1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROSE MCCULLY, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01843-JES-KSC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 14 HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, URSULA 15 AND SUA SPONTE DISMISSING MAI, SALVATORE LUPO, PARKER CASE WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; 16 PROPERTIES, TERRI PARKER,
CASSANDRA MILLS, CSA SAN 17 (2) DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE DIEGO COUNTY FAIR HOUSING, and TO ELECTRONICALLY FILE 18 GEORGE IBARRA, DOCUMENTS; and 19 Defendants. (3) DENYING MOTION TO FILE 20 ADDRESS UNDER SEAL 21 [ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11] 22 23 On July 18, 2025, Plaintiff Rose McCully (“Plaintiff”) filed a pro se complaint 24 alleging various causes of action against Defendants. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). On August 25 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed several motions: a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 26 (“IFP”), Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents, and Motion to File Address 27 Under Seal. ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11. After due consideration and for the reasons set forth below, 28 the Court GRANTS the motion to proceed IFP and DISMISSES the case without 1 prejudice, DENIES the motion for leave to electronically file documents, and GRANTS 2 the motion to file address under seal. 3 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 4 Parties instituting a civil action must pay a filing fee of $405 unless they are granted 5 leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A party need not “be absolutely 6 destitute” to proceed IFP. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 7 (1948). “Nonetheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some 8 particularity, definiteness, and certainty.’” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 9 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. McQuade, 647 F.3d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). To 10 that end, “[a]n affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that 11 the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. “But, the 12 same even-handed care must be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered 13 to underwrite, at public expense, either frivolous claims or the remonstrances of a suitor 14 who is financially able, in whole or in part, to pull his own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorp, 586 15 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). 16 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s renewed IFP motion and finds that Plaintiff is 17 unable to pay fees or post securities required to maintain this action. Plaintiff submitted a 18 renewed application stating that she receives $2,146 per month combined in income and 19 food stamps. ECF No. 9-2 at 1-2. Plaintiff’s monthly expenses total $1,675 per month. The 20 Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee. Therefore, the Court GRANTS 21 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. 22 II. Screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 23 The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding pro se and IFP. 28 24 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if 25 it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 26 if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 27 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 28 1 A. Standard of Review 2 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 3 pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Though plaintiffs need not give 4 “detailed factual allegations,” plaintiffs must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a 5 right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 6 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 7 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 8 Adequately pled claims will “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is 9 and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). And courts 10 dismiss complaints that “fail[ ] to provide the individual defendants with proper notice of 11 the claims being asserted against them and ... [do] not afford defendants a fair opportunity 12 to assert ... defenses.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1996). 13 To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires 14 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is 15 liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss 16 v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a 17 defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short 18 of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); 19 Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 20 B. Legal Analysis 21 On page 17 of the complaint, Plaintiff lists twelve different California statutes titled 22 “Specific Violations and Claims.” Compl. at 17. On the very next page, Plaintiff lists eight 23 causes of action that are misnumbered and titled the page “Causes of Action.” Id. at 18. It 24 is unclear whether Plaintiff is asserting claims under the “Specific Violations and Claims” 25 listed or the “Causes of Action” listed. Regardless, Plaintiff lists eight named Defendants 26 in her complaint, but does not identify which causes of action or specific violations are 27 alleged against each specific Defendant. Plaintiff needs to clarify the specific claims she 28 brings and the specific Defendants she brings those claims against. 1 In light of the above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not met the requisite Rule 2 8 pleading standard. First, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege facts to support the elements of 3 several of the causes of action. See Bautista v. Los Angeles Cnty., 216 F.3d 837, 840 (9th 4 Cir. 2000) (Rule 8 requires a plaintiff to “plead a short and plain statement of the elements 5 of his or her claim, identifying the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the claim and 6 the elements of the prima facie case.”). Additionally, Plaintiff does not specify which 7 claims she is making against which defendant. See Dougherty v. Bank of America, N.A., 8 177 F. Supp. 3d 1230, 1253 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (where there are multiple defendants, the 9 complaint “must allege the basis of [her] claim against each defendant to satisfy” Rule 8). 