Rosenthal v. American Construction & Realty Co.

247 N.W. 117, 262 Mich. 91, 1933 Mich. LEXIS 837

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: March 2, 1933
• Docket: Docket No. 98, Calendar No. 36,648.
• Status: Published

Opinions

McDonald, C. J.

This is a suit at law after rescission to recover money paid on a land contract.

On May 27, 1924, the defendant sold certain real estate on two land contracts to Nathan P. Levin, who subsequently assigned his vendee’s interest to the plaintiff, Rosenthal. The assignments were consented to by the vendor. Rosenthal made payments for a time, then defaulted. The defendant vendor served notice of intention to forfeit the contracts and later a declaration of forfeiture. Thereafter, summary proceedings for possession were begun and judgment for restitution was entered. After writs of restitution were issued, Rosenthal declared a rescission of the contracts for failure to install improvements in accordance with the provisions thereof and instituted the present suit. The defendant appeared, and, under Court Rule No. 18 (1931) filed a motion to dismiss supported by affidavit. The motion was granted, and the plaintiff has appealed.

The question raised by the motion to dismiss was whether the plaintiff could rescind for breach of provisions in the contracts and maintain a suit for damages after valid forfeiture and judgment in summary proceedings in which proceedings no defense of breach is made.

The plaintiff rescinded on the ground that defendant had breached the contract relative to instalment of certain improvements. If the defendant had breached the contracts he could not have maintained summary proceedings, for if there was a breach there was no cause for forfeiture and no right to possession. The breach was a proper defense in the action before the commissioner for possession. The plaintiff could not withhold that defense and subsequently use it as a ground for. rescission. The validity of the forfeiture was established by the judgment in the summary proceedings. Thereafter, when he attempted to rescind, his interest in the contracts had been terminated. He had nothing to rescind. Blazewicz v. Weberski, 234 Mich. 431; Augustyn v. Zawacki, 250 Mich. 218; Security Investment Co. v. Meister, 214 Mich. 337.

The declaration contains a special count and the common counts in assumpsit. The plaintiff contends that on motion to dismiss it cannot be held that the common counts do not state a cause of action. There is no doubt as to that rule, but where the common counts rest upon the facts averred in the special count the rule does not apply. Lightstone v. Fixel, 227 Mich. 360.

In the instant case, the special count sets up the facts constituting the entire cause of action. The common counts rest on the same facts, which do not state a cause of action. The common counts were not required. The plaintiff does not claim anything beyond what appears in the special count. In these circumstances, the rule that on motion to dismiss it cannot be held that the common counts do not state a cause of action does not apply.

The trial court was right in granting the motion to dismiss. The judgment is affirmed, with costs to' defendant.

Fead and Wiest, JJ., concurred with McDonald, C. J.