BACON, Judge.
In 1915 Bruce Prather married Florence L. Rose, who was a divorcee with three children. Bruce had no children and none were born of his marriage to Florence. In 1942 Bruce had a lawyer prepare his will1 leaving his estate to Florence. In March of 1961 Florence died. Bruce died unmarried and without issue about eleven years later in April of 1972 without executing a new will or a codicil to the 1942 will. Bruce’s brothers and sisters (appellees) filed an action for letters of administration and subsequently Florence’s heirs (appellants) filed another action seeking to probate Bruce’s will. The trial court consolidated the two actions and after hearings ultimately determined Bruce died testate, but since Florence, who was the sole beneficiary under the will, predeceased Bruce, the legacy lapsed and Bruce’s estate would therefore pass to appellees under the laws of intestate succession. Appellants appeal from that finding arguing under two propositions of error.
Appellants’ first proposition reads:
“The trial court erred in construing the words 'To Have and to Hold unto her and her heirs forever’ as being words pertaining to the quality of the estate bequeathed to the designated beneficiary, [213]*213and not words showing an intention to substitute, under 84 O.S. 177, the lineal heirs of the wife in her place should she predecease the testator.”
Title 84 O.S.1971 § 177 reads:
“If a devisee or legatee dies during the lifetime of the testator, the testamentary disposition to him fails, unless an intention appears to substitute some other in his place, except as provided in Section 8922 [84 O.S.1971 § 142].”
As previously shown herein (footnote 1) Bruce’s will left his estate to Florence “To Have and to Hold unto her and her heirs forever.” Appellants urge that it is this language in the will that amounts to an “intention, . . . to substitute some other” (Appellants) in Florence’s place under §-177. Thus, argue appellants, the testamentary disposition to Florence should /fiot fail, because the above wording shows Bruce’s intention to substitute appellants in Florence’s place. We do not agree with appellants. Appellants cite numerous statutes and cases dealing with presumptions against intestacy; liberal construction of statutes in derogation of common law; and courts sometimes substituting “or” for “and” to arrive at the testator’s intentions. We think these citations are applicable not only to this case, but to all will cases; however, we find the two controlling statutes in the present case to be § 177 and § 142.
Normally, a will contains a residuary clause under which a predeceasing devisee or legatee’s interest will pass, thus avoiding failure of testamentary disposition or a lapse. However, not uncommon is a will like the one in the present case, that is, one without a residuary clause. Absence of such residuary clause seems to manifest a testator’s intent for the property to pass intestate where he names only one beneficiary as was done in the present case. It therefore follows that unless the words “and her heirs” amounts to an intention to substitute under § 177, or unless the anti-lapse statute is applicable, there is a lapse and the property would pass intestate.
Under common law it was necessary to include the words “and his heirs” to convey the fee simple estate.2 Now under 16 O.S.1971 § 29 every estate demised by will is deemed an estate in fee simple unless limited by express words. The words “and his heirs” at the most are words of limitation and not words of substitution. Lacking a residuary clause or language sufficient to make it appear Bruce’s intention was to substitute appellants in Florence’s place, we find under § 177 there is a failure of testamentary disposition unless Oklahoma’s antilapse statute (84 O.S.1971 § 142) prevents such, which brings us to appellants’ second proposition.
[214]*214Appellants’ second proposition reads :
“The trial court erred in determining that a wife is not an 'other relation’ of the testator as used in 84 O.S. 142.”
Section 142, which is Oklahoma’s anti-lapse statute, reads as follows:
“When any estate is devised or bequeathed to any child or other relation of the testator, and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving lineal descendants, such descendants take the estate so given by the will, in the same manner as the devisee or legatee would have done had he survived the testator.” (emphasis ours)
In this regard, appellants argue Florence was an “other relation” of the testator and that they are Florence’s lineal heirs, therefore there was no lapse.
Oklahoma has never r.uled on whether a spouse is an “other relation” under § 142. However, there are two cases in Oklahoma which deserve some discussion since they do relate to the issue at hand, but indicate opposite conclusions—De Graffenreid v. Iowa Land & Trust Co., 20 Okl. 687, 95 P. 624 (1908) and Royston v. Besett, 183 Okl. 643, 83 P.2d 874 (1938). In De Graffenreid, the court construed the term “nearest relation” as it was used in the laws of descent and distribution of the Creek Nation and found that term excluded the husband, wife and children. In Royston the wife’s will, which had no residuary clause, left all her estate to her husband who predeceased her by four days. The court said:
“ . . . The husband, having predeceased his wife, and no intention to the contrary appearing from the will of Gertrude Royston the testamentary disposition to William Royston, (under the wife’s will,) failed under the provisions of Section 1605, O.S.1931, 84 Okl.St.Ann. § 177 which reads: ‘If a devisee or legatee dies during the lifetime of the ■testator, the testamentary disposition to him fails, unless an intention appears to substitute some other in his place except as provided in Section 8376 [1574].’
