Rosas-Gonzalez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 17, 2026
• Docket: 23-3564
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA TERESA ROSAS-GONZALEZ, No. 23-3564 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-411-452 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 4, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, BYBEE, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Maria Teresa Rosas-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision upholding an

Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for cancellation of removal. We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ, cites Matter of Burbano, “and does not

express disagreement with any part of the IJ’s decision, the BIA effectively adopts

the IJ’s decision in its entirety,” and “we review the IJ’s decision as if it were the

BIA’s.” Moreno-Morante v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007)

(discussing Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (B.I.A. 1994)). Our task is to

determine “whether the BIA erred in applying the exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship standard to a given set of facts [] by reviewing for substantial evidence,”

Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025), and we will reverse

only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary

based on the evidence in the record,” Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051,

1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citation modified).

To qualify for cancellation of removal, an applicant is required to show that

her removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a

qualifying relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The hardship “must be out of the

ordinary and exceedingly uncommon” and “must deviate, in the extreme, from the

norm” when compared to “the hardship that results in the usual, ordinary course

when an alien is removed.” Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1006.

Here, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Petitioner did

not show that her removal would cause her citizen father to suffer the requisite

hardship for her to qualify for cancellation of removal. The IJ considered

2 23-3564 Petitioner’s father’s various medical conditions but noted that he lived in California

while Petitioner lived in Arizona and visited him only three times a year. The IJ

further noted that Petitioner’s father appeared relatively independent, was still able

to drive short distances, and was financially stable. Finally, the IJ noted that

Petitioner was not her father’s only caregiver, as he lived with his wife, who, like

him, was receiving financial and medical benefits. Petitioner’s claim that the IJ

failed to consider “how the father’s health would continue to decline and that what

he faces in 2025 would naturally be different tha[n] 2019 when the father’s health

was assessed” is simply untrue—the IJ expressly took account of the fact that her

father “will continue to suffer the ill-effects of being 79 and later age[s] other than

that.” And in any event, Petitioner has not presented any evidence that her removal

would be the cause of any exceptional or extremely unusual hardship.

Petitioner argues that because the IJ stated he was giving “greater weight” to

certain evidence of country conditions in Mexico, the IJ incorrectly believed

Petitioner’s father would be returning to Mexico with her if she was removed. But

the IJ never suggested he believed Petitioner’s father would return to Mexico with

her, nor does he appear to have ever contemplated this possibility anywhere in his

decision. To the contrary, the IJ appears to have assumed her father would continue

to live in California, receiving medical benefits and retirement pay and making

mortgage payments on his house.

3 23-3564 Considering the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence supports

the conclusion that Petitioner’s father would not suffer exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship as a result of Petitioner’s removal.

PETITION DENIED.

4 23-3564