Ross Massbaum v. Wnc Management

361 F. App'x 904
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 11, 2010
Docket08-55406
StatusUnpublished

This text of 361 F. App'x 904 (Ross Massbaum v. Wnc Management) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ross Massbaum v. Wnc Management, 361 F. App'x 904 (9th Cir. 2010).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Ross Massbaum appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for defendants in his action alleging housing discrimination on the basis of race and disability. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Gam *905 ble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir.1997), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Fair Housing Act claim because Massbaum failed to raise a triable issue as to whether the defendants acted with any discriminatory intent during the events at issue, or whether their practices disproportionately impacted any particular racial group. See McDonald v. Coldwell Banker, 543 F.3d 498, 505 n. 7 (9th Cir.2008) (explaining that a disparate treatment claim under the Fair Housing Act requires some showing of discriminatory intent, while a disparate impact claim requires, inter aha, showing “a significantly ... disproportionate impact on persons of a particular type produced by the defendant’s facially neutral acts or practices”).

For the same reasons, summary judgment was proper on the claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VI. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir.2003) (“Title VI itself directly reach[es] only instances of intentional discrimination.”); De Horney v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 879 F.2d 459, 467 (9th Cir.1989) (“[T]o establish a § 1981 claim, the plaintiff must prove intentional or purposeful discrimination.”).

Summary judgment was proper on the 42 U.S.C. § 1982 claim because Massbaum did not show he is a member of a racial minority. See Phijfer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir.1980).

Summary judgment was proper on the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act claims, because Massbaum failed to raise a triable issue as to whether defendants discriminated against him on the basis of a disability. See Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.1997) (stating that both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act require proof of discrimination by reason of a disability).

Massbaum’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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361 F. App'x 904, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ross-massbaum-v-wnc-management-ca9-2010.