Ross’ outside purchasing activities were in no conflict with the Company’s *313 business. The auctions were conducted by-auctioneers who did not represent the Company. The Company was neither buyer nor seller, but served the sellers in finding the highest bidders. Ross, bidding openly and with the knowledge of all, helped to keep prices up. Except on rare occasions he and his associates never sold at the Company’s auctions. They thus seldom owed a seller’s commission, and their help to the sales as buyers was esteemed of more value to the Company than the rarely incurred commission, which therefore by a special agreement was never charged to them. Otherwise, Ross and his associates, under the firm name of W. R. Ross Mule Account, were treated by the Company exactly like any other customer.

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Bluebook (online)
129 F.2d 310, 29 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 829, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 3346, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ross-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca5-1942.