Rosier v. Johnston

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Rosier v. Johnston

496 So. 2d 167, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2003, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 9799

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedSeptember 18, 1986

DocketNo. BO-465

StatusPublished

This text of 496 So. 2d 167 (Rosier v. Johnston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rosier v. Johnston, 496 So. 2d 167, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2003, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 9799 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986).

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Opinion

OPINION

MILLS, Judge.

Pursuant to Rule 9.130(a)(3)B, Fla.R. App.P., Joe Rosier appeals from a nonfinal order of the trial court denying his application for an injunction. We affirm.

Rosier sought the injunction for the purpose of striking Lawrence V. “Larry” Johnston from the ballot as a candidate for the [168]*168office of Circuit Judge for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Group Three, maintaining that Johnston had not “irrevocably” resigned as County Judge, pursuant to the requirements of Section 99.012(2) and (3), Florida Statutes (1985). Rosier based his allegation on a postscript to Johnston’s letter of resignation which stated that “[t]his letter is conditioned only upon it being construed as a timely letter within the provisions of F.S. 99.012. If, for and [sic] reason, this letter is not timely and it or my qualifying for the upcoming election would result in immediate termination, then this letter shall be of no force and effect and deemed withdrawn.”

In our view, the disputed postscript does not render Johnston’s resignation revocable in contravention of the statute, as it unambiguously states an intent to resign from one office for the purpose of seeking another. Rather, the language simply renders the resignation nonfinal pending fulfillment of the conditions stated in the postscript. As a reading of the applicable statutes demonstrates, the conditions were fulfilled at the time the letter was submitted.

Affirmed.

WENTWORTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.

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OPINION

MILLS, Judge.

Pursuant to Rule 9.130(a)(3)B, Fla.R. App.P., Joe Rosier appeals from a nonfinal order of the trial court denying his application for an injunction. We affirm.

Rosier sought the injunction for the purpose of striking Lawrence V. “Larry” Johnston from the ballot as a candidate for the [168]*168office of Circuit Judge for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Group Three, maintaining that Johnston had not “irrevocably” resigned as County Judge, pursuant to the requirements of Section 99.012(2) and (3), Florida Statutes (1985). Rosier based his allegation on a postscript to Johnston’s letter of resignation which stated that “[t]his letter is conditioned only upon it being construed as a timely letter within the provisions of F.S. 99.012. If, for and [sic] reason, this letter is not timely and it or my qualifying for the upcoming election would result in immediate termination, then this letter shall be of no force and effect and deemed withdrawn.”

In our view, the disputed postscript does not render Johnston’s resignation revocable in contravention of the statute, as it unambiguously states an intent to resign from one office for the purpose of seeking another. Rather, the language simply renders the resignation nonfinal pending fulfillment of the conditions stated in the postscript. As a reading of the applicable statutes demonstrates, the conditions were fulfilled at the time the letter was submitted.

Affirmed.

WENTWORTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

496 So. 2d 167, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2003, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 9799, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosier-v-johnston-fladistctapp-1986.