Rosetta Davis v. Department of the Treasury

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 8, 2024
DocketDA-315H-23-0023-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Rosetta Davis v. Department of the Treasury (Rosetta Davis v. Department of the Treasury) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rosetta Davis v. Department of the Treasury, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ROSETTA DAVIS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-315H-23-0023-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, DATE: August 8, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Rosetta Davis , San Antonio, Texas, pro se.

Sundrea Richardson and Javon Coatie , Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 We have considered all of the appellant’s arguments on review ; however, we find that none provide a basis to disturb the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that she has either a statutory or a regulatory right to appeal her termination to the Board . Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-5, Tab 5 at 4-6; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID) at 4-5. For example, the appellant asserts that her service computation date was recently amended to accurately reflect that she has over 20 years of total Federal service. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. However, the appellant’s submissions indicate, and she does not dispute, that she had a 5-month break in service between her prior employment with the U.S. Postal Service and her employment with the agency; thus, she lacks statutory Board appeal rights. IAF, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 4 at 13; see 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a); see also Hurston v. Department of the Army, 113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 9 (2010). The appellant also alleges that discrimination precipitated her removal; however, as set forth in the initial decision, absent an otherwise appealable action, the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s discrimination-related claims. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5; ID at 6; see Wren v. Department of the Army, 3

2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980) (explaining that prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) are not an independent source of Board jurisdiction), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982). ¶3 The appellant asserts that she has filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. We interpret this assertion as an argument that the Board has individual right of action (IRA) jurisdiction over her appeal. Notably, the appellant made whistleblower-related allegations before the administrative judge; however, the administrative judge did not provide her with notice of the jurisdictional burden applicable to IRA appeals. E.g., IAF, Tab 4 at 5; see Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (indicating that an appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue); s ee also Baggan v. Department of State, 109 M.S.P.R. 572, ¶ 10 (2008) (explaining that, even when the Board lacks direct jurisdiction over the termination of a probationary employee, the employee may bring an IRA appeal before the Board) . We find, however, that this oversight does not constitute material error. Indeed, subsequent to filing this appeal, the appellant filed an IRA appeal with the Board, i.e., Davis v. Department of the Treasury, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-23-0247-W-1, wherein she reasserted the same whistleblowing-related allegations. The administrative judge assigned to the appellant’s IRA appeal provided her with notice of the applicable jurisdictional burden and adjudicated these claims. Davis v. Department of the Treasury, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-23-0247-W-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 4 at 2-6, Tab 19, Initial Decision. 2 Thus, a different outcome is not warranted. 2 The appellant has filed a petition for review of this initial decision, which dismissed her IRA appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Davis v. Department of the Treasury, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-23-0247-W-1, Petition for Review File, Tab 1. We have, concurrent with the issuance of this final order, issued a final order affirming the initial decision regarding the appellant’s IRA appeal. We have considered whether any of the claims raised by the appellant in her petition for review for her IRA appeal warrant a different outcome in the instant appeal; however, we find that they do not. See Miles v. 4

¶4 The appellant provides additional documents with both her petition for review and her reply, to include email correspondence and documents regarding her employment with, and cases she has filed against, the U.S. Postal Service. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-11, Tab 5 at 8-9. The Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with a petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record closed despite the party’s due diligence. See Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). Here, all but one of the documents predate the initial decision. 3 In any event, none of the documents provide a basis to disturb the administrative judge’s conclusions regarding jurisdiction. See Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (stating that the Board will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision).

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Related

Celia A. Wren v. Merit Systems Protection Board
681 F.2d 867 (D.C. Circuit, 1982)
Bridgett L. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board
758 F.2d 641 (Federal Circuit, 1985)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Rosetta Davis v. Department of the Treasury, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosetta-davis-v-department-of-the-treasury-mspb-2024.