10 As pleaded, Plaintiff's claims do “not afford defendants a fair opportunity” to defend 11 themselves and does not satisfy the Rule 8 pleading requirements. See McHenry, 84 F.3d 12 at 1175. Accordingly, the Court sua sponte DISMISSES the complaint for failing to state 13 a claim. 14 C.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROSE MCCULLY, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01843-JES-KSC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 14 HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, URSULA 15 AND SUA SPONTE DISMISSING MAI, SALVATORE LUPO, PARKER CASE WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; 16 PROPERTIES, TERRI PARKER,
CASSANDRA MILLS, CSA SAN 17 (2) DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE DIEGO COUNTY FAIR HOUSING, and TO ELECTRONICALLY FILE 18 GEORGE IBARRA, DOCUMENTS; and 19 Defendants. (3) DENYING MOTION TO FILE 20 ADDRESS UNDER SEAL 21 [ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11] 22 23 On July 18, 2025, Plaintiff Rose McCully (“Plaintiff”) filed a pro se complaint 24 alleging various causes of action against Defendants. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). On August 25 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed several motions: a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 26 (“IFP”), Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents, and Motion to File Address 27 Under Seal. ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11. After due consideration and for the reasons set forth below, 28 the Court GRANTS the motion to proceed IFP and DISMISSES the case without 1 prejudice, DENIES the motion for leave to electronically file documents, and GRANTS 2 the motion to file address under seal. 3 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 4 Parties instituting a civil action must pay a filing fee of $405 unless they are granted 5 leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A party need not “be absolutely 6 destitute” to proceed IFP. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 7 (1948). “Nonetheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some 8 particularity, definiteness, and certainty.’” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 9 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. McQuade, 647 F.3d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). To 10 that end, “[a]n affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that 11 the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. “But, the 12 same even-handed care must be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered 13 to underwrite, at public expense, either frivolous claims or the remonstrances of a suitor 14 who is financially able, in whole or in part, to pull his own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorp, 586 15 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). 16 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s renewed IFP motion and finds that Plaintiff is 17 unable to pay fees or post securities required to maintain this action. Plaintiff submitted a 18 renewed application stating that she receives $2,146 per month combined in income and 19 food stamps. ECF No. 9-2 at 1-2. Plaintiff’s monthly expenses total $1,675 per month. The 20 Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee. Therefore, the Court GRANTS 21 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. 22 II. Screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 23 The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding pro se and IFP. 28 24 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if 25 it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 26 if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 27 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 28 1 A. Standard of Review 2 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 3 pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Though plaintiffs need not give 4 “detailed factual allegations,” plaintiffs must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a 5 right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 6 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 7 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 8 Adequately pled claims will “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is 9 and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). And courts 10 dismiss complaints that “fail[ ] to provide the individual defendants with proper notice of 11 the claims being asserted against them and ... [do] not afford defendants a fair opportunity 12 to assert ... defenses.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1996). 13 To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires 14 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is 15 liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss 16 v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a 17 defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short 18 of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); 19 Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 20 B. Legal Analysis 21 On page 17 of the complaint, Plaintiff lists twelve different California statutes titled 22 “Specific Violations and Claims.” Compl. at 17. On the very next page, Plaintiff lists eight 23 causes of action that are misnumbered and titled the page “Causes of Action.” Id. at 18. It 24 is unclear whether Plaintiff is asserting claims under the “Specific Violations and Claims” 25 listed or the “Causes of Action” listed. Regardless, Plaintiff lists eight named Defendants 26 in her complaint, but does not identify which causes of action or specific violations are 27 alleged against each specific Defendant. Plaintiff needs to clarify the specific claims she 28 brings and the specific Defendants she brings those claims against. 