ACCEPTED 15-25-00180-cv FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 12/10/2025 7:12 PM 15-25-00180-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS FOR THE FIFTEENTH DISTRICT 12/10/2025 7:12:28 PM AUSTIN, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
ROSALINDA E. ROMERO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND CORP., Defendant-Appellee.
On Appeal from the 98th District Court, Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-24-009170
APPELLANT’S BRIEF APPELLEE HEREBY REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT
John F. Melton Email: jmelton@jfmeltonlaw.com State Bar No. 24013155 THE MELTON LAW FIRM, P.L.L.C. 6001 Bold Ruler Way, Suite 100 Austin, Texas 78746 (512) 633-9059 Telephone ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
IDENTITIES OF PARTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii - iv INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ISSUE PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ii IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
PLAINTIFF: Rosalinda E. Romero, Appellant
APPELLATE COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF: John F. Melton State Bar No. 24013155 The Melton Law Firm, PLLC 6001 Bold Ruler Way, Suite 100 Austin, Texas 78746 Phone (512) 633-9059
TRIAL COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF: John F. Melton State Bar No. 24013155 The Melton Law Firm, PLLC 6001 Bold Ruler Way, Suite 100 Austin, Texas 78746 Phone (512) 633-9059
DEFENDANTS: Texas Permanent School Fund Corp. Appellee
APPELLEES COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS: David Schlottman State Bar No.: 24083807 Jackson Walker, LLP 2323 Ross, Suite 600 Dallas, Texas 75201
iii Phone (214) 953-6000
TRIAL COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: David Schlottman State Bar No.: 24083807 Jackson Walker, LLP 2323 Ross, Suite 600 Dallas, Texas 75201 Phone (214) 953-6000
iv INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000)......................... ...2
Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227-28 (Tex. 2004).....3
Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019)......................2
STATUTES
Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 122.001 ...................................................................................... 1, 2, 7
v STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a wrongful employment termination case. Under Texas law, it is illegal
to terminate an employee because the employee serves as a juror. An employee whose
employment is terminated for serving as a juror is a violation of Civil Practice &
Remedies Code Section 122.001. On May 16, 2025, Appellant filed her First
Amended Original Petition. CR 46-54. On May 29, 2025, Appellee filed an
Amended plea to the jurisdiction. CR 55-68-102. On July 1, 2025, Appellant filed
her response to the Amended Plea. C.R. 75-81. The trial court granted the plea on
July 10, 2025 and entered a final judgment. CR 89-93. Appellant then filed a Notice
of Appeal. C.R. 94-96.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests oral argument in this case. The matter
at issue is unique and important under the Texas Constitution and Appellant believes
oral argument would be beneficial.
ISSUE PRESENTED
An employee whose employment is terminated for serving as a juror is a
violation of Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 122.001. Did the trial court err
in granting Appellee’s Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction?
Page 1 of 12 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff began working for Defendant in April, 2007. C.R. 46-54. On March
19, 2024, Plaintiff received jury duty notice for 6/3/24 through 6/5/24. See id.
Appellant does not have any disciplinary actions on her record over her 18 years
there. See id. Appellant was fired for the time she spent away from work while
serving on a jury. See id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant was fired for doing her civic duty by serving on a jury. The issue in
this case is whether or not the statute at issue applies to government employees. As
argued below, the statute was amended to include governmental employees who like
private employees should be protected from termination for doing their civic duty by
serving on a jury. See Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 122.001
ARGUMENT
“[W]hen a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional
facts with supporting evidence, the standard of review mirrors that of a traditional
summary judgment: all the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists." Town of Shady
Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019); see Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000) ("[A] court deciding a plea to the jurisdiction
Page 2 of 12 . . . may consider evidence and must do so when necessary to resolve the
jurisdictional issues raised."). If the defendant establishes that the trial court lacks
jurisdiction, the plaintiff is then required to show that there is a material fact question
about jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,
227-28 (Tex. 2004). If the evidence raises a fact issue on jurisdiction, the plea cannot
be granted, and a fact finder must resolve the issue. Id.
