Rosenberg v. Kubeck

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Rosenberg v. Kubeck

541 So. 2d 788, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 989, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 2020, 1989 WL 36275

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 19, 1989

DocketNo. 88-2001

StatusPublished

This text of 541 So. 2d 788 (Rosenberg v. Kubeck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rosenberg v. Kubeck, 541 So. 2d 788, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 989, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 2020, 1989 WL 36275 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989).

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Opinion

FRANK, RICHARD H., Associate Judge.

The question before us is whether an enforceable agreement was formed when the seller of real property, Rosenberg, agreed with a salesman, Slie, that one-half of the commission would be paid to Rosenberg upon sale of the property. The trial court dismissed Rosenberg’s first amended complaint with prejudice upon the motion filed by Kubeck, acting as the personal representative of Slie’s estate, in which it was asserted that section 475.011(2), Florida Statutes (1987), bars Rosenberg’s claim because of the failure to allege that he is a licensed real estate broker.¹ We reverse based upon our determination that chapter 475, a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating real estate salesmen and brokers, is inapplicable to the arrangement reached between Rosenberg and Slie. Section 475.011(2) expressly exempts from the chapter any person who sells property he or she owns. In the face of the exemption, acknowledged by the trial court, we are unable to find a juridically cognizable predicate for the trial court’s conclusion that Rosenberg’s cause of action was deficient [789]*789for the want of an allegation "that he is a licensed, Florida real estate broker.”

Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

HERSEY, C.J., and STONE, J., . concur.

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FRANK, RICHARD H., Associate Judge.

The question before us is whether an enforceable agreement was formed when the seller of real property, Rosenberg, agreed with a salesman, Slie, that one-half of the commission would be paid to Rosenberg upon sale of the property. The trial court dismissed Rosenberg’s first amended complaint with prejudice upon the motion filed by Kubeck, acting as the personal representative of Slie’s estate, in which it was asserted that section 475.011(2), Florida Statutes (1987), bars Rosenberg’s claim because of the failure to allege that he is a licensed real estate broker.¹ We reverse based upon our determination that chapter 475, a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating real estate salesmen and brokers, is inapplicable to the arrangement reached between Rosenberg and Slie. Section 475.011(2) expressly exempts from the chapter any person who sells property he or she owns. In the face of the exemption, acknowledged by the trial court, we are unable to find a juridically cognizable predicate for the trial court’s conclusion that Rosenberg’s cause of action was deficient [789]*789for the want of an allegation "that he is a licensed, Florida real estate broker.”

Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

HERSEY, C.J., and STONE, J., . concur.

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Bluebook (online)

541 So. 2d 788, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 989, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 2020, 1989 WL 36275, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosenberg-v-kubeck-fladistctapp-1989.