Roshan v. Sunquist

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 5, 2026
• Docket: 25-3157
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 5 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PEYMAN ROSHAN, No. 25-3157 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 4:24-cv-02789-JST v. MEMORANDUM*

CHIKA SUNQUIST, California Real Estate Commissioner; DOUGLAS R. MCCAULEY; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 30, 2026**

Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Peyman Roshan appeals the district court’s order dismissing his claims

against Chika Sunquist, Douglas McCauley, and the California Department of Real

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Estate (“DRE”). We review questions of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment and applications of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine de novo. Savage v.

Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (Eleventh

Amendment immunity); Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir.

2010) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We affirm.

1. Roshan’s claims against the DRE fail because the DRE is a state agency

and California has not waived sovereign immunity. See Roshan v. McCauley, 130

F.4th 780, 783 (9th Cir. 2025) (characterizing the DRE as a state agency).

California has not “unequivocally expressed” a waiver of Eleventh Amendment

immunity, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984),

and “a State’s consent to suit in its own courts is not a waiver of its immunity from

suit in federal court,” Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285 (2011). The Supreme

Court did not silently modify this doctrine in DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285

(2024), as Roshan contests.

2. Roshan’s remaining claims on appeal fail due to the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. This doctrine “prohibits federal district courts from considering ‘de facto

appeals’—suits in which ‘the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the

state ruling.’” Searle v. Allen, 148 F.4th 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting

Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)). Though he has sued

2 25-3157 the DRE, Sunquist, and McCauley, Roshan seeks a de facto appeal of the

California Supreme Court’s decision to deny review of the California State Bar

disciplinary order at the foundation of the defendants’ actions. His claims are

analogous to those dismissed in D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

(1983), see id. at 486–87. Williams v. Reed, 604 U.S. 168 (2025), does not alter

this analysis, id. at 179. The district court therefore appropriately dismissed

Roshan’s claims.

AFFIRMED.

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