1. Background Facts
1.1 Plaintiff began working for Defendant in April, 2007. C.R. 46-54.
1.2 On March 19, 2024, Plaintiff received jury duty notice for 6/3/24 through
6/5/24 stating normal hours for court operation are 8:00 AM to 5 PM. See id.
1.3 On June 3, 2024, Plaintiff arrived at the courthouse around 8:00 am. She then
checked her email to see what room to go to and noticed a new email at 6:25 a.m.
stating that she was to report at 1:30 p.m. See id.
1.4 On June 3, 2024 at around 8:20 a.m. Plaintiff drove back home because she did
not bring her laptop with her to court. See id.
1.5 On June 3, 2024, between her first trip to the courthouse and her second trip,
Plaintiff exchanged messages with the Budget Director and took a data governance
online training. She was working. See id.
Page 3 of 12 1.6 Plaintiff had lunch on June 3, 2024 between 11 a.m. - 11:45 a.m.; and at 11:57
a.m. Plaintiff drove back to the courthouse. She arrived at the courthouse and parked
at 12:21 p.m. Initially she went to the wrong building and had to rush to another
building. She arrived at the correct location and went to the courtroom floor she was
assigned at around 12:50 p.m. When she arrived, she saw people waiting and learned
they were waiting for a trooper to come out of an office. See id.
1.7 On June 3, 2024 at around 1:20 p.m, the trooper came out, he handed out letters
to the people that were waiting and explained that an agreement was reached and that
we were dismissed. The trooper asked if we needed a note for work. The trooper
then went back into the office to get the notes, and came back out a few minutes later
and gave us the notes. Plaintiff received her note, stopped by the restroom and left.
She walked back to her car at around 2:10 p.m - 2:30 p.m. Before heading home,
Plaintiff inspected her car for damage, because she had hit a short cement object
while trying to park when she arrived at the courthouse. See id.
1.8 On June 3, 2024 at 2:45 p.m. she drove back home; and she arrived home at
around 3:20p.m.
1.9 On June 3, 2024 from 3:30 p.m - 4:00 p.m. she worked on her assigned career
path planning and roadmap for application rationalization (this was offline). See id.
Page 4 of 12 1.10 The events listed above were shared verbally with both Katie Whiting (HR),
Eric Obermier (Supervisor), and Steve Foucheck who has since replaced Eric as the
Director of Information Technology. Katie offered to enter the request on Plaintiff’s
behalf in the Salesforce timekeeping system, which serves as the approval record. She
did not enter the time in Salesforce but later reminded me to enter and submit the
time, which was approved by my supervisor. Plaintiff had spent the majority of the
day going back and forth to the courthouse and did work while not driving or at the
courthouse, so she just listed the day as jury duty. There was never any attempt to
deceive what her day looked like with both her supervisor or HR. See id.
1.11 Around 4:00 p.m. on June 24, 2024 Plaintiff checked with Eric (supervisor) via
Teams to see if they were meeting in person or he wanted to meet remote for a regular
one-on-one meeting. Eric responded that they would meet in his old office after he
finished his current meeting. Plaintiff told Eric to let her know when he was ready.
Plaintiff walked into what she thought was her regular one-on-one with her
supervisor. In this meeting, the following people were present, the HR Director Diana
Herring, Eric Obermier Plaintiff’s supervisor, and John Wright Legal Counsel. Diana
then began explaining that Plaintiff was being terminated based on ethical violations
due to entering 8 hours for jury duty that should have only been 4 hours. Diana then
had Eric read the agency ethical policy to Plaintiff, which she did not hear due to the
Page 5 of 12 shock. Diana went on to explain two options for termination. They were immediate
termination or resign effective July 1, 2024. Diana also explained the benefits and
mentioned that Plaintiff was no longer eligible for the Performance Incentive
Payment Plan (PIPP) FY 24, which requires employment on July 1, 2024, which is
Plaintiff’s last day per the resignation letter. Plaintiff earned this working long hours
and weekends, leading one of the major initiatives of her career, during the
technology separation effort from the Texas Education Agency. Plaintiff tried to
explain that she did not know she was supposed to keep up with the time for the day
and also explained that she shared the events of that day with Katie. Diana just kept
repeating that we were done with this conversation. She never let Plaintiff finish what
she was trying to tell her, it was just a constant "This conversation is over." Plaintiff
then was asked to sign a resignation letter that Diana had prepared. Plaintiff asked if
she could take it home to review and Diana stated that she needed to sign it right then.
