Rosas Bernal v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 8, 2025
• Docket: 23-588
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 8 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE ROSAS BERNAL, No. 23-588 Agency No. Petitioner, A200-682-026 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 4, 2025** Portland, Oregon

Before: McKEOWN and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER, District Judge.***

Petitioner Jose Rosas Bernal seeks review of a Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the denial of his application for cancellation of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. removal. The only question before us is whether Rosas Bernal satisfied his burden

under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(D) to demonstrate “exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. We review BIA hardship determinations

for substantial evidence. Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1005 (9th Cir.

2025). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we deny the

petition.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Rosas Bernal’s

qualifying children would not suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”

if he were removed to Mexico. Of course, some hardship “would normally be

expected from the deportation of a close family member.” Wilkinson v. Garland,

601 U.S. 209, 221 (2024) (cleaned up). The record, however, lacks evidence

indicative of extreme hardship, such as complete financial dependence on the

petitioning parent, or challenges like “very serious health issues” or “compelling

special needs in school” that the parent’s presence is necessary to manage. See

Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1006. Indeed, the record reflects that Rosas Bernal’s

children, who were 17 and 19 at the time of the BIA’s decision, do not suffer from

health issues or other significant challenges. Rosas Bernal may continue to support

them financially by working in Mexico, and they have other family members in the

United States who may help care for them. This evidence would not compel a

2 23-588 reasonable adjudicator to conclude that any harm the children may face

“deviate[s], in the extreme, from the norm.” Id.

Moreover, Rosas Bernal has not demonstrated that the BIA overlooked

“highly probative or potentially dispositive” evidence in its analysis. See Castillo v.

Barr, 980 F.3d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 2020). The BIA referenced nearly all the facts

Rosas Bernal cites in support of a hardship showing, including his testimony about

being the “primary financial source” for his family, and his qualifying children’s

health and educational circumstances. And a broad country-conditions report that

does not pertain to Rosas Bernal or to the areas in Mexico to which he would likely

return is neither highly probative nor dispositive of hardship in this case. Gonzalez-

Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1007–08 (Evidence of country conditions “that applies equally

to a large portion of removal cases does not compel the conclusion that the

hardship standard is met.”).

PETITION DENIED.

3 23-588