Rose v. Morrell

259 A.2d 8, 128 Vt. 110, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 208
CourtSupreme Court of Vermont
DecidedOctober 7, 1969
Docket16-68
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 259 A.2d 8 (Rose v. Morrell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rose v. Morrell, 259 A.2d 8, 128 Vt. 110, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 208 (Vt. 1969).

Opinion

Holden, C.J.

The plaintiffs are judgmént creditors of the defendant George Palmer Morrell. Morrell was formerly married to the plaintiffs’ daughter. This proceeding in the court of chancery was instituted under 12 V.S.A. §§ 2808-2810 in aid of an execution held by the plaintiffs. The objective of the action is to reach real property, known as the Sanborn Farm in Stowe, Vermont, which was deeded to the defendants as tenants by the entirety in 1958. The claim is that the joint title and estate held by the defendants is in fraud of the plaintiffs.

The cause was heard by the chancellor in February 1968. It was contested by the defendant Martha alone. The plaintiffs’ prior motion to take the bill as confessed against George had been granted in December 1966. The facts are extensively reported. The decree, which followed, denied equitable relief against Martha and dismissed the complaint as to her. The decree also dismissed her cross-bill which sought declaratory relief to establish the validity of a subsequent conveyance of the Sanborn Farm by warranty deed of her husband to her, as grantee, dated October 2, 1962. The plaintiffs appealed.

The title of the Sanborn Farm is tangled in the thicket of George Morrell’s matrimonial problems. He purchased the farm on March 10, 1944 during the time of his marriage to his first wife Elizabeth Morrell. This marriage was dissolved by divorce in 1951. About that time George gave a mortgage to Elizabeth.

George married the plaintiffs’ daughter Therese the same year. This marriage terminated in 1958. In the aftermath of that divorce George was arrested in Florida in an action instituted by Therese to recover for payments due for the support of their daughter Melinda.

On August 16, 1954, George executed a warranty deed of the Sanborn Farm to Murray and Beatrice Goldberg of Miami, Florida. The chancellor has determined that the deed was in fact a mortgage to partly secure the Goldbergs for providing bail to obtain his release from arrest in the Florida action for support of Melinda.

*112 George and his co-defendant Martha were married on September 7, 1957. At the time of their marriage, other than his interest in the Sanborn Farm and an old automobile, George had no property. The defendant Martha had assets of approximately $8,500.

Sometime prior to November 1958, the participating sureties in George’s bail bond caused George to be arrested without warrant in Cincinnati. He was taken to Florida and committed to jail. As a result of these events, George brought an action against his sureties which was later settled for an amount in excess of $36,000.

On November 4, 1958, Murray and Beatrice Goldberg reconveyed the Sanborn Farm to the defendants as tenants by the entirety. Subject to the plaintiffs’ exception, the lower court found the consideration for this transfer was the discharge of the Florida bail bond on which the Goldbergs were sureties.

The estate of the wife and the husband’s interest in her tenancy by the entirety, if validly created, is protected from the husband’s sole creditors. Town of Corinth v. Emery, 63 Vt. 505, 508, 22 A. 618. The plaintiffs, as later creditors of the husband, maintain that the interest in the Sanborn Farm, which the Goldberg deed conveyed to Martha, was in fraud of creditors and should be held to respond to their claim.

The findings tell us that the plaintiffs were awarded custody of Melinda on September 9, 1959. They became judgment creditors of George on April 30, 1963. On that date they were awarded a “compensatory fine” in a proceeding against their former son-in-law issued by the Circuit Court in Dade County, Florida. .

The decree pro eonfesso against George does not establish his fraudulent intent as to Martha’s interest in the subject matter of the present action. The implied admission arising from a decree by default does not bind a codefendant who appears and contests the litigation. The Mary (U.S.) 9 Cranch 126, 3 L.Ed. 678, 684; 30 Am.Jur., Judgments § 223; 49 C.J.S., Judgments § 191 (b).

. There is a broad finding to the effect that “the defendant George Morrell at all times material, displayed an interest to contest and avoid his obligations with respect to alimony and *113 support money” due his first wife Elizabeth and in regard to the custody and support of his daughter Melinda. There is no showing however that this general disposition on his part motivated the creation of Martha’s interest as a tenant by the entirety in the conveyance by the Goldbergs.

His obligation to Elizabeth was secured by a prior mortgage on the property and Martha’s interest was subject to that encumbrance. There is evidence, undisputed, that the conveyance to Goldbergs, in the first place, was made to secure the bond given to protect Therese Morrell for Melinda’s support. And the court specifically found that the consideration for the deed from the Goldbergs was their discharge of the bond upon which the grantors were sureties. This finding is not challenged. Thus, as to George, we are not dealing with a voluntary conveyance, for the deed was given for valuable consideration. And there is no showing that these transactions were fraudulently detrimental to the claims of either of his divorced wives as existing creditors.

The plaintiffs contend that the conveyance was voluntary as to Martha. They excepted to the chancellor’s failure to find in accordance with their request for such a finding. Compliance with this request was not required by the evidence and the court did not err in its denial.

There is substantial evidence that during any of the years 1958 through 1960 George earned less than $3,000 from employment as a hotel clerk and part-time teacher in a private school. His wife Martha had substantial earnings as an industrial nurse and as a reserve officer with the Army Nurse Corps in the rank of major. At the time of the deed from the Gold-bergs she had advanced more than six thousand dollars for his use and benefit. Subsequent loans and advancements in his behalf exceed forty thousand dollars.

Martha testified that her interest, as a grantee in the Goldberg deed, was conveyed in consideration of prior loans and advancements which she had made to her husband. Her evidence on this point was not directly refuted. In the situation that prevailed at the time of this conveyance it was not necessarily dishonest for the grantees to accept the return of George’s remaining equity in the Sanborn Farm as tenants by the entirety.

*114 If the husband’s debt to his wife is an honest one, it is not fraudulent in law for him 'to prefer to secure her claim over those of other creditors. Holstein v. Blanchette, 108 Vt. 30, 35, 182 A. 289; Drew v. Corliss, 65 Vt. 650, 655, 27 A. 613. Moreover, the plaintiffs, as subsequent creditors with notice of Martha’s interest, are in no position to complain that they were hindered, delayed or defrauded by a tenancy created long before their obligation accrued. As later creditors, their burden of proof is not discharged by suspicious circumstances. Constructive fraud will not take away her interest in the property.

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Bluebook (online)
259 A.2d 8, 128 Vt. 110, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 208, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rose-v-morrell-vt-1969.