Roseann C. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 30, 2026
• Docket: 5:24-cv-01547
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 11 ROSEANN C., ) Case No. 5:24-cv-01547-SP ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) 13 v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ORDER 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, ) Commissioner of Social Security ) 15 Administration, ) ) 16 Defendant. ) ) 17 )

18 19 I. 20 INTRODUCTION 21 On July 25, 2024, plaintiff Roseann C. filed a complaint against defendant, the 22 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), seeking a review 23 of a denial of a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). The parties 24 have fully briefed the matter in dispute, and the court deems the matter suitable for 25 adjudication without oral argument. 26 The parties here agree that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in 27 evaluating the medical evidence. But a dispute remains: whether to remand for further 28 proceedings or reverse and award benefits. See Plaintiff’s Amended Brief (“P. Mem.”) at 1 8-9; Commissioner’s Responsive Brief and Motion for Voluntary Remand for Further 2 Proceedings (“D. Mem.”) at 1-7; Plaintiff’s Reply at 2-6. 3 Having carefully studied the parties’ memoranda, the Administrative Record 4 (“AR”), and the ALJ’s decision, the court concludes that, as detailed herein, the 5 conditions of the credit-as-true rule are not met. The court therefore remands this matter 6 to the Commissioner in accordance with the principles and instructions enunciated in this 7 Memorandum Opinion and Order. 8 II. 9 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 10 Plaintiff was 52 years old on her alleged onset date. AR at 79. Plaintiff is a high 11 school graduate and has past relevant work as an accounts receivable clerk. AR at 57, 12 234, 683. 13 On November 21, 2019, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and 14 DIB, alleging on onset date of November 1, 2018 due to degenerative bilateral arthritis, 15 degenerative lumbar disease, left lumbar radiculopathy, severe pain, and a sleeping 16 disorder. AR at 79. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after 17 which plaintiff filed a request for hearing. AR at 102-05, 108-14. 18 On December 15, 2020, plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at 19 a hearing before an ALJ. AR at 51-78. The ALJ also heard testimony from a vocational 20 expert, Jackie Bethell. AR at 70-75. On February 11, 2021, the ALJ denied plaintiff’s 21 claim for benefits. AR at 39-46. Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ’s 22 decision, which the Appeals Council denied on January 10, 2022. AR at 1-4. 23 On February 18, 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint in this court seeking review, in 24 what became case number 5:22-cv-00326. AR at 718. The parties filed a stipulation to 25 remand on July 7, 2022, and the court ordered the case remanded on July 11, 2022. AR 26 at 719. 27 On February 13, 2024, plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing before a 28 different ALJ, and also requested to amend her application to a closed period of 1 disability. AR at 666-87. The ALJ also heard testimony from Dr. Kwock, a medical 2 expert, and Dr. Luis Masa, a vocational expert. AR at 671-76, 683-85. 3 In her decision, the ALJ denied plaintiff’s request for a closed period of disability 4 from November 1, 2018 through March 27, 2022, finding there was no evidence of 5 significant improvement in plaintiff’s condition and pain. AR at 646; see AR at 653. 6 Then, applying the well-known five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 7 found, at step one, that there had been a continuous 12-month period or periods when 8 plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity; however, plaintiff had engaged in 9 substantial gainful activity from April 1, 2022 to December 31, 2023. AR at 649. 10 At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff suffered from the following severe 11 impairments: degenerative joint disease and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar 12 spine; status post left total hip arthroplasty; status post bilateral knee replacements; 13 obesity; and left ankle arthritis. Id. 14 At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff’s impairments, whether individually or in 15 combination, did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments set forth in 20 16 C.F.R. part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR at 650. 17 The ALJ then assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), and 18 determined plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 19 § 404.1567(a), with limitations. AR at 650-51. Plaintiff could: occasionally push, pull, 20 and operate pedals and foot controls with the bilateral lower extremities; never climb 21 ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; never crouch; occasionally climb ramps or stairs; and 22 occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, or crawl. Id. The ALJ precluded plaintiff from 23 concentrated exposure to extreme cold and any exposure to unprotected heights, or 24 moving or heavy machinery. AR at 651. The ALJ also determined plaintiff required a 25 hand-held device only for walking on uneven terrain or greater than 10 yards. Id. 26 The ALJ found, at step four, that plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant 27 work as an accounts receivable clerk. AR at 656. