Rosebud Sioux Tribe, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Honorable Richard Kneip, Appellees-Defendants

521 F.2d 87
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJuly 16, 1975
Docket74-1211
StatusPublished
Cited by39 cases

This text of 521 F.2d 87 (Rosebud Sioux Tribe, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Honorable Richard Kneip, Appellees-Defendants) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rosebud Sioux Tribe, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Honorable Richard Kneip, Appellees-Defendants, 521 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1975).

Opinion

TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge.

The complaint before us seeks that we declare that the original “boundaries of the [Rosebud Indian] reservation as fixed by the 1889 Act, were not affected by the three ‘surplus’ land statutes of 1904, 1907, and 1910.” 1 It follows, according to plaintiff’s (hereinafter the Tribe’s) theory that the areas involved, namely, all or parts of the Counties of Gregory, Tripp, Lyman and Mellette, in the State of South Dakota, remain a part of the Rosebud Reservation and are subject to the appropriate federal and tribal powers and jurisdiction. 2

As originally delimited the Rosebud Indian Reservation contained over 3 million acres. Three-fourths of this area, all the original reservation outside Todd County, South Dakota, is involved in this action. The three Acts we are asked to construe disposed of all lands in this area which were not allotted to the Indians. 3 Most of the unallotted lands were sold to homesteaders under the terms of the three Acts. About ninety percent of the present population in the disputed area is non-Indian. 4 The defendants Kneip and Mydland, the Governor and Attorney General of South Dakota, assert that the area involved was settled and developed by non-Indians in partial reliance upon the removal of their lands from the *89 exterior boundaries of the reservation, 5 and that the Acts in question were intended to and did effectuate the alteration of the reservation boundaries to exclude the areas therein opened for settlement.

The court below rejected the Tribe’s tendered theories in support of its argument that the boundaries of the reservation as defined in the Act of March 2, 1889 had not been changed. It held that the surrounding circumstances and legislative history of the Acts made it clear that it was the congressional intent to separate each of the counties concerned and to extinguish the reservation status of those counties. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 375 F.Supp. 1065 (D.S.D.1974). We agree and we affirm.

In view of the many authorities cited to us, we deem it pertinent to note at the outset that they are of limited utility and we comment only on those deemed relevant to decision herein. Save as to broad generalities the holding in any particular case will depend upon circumstances applicable to that case, including among others, specific treaty or statutory provisions. Secretary Ickes, in his foreword to Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, speaks of “the complexity of the body of Indian law, based upon more than 4,000 treaties and statutes and upon thousands of judicial decisions and administrative rulings, rendered during a century and a half.” 6 Obviously, separate treaties and agreements with separate tribes must be separately construed.

It is clear from the reported cases that, despite numerous differences in specific fact situations, the overriding judicial inquiry remains unchanged, namely, the congressional intent. Thus in Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 356, 82 S.Ct. 424, 427, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1961), in holding that the 1906 Act of Congress there involved did not extinguish the Colville Indian Reservation, the Court relied repeatedly on materials from which it “seem[ed] clear that the purpose of the 1906 Act was neither to destroy the existence of the diminished Colville Indian Reservation nor to lessen federal responsibility for and jurisdiction over the Indians having tribal rights on that reservation.” Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 2258, 37 L.Ed.2d 92 (1973) utilizes the same test for disestablishment, namely, “A congressional determination to terminate *90 * * * expressed on the face of the Act or * * * clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history.” We are aware of course, that much modem thinking respecting the culture and welfare of the Indians is at marked variance with that of the period we now survey, that around the turn of the century. But we do not sit to rewrite the legislation of decades past. We look to the congressional intent when it was written viewing the totality of the circumstances from the record in its entirety. The Tribe urges the lack of “express language extinguishing tribal title, or placing the land in the public domain, or altering the boundaries of the reservation.” But here the Tribe misapprehends the applicable criteria. 7 Precise verbal formulae of extinguishment or alteration of boundaries, however apt or helpful, are not a sine qua non of disestablishment. We seek, as we said, the congressional intent, which may be variously expressed.

Our guidelines were most recently stated in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 1092-93, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975) wherein it was held;

This Court does not lightly conclude that an Indian reservation has been terminated. “[W]hen Congress has once established a reservation, all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.” United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 30 S.Ct. 93, 54 L.Ed. 195. The congressional intent must be clear, to overcome “the general rule that ‘[djoubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.’ ” McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, at 174, 93 S.Ct. 1257, at 1263, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, at 367, 50 S.Ct. 121, at 122, 74 L.Ed. 478. Accordingly, the Court requires that the “congressional determination to terminate ... be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history.” *91 Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S., at 505, 93 S.Ct. at 2258. See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346, and United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 36 S.Ct. 696, 60 L.Ed. 1192.

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