She then turned to John. Plaintiff does not remember if he agreed or not, but he said
we can make you a copy. Plaintiff was still hesitant, but they insisted they needed a
signature right then. After Plaintiff signed it, they asked if she had any personal
belongings at her desk and to return the laptop which she had with her at the meeting.
They then asked for her badge, and she told them it was at her desk. They then called
Skip Baylor, the facilities coordinator, to get Plaintiff’s belongings and make a copy
Page 6 of 12 of the resignation letter. After Skip got Plaintiff’s purse, she realized that she had a
few camping items at her desk that she had forgotten. Skip put all of the items in a
brown banker box and brought them to her. She then asked Eric if she could have an
old laptop bag to put her stuff in. She did not want the humiliation of being walked
out with a box. Eric agreed and said it was fine to use an old bag. As she was trying
to put her stuff in her backpack, she continued to try to explain her thought process
for entering the time and kept being told this conversation is over. Diana also made
a comment about this not being Plaintiff’s first time and Plaintiff has no idea what she
meant. She has never had any discussions about her timekeeping and does not have
any disciplinary actions on her record over her 18 years there. See id.
2. Argument and Authorities
2.2 Under Texas law, it is illegal to terminate an employee because the employee
serves as a juror. An employee whose employment is terminated is a violation of Civil
Practice & Remedies Code Section 122.001. An employer may not discharge,
threaten to discharge, intimidate or coerce any employee because the employee serves
as a juror, or for the employee’s attendance or scheduled attendance in connection
with the service. An employer who has violated this law is liable for the damages
stated below. See id.
Page 7 of 12 2.3 The State has clearly and unambiguously waived immunity from suit under
Section 122.001. S.B. No. 370 passed the Senate on April 17, 2019 by a 30-1 vote.
C.R. 75-81. The previous version of Section 122.001 was specifically limited to “A
private employer.” The word “private” was removed from the statute showing a
specific intent to include non-private employers.
2.4 Furthermore, there are now two versions of similar statutes. One section is
limited to private employers and the other is not. This shows an intent to include both
private employers as specifically named in one section, and to include non-private
employers in the other section. The Legislature clearly intended to stop retaliation of
employees serving their civic duty by including two similar statutes. There is no
doubt that a government entity is an employer and one section names employers and
one is specifically limited to private employers.
2.5 These are all allegations contained in Plaintiff’s petition. C.R. 46-54. These
allegations at the pleading stage must be taken as true. As such, Appellee’s Amended
Plea to the Jurisdiction should have been denied.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant respectfully prays this
Court reverse the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s Amended Plea to the
Jurisdiction and for any such other relief she should be entitled to.
Page 8 of 12 Respectfully submitted,
THE MELTON LAW FIRM, P.L.L.C 6001 Bold Ruler Way, Suite 100 Austin, Texas 78746 (512) 633-9059 Telephone
/s/ John F. Melton John F. Melton Jmelton@jfmeltonlaw.com State Bar No. 24013155 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief contains 2392 words according to WordPerfect 2021.
/s/ John F. Melton John F. Melton
9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
By my signature hereunder affixed, I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been transmitted to all parties of record via email, on this 10th day of December, 2025, addressed as follows:
email: dschlottman@jw.com David Schlottman Jackson Walker, LLP 2323 Ross, Suite 600 Dallas, Texas 75201 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
/s/ John F. Melton John F. Melton
10 15-25-00180-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTEENTH DISTRICT AUSTIN, TEXAS
ROSALINDA E. ROMERO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND CORP., Defendants-Appellees.
