Rosario v. Puerto Rico Land Authority

97 P.R. 316
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedMay 20, 1969
DocketNo. R-68-47
StatusPublished

This text of 97 P.R. 316 (Rosario v. Puerto Rico Land Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rosario v. Puerto Rico Land Authority, 97 P.R. 316 (prsupreme 1969).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Ramírez Bages

delivered the opinion of the Court.

[318]*318A group of workers from the proportional-profit farms of the Land Authority filed a complaint against the latter in the Superior Court, San Juan Part, in which they claimed:

1. Unpaid proportional profits $32,000
2. Unpaid extra hours at the rate of $7,000
for each one of the 32 plaintiffs $224,000
3. Difference in wages for work performed in burnt sugarcane at the rate of $3,000 for
each one of the 32 plaintiffs $96,000
4. Overtime worked during the dull season (rainy season) during 10 years at the rate
of $10,000 for each claimant $320,000
Total $672,000

They also claimed penalties, costs and attorney’s fees.

The entire claim, having been denied and a special master having been appointed by the trial court to receive the evidence of the parties and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, the parties stipulated, among other things, that the claim “for burnt sugarcane was limited to the difference for sugarcane burnt during extra hours” and that the analyses of the payrolls made by appellant in relation to each appellee be admitted without interpreting this “as an admission against appellees.”

After several hearings held before the special master, the latter submitted a report to the trial court where he made the following findings of fact:

(a) Concerning the claim for extra hours:

“6. That during the grinding season and during the so-called dull season the .plaintiffs had regularly an eight-hour working day. This eight-hour working day began almost always at 7:00 a.m. and continued until 11:00 a.m. The laborers took lunch from 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 m., time at which they resumed their work and left regularly at 4:00 p.m.

[319]*319“7. All the claimants denied having been paid any extra hour. According to their testimony they all worked from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. from Monday to Saturday, and on many occasions Sunday morning, except for an hour off for lunch from 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 m. The pay tickets admitted in evidence show that extra hours were paid to them, and it was thus admitted by plaintiffs from the witness stand when they were confronted with the same.

“8. From the evidence of the defendant, consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Felipe Padilla Remigio, Víctor Pagán, Jenaro Martínez Díaz, José I. Barbosa, Juan Santana Franco, Máximo García Colón, Antonio Morales Franco, and José Ángel Boria Gómez (timekeepers and farm managers), it is inferred that on occasions there were omissions and discrepancies as to fractions of extra hours worked and which had not been entered. Sometimes the laborer won his claim and on those occasions the difference was paid to the laborer in the following week, showing it in the payroll as 'payment for omission in the preceding week.

“10. It was not usual that the plaintiffs would work extra hours during the so-called dull season, and the few extra hours worked by some of the plaintiffs during this period, as it appears from the excerpts of the payrolls and pay tickets, were satisfied. The planting and farming work in the proportional-profit farms where plaintiffs work is substantially reduced three months after the grinding season is finished. After these three months have elapsed the majority of the few laborers who continued working on the farm rarely work in excess of eight hours a day.”

In finding No. 9 numerous extra hours worked by appel-lees, which were duly paid by appellant, are indicated.

However in paragraph III of his conclusions of law the special master informs that:

“Compensation for extra hours worked during the period of 10 years for which they did not receive compensation.
“In our findings of fact we determined that eleven out of the twenty-seven plaintiffs worked extra hours for which they had not received additional compensation. As to the remaining sixteen all extra hours worked were paid according to the provisions [320]*320of the agreement and the law except for the differential for extra hours worked in burnt sugarcane.”

The total amounts recognized by the special master, as owed by appellant to each appellee on account of extra hours and differential of work in burnt sugarcane, appear in finding No. 18. They add up to the amount of $11,525.08 plus an equal amount as penalty.

The trial court rendered judgment ordering appellant to pay said sum in the way and manner provided in the special master’s report, plus $7,606.55 for attorney’s fees and, in addition, it ruled the following:

“By order of December 9, 1964 this court provided that the fees of the Special Master would be paid by the prevailing party. As to this aspect the aforecited order is set aside, because the court understands that it is contrary to the public policy underlying the legislation concerning wages in' Puerto Rico, since it would be equivalent to reducing the wages to which laborers are entitled. It is ordered that the fees of the Special Master as well as the other expenses incurred during the hearings will be paid by defendant, Puerto Rico Land Authority.
“Special Master Mr. Martin Almodovar Acevedo’s fees are fixed in the amount of $5,500 and those of the stenographer Olga Vázquez Leal in the amount of $588.”

Of the four assignments which the appellant made on appeal, only the first three have been discussed. We conclude that it is correct as to the first two, that is to say that the granting of any amount for alleged extra hours worked and not paid for did not lie, and that the amount of attorney’s fees' is excessive and should be reduced from the sum of $7,606.55 to $2,000. The third assignment challenges, the determination ordering the payment of the special master’s fees, for it alleges that the trial court erred in setting aside a former order which enforced the stipulation of the parties, that such fees would be paid by the prevailing party. As to this one, appellant is wrong, despite concluding that it was inappropriate to set aside the said order.

[321]*3211 — We consider first the assignment about extra hours.

It is true that it has been the policy of this Court to uphold the weighing of the evidence made by trial judges except in cases of manifest error, clear arbitrariness or prejudice or passion, and that the findings fully supported by the evidence will not be disturbed by this Court. Community Partnership v. Presbyterian Hospital, 88 P.R.R. 379, 399 (1963); Alvarez v. Alvarez, 77 P.R.R. 862, 869 (1955).

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