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that 28 plaintiff did not suffer from a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. Id. 1 Plaintiff did not file a request for review with the Appeals Council. See P. Mem. at 2 2-3. The ALJ’s decision stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. 3 III. 4 DISCUSSION 5 Both parties agree that the ALJ erred in evaluating the objective medical evidence, 6 which formed a reason for the ALJ to reject plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. 7 The question is whether the court should remand the case for further proceedings or 8 reverse the decision and award benefits. 9 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or reverse and award 10 benefits is within the discretion of the district court. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 11 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Typically, in accordance with the “ordinary remand rule,” the 12 reviewing court will remand to the Commissioner for additional investigation or 13 explanation upon finding error by the ALJ. Treichler v. Comm’r, 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 14 (9th Cir. 2014). Nonetheless, it is appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to 15 direct an immediate award of benefits where: (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally 16 sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical 17 opinions; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved and further 18 administrative proceedings would be not be useful; and (3) if the improperly discredited 19 evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled 20 on remand. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth three- 21 part credit-as-true standard for remanding with instructions to calculate and award 22 benefits); Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100-01. This three-prong test is known as the credit-as- 23 true standard. But where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 24 determination can be made, or it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be 25 required to find a plaintiff disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated, remand 26 for further proceedings is appropriate. Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96 (9th 27 Cir. 2004); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2000). 28 1 Even when all of the conditions of the credit-as-true standard are met, the court 2 still has the discretion to remand. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021 (the credit-as true test is 3 not necessarily dispositive of the remand question). The credit-as true test envisions 4 “some flexibility,” which is “properly understood as requiring courts to remand for 5 further proceedings when, even though all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are 6 satisfied, an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in 7 fact, disabled.” Id.; Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101-02. 8 Here, plaintiff argues that the conditions of the credit-as-true rule are met such that 9 plaintiff’s testimony should be credited. If so, plaintiff contends, then pursuant to the 10 testimony of the vocational expert, it would be established that plaintiff would be off-task 11 20% of the workday and miss more than two days of work, which would mean she would 12 be unable to engage in substantial gainful activity. P. Mem. at 9; Reply at 5. 13 As an initial matter, plaintiff’s contention that the court should award benefits is 14 based on the incorrect assertion that her application is for a closed period of disability 15 between November 1, 2018 through March 1, 2022. P. Mem. at 2. The ALJ expressly 16 denied plaintiff’s request to amend her application to a disability for a closed period, 17 finding there was no evidence of significant medical improvement. AR at 646, 653. 18 Rather than raise the ALJ’s denial of her request for a closed period of disability as a 19 disputed issue for review, plaintiff simply ignores the denial and proceeds as if the ALJ 20 denied an application for a closed period of disability instead of an application for an 21 open period of disability.1 Plaintiff therefore forfeits the argument. The decision 22 whether to remand or award benefits here is based on an examination of the record in its 23 entirety and is not limited to the records from the rejected closed period. Here, the record 24 indicates the conditions of the credit-as-true rule are not met. 25 26 1 Liberally construing the memoranda, plaintiff indirectly argues that her 27 testimony that her symptoms improved in March 2022 should be credited as true and the court should award for a closed period between November 1, 2018 through March 1, 28 2022. 