On Appeal from the 98th District Court, Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-24-009170
APPELLANT’S APPENDIX
John F. Melton Email: jmelton@jfmeltonlaw.com State Bar No. 24013155 THE MELTON LAW FIRM, P.L.L.C. 6001 Bold Ruler Way, Suite 100 Austin, Texas 78746 (512) 633-9059 Telephone ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT APPELLANT’S APPENDIX
1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition
2. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction
3. Order Granting Defendant’s Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction
4. Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 122.001 TAB 1 5/16/2025 4:34 PM Velva L. Price District Clerk Travis County CAUSE NO.: D-1-GN-24-009170 D-1-GN-24-009170 Stefany Vega juarez ROSALINDA E. ROMERO, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS § TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL § FUND CORP., § Defendant. § 98" JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
NOW COMES Plaintiff, Rosalinda E. Romero, and files this Plaintiff's First Amended
Original Petition complaining of Defendant Texas Permanent School Fund Corp., and for cause of
action would show the Court the following:
I.
DISCOVERY
1.1 Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery under Rule 190.3 (Level 2) of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure.
IL.
THE PARTIES
2.1 Plaintiff is an individual who can be served through counsel.
2.2. Defendant is an entity that has been served and has answered the lawsuit.
Ill.
JURISDICTION, VENUE AND CONDITION PRECEDENT
3.1 The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy for
Page 1 of 8
46 this Court. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief over $1,000,000.
3.2 Pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §15.002, venue is proper in Travis
County, Texas, as it is the county in which the actions giving rise to this complaint occurred.
3.3. All conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred.
IV.
FACTS
4.1 Plaintiff began working for Defendant in April, 2007.
4.2. On March 19, 2024, Plaintiff received jury duty notice for 6/3/24 through 6/5/24 stating
normal hours for court operation are 8:00 AM to 5 PM.
4.3 On June 3, 2024, Plaintiff arrived at the courthouse around 8:00 am. She then checked her
email to see what room to go to and noticed a new email at 6:25 a.m. stating that she was to report
at 1:30 p.m.
44 OnJune 3, 2024 at around 8:20 a.m. Plaintiff drove back home because she did not bring her
laptop with her to court.
4.5 On June 3, 2024, between her first trip to the courthouse and her second trip, Plaintiff
exchanged messages with the Budget Director and took a data governance online training. She was
working.
4.6 Plaintiff had lunch on June 3, 2024 between 11 a.m. 11:45 a.m.; and at 11:57 a.m. Plaintiff -
drove back to the courthouse. She arrived at the courthouse and parked at 12:21 p.m. Initially she
went to the wrong building and had to rush to another building. She arrived at the correct location
and went to the courtroom floor she was assigned at around 12:50 p.m. When she arrived, she saw
people waiting and learned they were waiting for a trooper to come out of an office.
Page 2 of 8
47 4.7 OnJune 3, 2024 at around 1:20 p.m, the trooper came out, he handed out letters to the people
that were waiting and explained that an agreement was reached and that we were dismissed. The
trooper asked if we needed a note for work. The trooper then went back into the office to get the
notes, and came back out a few minutes later and gave us the notes. Plaintiff received her note,
stopped by the restroom and left. She walked back to her car at around 2:10 p.m 2:30 p.m. Before -
heading home, Plaintiff inspected her car for damage, because she had hit a short cement object
while trying to park when she arrived at the courthouse.
4.8 On June 3, 2024 at 2:45 p.m. she drove back home; and she arrived home at around 3: 20p.m.
4.9 OnJune 3, 2024 from 3:30 p.m 4:00 p.m. she worked on her assigned career path planning -
and roadmap for application rationalization (this was offline).
4.10 The events listed above were shared verbally with both Katie Whiting (HR), Eric Obermier
(Supervisor), and Steve Foucheck who has since replaced Eric as the Director of Information
Technology. Katie offered to enter the request on Plaintiff's behalf in the Salesforce timekeeping
system, which serves as the approval record. She did not enter the time in Salesforce but later
reminded me to enter and submit the time, which was approved by my supervisor. Plaintiffhad spent
the majority of the day going back and forth to the courthouse and did work while not driving or at
the courthouse, so she just listed the day as jury duty. There was never any attempt to deceive what
her day looked like with both her supervisor or HR.