“Inasmuch as William Royston left no lineal descendants Section 1574, O.S.1931 [now 84 O.S.1971 § 142], does not apply.”
Thus it appears had the husband left lineal heirs (as in the present case) the court may have concluded that the heirs would have taken in place of their parent.
De Graffenreid is clearly distinguishable and the quoted part of Royston is dicta. Therefore neither case is controlling and we therefore look to other states that have ruled on the issue that is before us.
It appears to be clearly the majority view that a spouse is not an “other relation1’ when used in antilapse statutes.3 The reasoning behind such interpretation is that for several hundred years, property went to blood relatives, and thus stayed in one blood line. A spouse was not a relative by blood and therefore was not related by consanguinity but by affinity. This reasoning sought to avoid just the situation that is before us, i. e., a person marries another with children, no issue is born of the marriage and the parent of the children predeceases the testator; if the “predeceasing spouse” was considered a “relation,” then the property would leave the blood line.
It further seems that if the legislature intended spouses to be other relations, they would have inserted that term in the statute just as they did the term “children.”
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BACON, Judge.
In 1915 Bruce Prather married Florence L. Rose, who was a divorcee with three children. Bruce had no children and none were born of his marriage to Florence. In 1942 Bruce had a lawyer prepare his will1 leaving his estate to Florence. In March of 1961 Florence died. Bruce died unmarried and without issue about eleven years later in April of 1972 without executing a new will or a codicil to the 1942 will. Bruce’s brothers and sisters (appellees) filed an action for letters of administration and subsequently Florence’s heirs (appellants) filed another action seeking to probate Bruce’s will. The trial court consolidated the two actions and after hearings ultimately determined Bruce died testate, but since Florence, who was the sole beneficiary under the will, predeceased Bruce, the legacy lapsed and Bruce’s estate would therefore pass to appellees under the laws of intestate succession. Appellants appeal from that finding arguing under two propositions of error.
Appellants’ first proposition reads:
“The trial court erred in construing the words 'To Have and to Hold unto her and her heirs forever’ as being words pertaining to the quality of the estate bequeathed to the designated beneficiary, [213]*213and not words showing an intention to substitute, under 84 O.S. 177, the lineal heirs of the wife in her place should she predecease the testator.”
Title 84 O.S.1971 § 177 reads:
“If a devisee or legatee dies during the lifetime of the testator, the testamentary disposition to him fails, unless an intention appears to substitute some other in his place, except as provided in Section 8922 [84 O.S.1971 § 142].”
As previously shown herein (footnote 1) Bruce’s will left his estate to Florence “To Have and to Hold unto her and her heirs forever.” Appellants urge that it is this language in the will that amounts to an “intention, . . . to substitute some other” (Appellants) in Florence’s place under §-177. Thus, argue appellants, the testamentary disposition to Florence should /fiot fail, because the above wording shows Bruce’s intention to substitute appellants in Florence’s place. We do not agree with appellants. Appellants cite numerous statutes and cases dealing with presumptions against intestacy; liberal construction of statutes in derogation of common law; and courts sometimes substituting “or” for “and” to arrive at the testator’s intentions. We think these citations are applicable not only to this case, but to all will cases; however, we find the two controlling statutes in the present case to be § 177 and § 142.
Normally, a will contains a residuary clause under which a predeceasing devisee or legatee’s interest will pass, thus avoiding failure of testamentary disposition or a lapse. However, not uncommon is a will like the one in the present case, that is, one without a residuary clause. Absence of such residuary clause seems to manifest a testator’s intent for the property to pass intestate where he names only one beneficiary as was done in the present case. It therefore follows that unless the words “and her heirs” amounts to an intention to substitute under § 177, or unless the anti-lapse statute is applicable, there is a lapse and the property would pass intestate.
Under common law it was necessary to include the words “and his heirs” to convey the fee simple estate.2 Now under 16 O.S.1971 § 29 every estate demised by will is deemed an estate in fee simple unless limited by express words. The words “and his heirs” at the most are words of limitation and not words of substitution. Lacking a residuary clause or language sufficient to make it appear Bruce’s intention was to substitute appellants in Florence’s place, we find under § 177 there is a failure of testamentary disposition unless Oklahoma’s antilapse statute (84 O.S.1971 § 142) prevents such, which brings us to appellants’ second proposition.