1 In light of the above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not met the requisite Rule 2 8 pleading standard. First, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege facts to support the elements of 3 several of the causes of action. See Bautista v. Los Angeles Cnty., 216 F.3d 837, 840 (9th 4 Cir. 2000) (Rule 8 requires a plaintiff to “plead a short and plain statement of the elements 5 of his or her claim, identifying the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the claim and 6 the elements of the prima facie case.”). Additionally, Plaintiff does not specify which 7 claims she is making against which defendant. See Dougherty v. Bank of America, N.A., 8 177 F. Supp. 3d 1230, 1253 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (where there are multiple defendants, the 9 complaint “must allege the basis of [her] claim against each defendant to satisfy” Rule 8). 10 As pleaded, Plaintiff's claims do “not afford defendants a fair opportunity” to defend 11 themselves and does not satisfy the Rule 8 pleading requirements. See McHenry, 84 F.3d 12 at 1175. Accordingly, the Court sua sponte DISMISSES the complaint for failing to state 13 a claim. 14 C. Leave to Amend 15 District courts “should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless 16 ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 17 amendment.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. 18 Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988)). Here, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to 19 amend her Complaint. If Plaintiff fails to timely amend, the Court will enter a final Order 20 dismissing the entire action. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If 21 a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court 22 may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). Plaintiff 23 is advised that any amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to her 24 prior complaint; accordingly, any defendant not named and any claims not re-alleged in 25 any amended complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach 26 Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n 27 amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 28 1 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged 2 in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 3 III. Motion for Leave to File Electronically 4 Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she has the proper equipment and software 5 capabilities to electronically file documents. Therefore, the Court DENIES without 6 prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Electronically. 7 IV. Motion to File Address Under Seal 8 Courts have historically recognized a “general right to inspect and copy public 9 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 10 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one 11 ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” 12 Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 13 Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). To overcome 14 this strong presumption, a party seeking to seal a judicial record must articulate 15 justifications for sealing that outweigh the public policies favoring disclosure. See 16 Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79. In turn, the court must “conscientiously balance[] the 17 competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records 18 secret.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135) (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 “After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial records, 20 it must ‘base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis for its 21 ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.’” Id. (quoting Hagestad v. Tragesser, 22 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)). However, where the material is, at most, “tangentially 23 related” to the merits of the case, the request to seal may be granted on a showing of “good 24 cause.” Ctr. For Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016). 25 Here, Plaintiff requests to seal her address from the public record because “one of 26 the named defendants in this action is a former property manager who has engaged in 27 stalking, harassment, and retaliatory conduct against Plaintiff. Public disclosure of 28 Plaintiff’s current address would subject her to further danger and intimidation.” ECF No. 1 || 11 at 2. This is an insufficient basis for the Court to grant sealing of the public record. 2 || Every defendant in this action would have to serve Plaintiff with motions. Pursuant to the 3 || Local Rules, “[a] party proceeding pro se must keep the Court and opposing parties advised 4 to current address.” S.D. Civ. L.R. 83.11(b). Plaintiff indicated she is willing to accept 5 || service through an alternative safe mailing address designated by the Court. ECF No. 11 at 6 The Clerk of Court cannot accept service on behalf of Plaintiff as she suggests. Plaintiff 7 welcome to provide an alternative address on her filings that she has access to and 8 ||monitors to receive any mail from the Court and opposing parties. Plaintiff's Motion to 9 || File Address under Seal is DENIED. 10 III. Conclusion 11 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in 12 || forma pauperis and sua sponte DISMISSES the complaint with leave to amend. The Court 13 || DENIES without prejudice Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents 14 DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to File Address Under Seal. Plaintiff must file an amended 15 ||/complaint on or before January 14, 2026. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint 16 || by the deadline, then the Court will dismiss the entire case with prejudice. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 Dated: December 19, 2025 = 4, 20 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 1 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28