4.11. Around 4:00 p.m. on June 24, 2024 Plaintiff checked with Eric (supervisor) via Teams to see
if they were meeting in person or he wanted to meet remote for a regular one-on-one meeting. Eric
responded that they would meet in his old office after he finished his current meeting. Plaintiff told
Eric to let her know when he was ready. Plaintiff walked into what she thought was her regular
Page 3 of 8
48 one-on-one with her supervisor. In this meeting, the following people were present, the HR Director
Diana Herring, Eric Obermier Plaintiff's supervisor, and JJohn Wright Legal Counsel. Diana then
began explaining that Plaintiff was being terminated based on ethical violations due to entering 8
hours for jury duty that should have only been 4 hours. Diana then had Eric read the agency ethical
policy to Plaintiff, which she did not hear due to the shock. Diana went on to explain two options
for termination. They were immediate termination or resign effective July 1, 2024. Diana also
explained the benefits and mentioned that Plaintiff was no longer eligible for the Performance
Incentive Payment Plan (PIPP) FY 24, which requires employment on July 1, 2024, which is
Plaintiffs last day per the resignation letter. Plaintiff earned this working long hours and weekends,
leading one of the major initiatives of her career, during the technology separation effort from the
Texas Education Agency. Plaintiff tried to explain that she did not know she was supposed to keep
up with the time for the day and also explained that she shared the events of that day with Katie.
Diana just kept repeating that we were done with this conversation. She never let Plaintiff finish
what she was trying to tell her, it was just a constant "This conversation is over." Plaintiff then was
asked to sign a resignation letter that Diana had prepared. Plaintiff asked if she could take it home
to review and Diana stated that she needed to sign it right then. She then turned to John. Plaintiff
does not remember if he agreed or not, but he said we can make you a copy. Plaintiff was still
hesitant, but they insisted they needed a signature right then. After Plaintiff signed it, they asked if
she had any personal belongings at her desk and to return the laptop which she had with her at the
meeting. They then asked for her badge, and she told them it was at her desk. They then called Skip
Baylor, the facilities coordinator, to get Plaintiff's belongings and make a copy of the resignation
letter. After Skip got Plaintiffs purse, she realized that she had a few camping items at her desk that
Page 4 of 8
49 she had forgotten. Skip put all of the items in a brown banker box and brought them to her. She then
asked Eric if she could have an old laptop bag to put her stuff in. She did not want the humiliation
of being walked out with a box. Eric agreed and said it was fine to use an old bag. As she was trying
to put her stuff in her backpack, she continued to try to explain her thought process for entering the
time and kept being told this conversation is over. Diana also made a comment about this not being
Plaintiff's first time and Plaintiff has no idea what she meant. She has never had any discussions
about her timekeeping and does not have any disciplinary actions on her record over her 18 years
there.
V.
CAUSES OF ACTION
5.1 The allegations contained in Paragraphs 4.1 through 4.11 inclusive are hereby incorporated
by reference for all causes of action.
WRONGFUL TERMINATION
5.2 Under Texas law, it is illegal to terminate an employee because the employee serves as a
juror. An employee whose employment is terminated is a violation of Civil Practice & Remedies
Code Section 122.001. An employer may not discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate or coerce
any employee because the employee serves as a juror, or for the employee's attendance or scheduled
attendance in connection with the service. An employer who has violated this law is liable for the
damages stated below.
5.3 The State has clearly and unambiguously waived immunity from suit under Section 122.001.
S.B. No. 370 passed the Senate on April 17, 2019 by a 30-1 vote. The previous version of Section
122.001 was specifically limited to "A private employer." The word "private" was removed from
Page 5 of 8
50 the statute showing a specific intent to include non-private employers.
5.4 Furthermore, there are now two versions of similar statutes. One section is limited to private
employers and the other is not. This shows an intent to include both private employers as specifically
named in one section, and to include non-private employers in the other section. The Legislature
clearly intended to stop retaliation of employees serving their civic duty by including two similar
statutes. There is no doubt that a government entity is an employer and one section names employers
and one is specifically limited to private employers.
VI.
DAMAGES
6.1 As a result of Defendant's unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered economic and actual
damages, including past and future lost income, back wages or back pay, interest on back pay and
front pay, future wages or front pay, employment benefits in the past and future, lost earnings in the
past and future, and all lost benefits under the contract or employment relationship.