1 First, both parties agree the ALJ erred when she considered objective evidence 2 belonging to a third party. Specifically, the ALJ considered and discussed a third party’s 3 left hip x-ray that was inadvertently included in the administrative record.2 See AR at 4 324, 652-53, 671, 673. The ALJ also stated plaintiff had hip pain, but examinations 5 revealed full range of motion of her hip. AR at 652; see AR at 1151. In reaching her 6 RFC determination, the ALJ discussed the hip x-ray and discounted plaintiff’s testimony, 7 in part, because it was not supported by the objective medical evidence, including the hip 8 x-ray. See AR at 652-53. Because the hip x-ray did not belong to plaintiff, the ALJ’s 9 consideration of the left hip x-ray was erroneous.3 10 The second prong of the credit-as-true standard is not satisfied. Here, there are 11 outstanding issues to resolve and further administrative proceedings would be useful. A 12 reevaluation of the applicable medical evidence without the third-party evidence would 13 establish the extent to which a new RFC determination is required and whether the ALJ’s 14 remaining reasons for discounting plaintiff’s testimony were sufficient. The ALJ cited 15

16 2 Plaintiff also notes Dr. Kwock and the state agency physicians considered the third party’s left hip x-ray in their assessments. P. Mem. at 7. Dr. Kwock discussed 17 the third party hip x-ray (AR at 673), but the ALJ found Dr. Kwock’s less restrictive 18 standing and walking limitations – which were, in part, based on the hip x-ray – to be not fully supported by the evidence. AR at 655. Similarly, Dr. F. Greene considered the x- 19 ray, but the ALJ found the opinion not persuasive. Id. And Dr. Gideon H. Lowell did 20 not mention the x-ray in his findings of fact and analysis of evidence. See AR at 94-95. 21 The x-ray has now been removed from the administrative record. See docket no. 24. 22 3 Because both parties accept this error as dispositive of the first step, the court proceeds to the other prongs of the credit-as-true analysis. Nevertheless, the court 23 notes it is at least arguable whether the first prong is met. Although the ALJ improperly 24 included the left hip x-ray in her consideration, the ALJ’s error may be harmless since 25 she cites other inconsistent objective evidence and provides other sufficient reasons for discounting plaintiff’s testimony as discussed below. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 26 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (error was harmless when the ALJ provided other legally 27 sufficient reasons for discounting testimony). Moreover, the ALJ’s error is based on her consideration of a single x-ray of a hip status-post arthroplasty, but plaintiff did not 28 complain of hip pain. See AR at 653. 1 other reasons for discounting plaintiff’s testimony, none of which is disputed by plaintiff 2 here. The ALJ noted plaintiff’s allegations regarding her back and lower extremity pain 3 were inconsistent with the objective evidence; the treatment notes showed plaintiff only 4 sometimes required a cane to ambulate; and she was able to return to work full time full 5 time without significant accommodations. See AR at 653; see also AR at 649. 6 Regarding plaintiff’s present ability to work, the ALJ found this was inconsistent with 7 plaintiff’s testimony that she could only sit a maximum of four hours a day, for 40 8 minutes at a time. See id. The ALJ acknowledged plaintiff reported improvement in her 9 condition, but found that neither her clinical findings nor her subjective complaints post- 10 surgeries indicated significant medical improvement. See id. Given all of the 11 uncontested reasons cited for discounting plaintiff’s testimony, it remains unclear 12 whether the exclusion of the hip x-ray affects the ALJ’s overall analysis of plaintiff’s 13 subjective testimony and would result in a different RFC assessment. 14 Third, it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find 15 plaintiff disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated. Plaintiff testifies her pain 16 would require her to be off task and miss work, but plaintiff began working full time in 17 March 2022 without significant accommodations. AR at 974. 18 In short, the record, as a whole, creates doubt as to whether plaintiff is, in fact, 19 disabled, even if only a closed period of disability were at issue. Accordingly, remand 20 for further proceedings is warranted here. 21 On remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate the objective medical evidence and reconsider 22 plaintiff’s subjective testimony. The ALJ shall then reassess plaintiff’s RFC and proceed 23 through steps four and five to determine what work, if any, plaintiff is capable of 24 performing. 25 // 26 // 27 28 1 IV. 2 CONCLUSION 3 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered REVERSING the 4 || decision of the Commissioner denying benefits, and REMANDING the matter to the 5 |}Commissioner for further administrative action consistent with this decision. 6 7 || Dated: March 30, 2026 LP 8 ON ON 9 SHERI PYM 10 United States Magistrate Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28