[214]*214Appellants’ second proposition reads :
“The trial court erred in determining that a wife is not an 'other relation’ of the testator as used in 84 O.S. 142.”
Section 142, which is Oklahoma’s anti-lapse statute, reads as follows:
“When any estate is devised or bequeathed to any child or other relation of the testator, and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving lineal descendants, such descendants take the estate so given by the will, in the same manner as the devisee or legatee would have done had he survived the testator.” (emphasis ours)
In this regard, appellants argue Florence was an “other relation” of the testator and that they are Florence’s lineal heirs, therefore there was no lapse.
Oklahoma has never r.uled on whether a spouse is an “other relation” under § 142. However, there are two cases in Oklahoma which deserve some discussion since they do relate to the issue at hand, but indicate opposite conclusions—De Graffenreid v. Iowa Land & Trust Co., 20 Okl. 687, 95 P. 624 (1908) and Royston v. Besett, 183 Okl. 643, 83 P.2d 874 (1938). In De Graffenreid, the court construed the term “nearest relation” as it was used in the laws of descent and distribution of the Creek Nation and found that term excluded the husband, wife and children. In Royston the wife’s will, which had no residuary clause, left all her estate to her husband who predeceased her by four days. The court said:
“ . . . The husband, having predeceased his wife, and no intention to the contrary appearing from the will of Gertrude Royston the testamentary disposition to William Royston, (under the wife’s will,) failed under the provisions of Section 1605, O.S.1931, 84 Okl.St.Ann. § 177 which reads: ‘If a devisee or legatee dies during the lifetime of the ■testator, the testamentary disposition to him fails, unless an intention appears to substitute some other in his place except as provided in Section 8376 [1574].’
“Inasmuch as William Royston left no lineal descendants Section 1574, O.S.1931 [now 84 O.S.1971 § 142], does not apply.”
Thus it appears had the husband left lineal heirs (as in the present case) the court may have concluded that the heirs would have taken in place of their parent.
De Graffenreid is clearly distinguishable and the quoted part of Royston is dicta. Therefore neither case is controlling and we therefore look to other states that have ruled on the issue that is before us.
It appears to be clearly the majority view that a spouse is not an “other relation1’ when used in antilapse statutes.3 The reasoning behind such interpretation is that for several hundred years, property went to blood relatives, and thus stayed in one blood line. A spouse was not a relative by blood and therefore was not related by consanguinity but by affinity. This reasoning sought to avoid just the situation that is before us, i. e., a person marries another with children, no issue is born of the marriage and the parent of the children predeceases the testator; if the “predeceasing spouse” was considered a “relation,” then the property would leave the blood line.
It further seems that if the legislature intended spouses to be other relations, they would have inserted that term in the statute just as they did the term “children.”
Section 142 was originally adopted in 1890 and taken directly from the Compiled Laws of the Territory of Dakota, 1887, § 3338, which was adopted from the California Civil Code, § 1310, enacted in 1872, which read almost verbatim as Oklahoma’s § 142. California has ruled on the issue [215]*215before us several times. The two most cited California cases are In re Pfuelb’s Estate, 48 Cal. 643 (1874) and In re Sowash’s Estate, 62 Cal.App. 512, 217 P. 123 (1923).
In In re Pfuelb’s Estate, the court said:
“The word relation, providing that a dev-isee to a relation shall not lapse by the death of the devisee during the lifetime of the testator, if the devisee leaves lineal descendants, includes only relation by blood, and not by affinity.”
In re Sowash’s Estate is probably the most cited California case and contains much of the reasoning which is usually applied in such cases.4 In Sowash the court [216]*216clearly held the wife was not a relation within the meaning of the statute. The supreme court of Oregon reached the same result in In re Miller’s Estate, 117 Or. 399, 244 P. 526 (1926), in which case the court cites numerous jurisdictions and authorities. Maine has reached the same result in Keniston v. Adams, 80 Me. 290, 14 A. 203 (1888) as did Washington in In re Renton’s Estate, 10 Wash. 533, 39 P. 145 (1895), and Michigan in In re Spier’s Estate, 224 Mich. 658, 195 N.W. 430 (1923) and many others.
We therefore will follow what is clearly the majority view and hold that the term “other relation” as used in 84 O.S. 1971 § 142 does not include the spouse of the testator or testatrix, as the case may be.
Affirmed.
BRIGHTMIRE, P. J., and NEPTUNE, J., concur.