Rosalinda Higdon v. Andrew Saul

District Court, C.D. California·Decided March 26, 2021·No. 8:19-cv-01622·Unknown

Opinion

ROSALINDA H.,1 ) Case No. SACV 19-1622-JPR ) Plaintiff, ) ) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER v. ) REVERSING COMMISSIONER ) ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner ) of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ) ) Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her applications for Social Security disability income benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The matter is before the Court on the parties’ Joint Stipulation, filed May 12, 2020, which the Court has taken under submission without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner’s decision is reversed and this action is 1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted in line with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. remanded for further proceedings. Plaintiff was born in 1972. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 344.) She completed high school (AR 386) and last worked as a billing clerk (AR 116-17, 386, 393-94). Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on October 19 and 30, 2015, respectively, alleging a disability onset date of August 18, 2015, based on fibromyalgia, migraines, restless-leg syndrome, and sleep apnea. (AR 344-50, 385-86.) After her applications and requests for reconsideration were denied (AR 225-40, 243-60, 265-69, 271-75), she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (AR 276-77). One was held on February 13, 2018, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified, as did a vocational expert. (AR 112-34.) In a written decision issued May 31, 2018, the ALJ found her not disabled. (AR 97-110.) She sought Appeals Council review (see AR 340-43, 475-76), which was denied on July 10, 2019 (AR 1- 7). This action followed. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The ALJ’s findings and decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the court “must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). “If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing,” the court “may not substitute its judgment” for the Commissioner’s. Id. at 720-21. People are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). A. The Five-Step Evaluation Process The ALJ follows a five-step evaluation process to assess whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended Apr. 9, 1996). In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim must be denied. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting her ability to do basic work activities; if not, the claimant is not disabled and her claim must be denied. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii) & (c). If the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments set forth at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii) & (d). If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity (“RFC”)2 to perform her past work; if so, she is not disabled and the claim must be denied. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The claimant has the burden of proving she is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets that burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. Id. 2 RFC is what a claimant can do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1); see Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). The Commissioner assesses the claimant’s RFC between steps three and four. Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing § 416.920(a)(4)). If that happens or if the claimant has no past relevant work, the Commissioner bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is not disabled because she can perform other substantial gainful work available in the national economy, the fifth and final step of the sequential analysis. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.960(b). B. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Process At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 18, 2015, the alleged onset date; her date last insured was December 31, 2020. (AR 99.) At step two, he concluded that she had the severe impairment of fibromyalgia. (AR 100.) At step three, he determined that her impairment did not meet or equal a Listing. (AR 102.) At step four, he found an RFC allowing her to perform a range of light work: the claimant can lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can stand and/or walk for six hours out of an eight-hour workday; can sit for six hours out of an eight-hour workday; cannot climb ladders, rope or sc

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