6.2. Anemployer who has violated this provision is liable for damages in an amount not less than
an amount equal to five years compensation and the Plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement.
VIL
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPERT FEES
7.1 A prevailing party may recover reasonable attorneys' fees, expert fees, and costs. Plaintiff
brings suit for these fees from Defendant. Plaintiff seeks all reasonable expert fees and attorneys' fees
in this case, including preparation and trial of this lawsuit, post-trial, pre-appeal work, and
post-judgment discovery and collection in the event execution on the judgment is necessary.
Page 6 of 8
51 Vill.
JURY DEMAND
8.1 Plaintiff has demanded a trial by jury on all issues.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that Defendant be cited to
appear and answer herein, and, upon final trial, Plaintiff have Judgment against Defendant as
requested above, and as follows:
1. Judgment against Defendant for all damages alleged in this petition;
2. Interest before and after judgment at the highest rate provided by law, until paid;
3. Costs of suit;
4. Reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and expert witness fees;
5. Such other and further relief to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
THE MELTON LAW FIRM, P.L.L.C. 925 South Capital of Texas Highway, Suite B-225 Austin, Texas 78746 (512) 330-0017 Telephone (512) 330-0067 Facsimile
/s/ John F. Melton John F. Melton jmelton@jfmeltonlaw.com State Bar No. 24013155 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
Page 7 of 8
52 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
By my signature below, I hereby certify that on May 16, 2025, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served on all parties of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:
email: dschlottman@jw.com David Schlottman Jackson Walker, LLP 2323 Ross, Suite 600 Dallas, Texas 75201
/s/ John F. Melton John F. Melton
Page 8 of 8
53 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
John Melton Bar No. 24013155 jmelton@meltonkumler.com Envelope ID: 100953536 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION Status as of 5/21/2025 3:34 PM CST
Associated Case Party: TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND CORP.
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status David Schlottman dschlottman@jw.com 5/16/2025 4:34:44 PM SENT Erin Shea eshea@jw.com 5/16/2025 4:34:44 PM SENT Lauren Vogel lvogel@jw.com 5/16/2025 4:34:44 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: ROSALINDAE.ROMERO
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status John Melton 24013155 jmelton@jfmeltonlaw.com 5/16/2025 4:34:44 PM SENT
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Paige Densman paige@jfmeltonilaw.com 5/16/2025 4:34:44 PM SENT John Melton jmelton@jfmeltonlaw.com 5/16/2025 4:34:44 PM SENT
09/05/2025 01:51:41
54 TAB 2 7/1/2025 5:32 PM Velva L. Price District Clerk Travis County CAUSE NO.: D-1-GN-24-009170 D-1-GN-24-009170 Susan Schmidt
ROSALINDA E. ROMERO, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § V. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS § TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL § FUND CORP., § Defendant. § 98" JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
NOW COMES Plaintiff, Rosalinda E. Romero, and files this Response to Defendant's
Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction.
I.
Background Facts
1.1 Plaintiff began working for Defendant in April, 2007. See Plaintiff's First Amended Petition.
1.2 On March 19, 2024, Plaintiff received jury duty notice for 6/3/24 through 6/5/24 stating
normal hours for court operation are 8:00 AM to 5 PM. See id.
1.3 On June 3, 2024, Plaintiff arrived at the courthouse around 8:00 am. She then checked her
email to see what room to go to and noticed a new email at 6:25 a.m. stating that she was to report
at 1:30 p.m. See id.
14 OnJune 3, 2024 at around 8:20 a.m. Plaintiff drove back home because she did not bring her
laptop with her to court. See id.
1.5 On June 3, 2024, between her first trip to the courthouse and her second trip, Plaintiff
exchanged messages with the Budget Director and took a data governance online training. She was
Page 1 of 6
75 working. See id.
1.6 Plaintiff had lunch on June 3, 2024 between 11 a.m. 11:45 a.m.; and at 11:57 a.m. Plaintiff -
drove back to the courthouse. She arrived at the courthouse and parked at 12:21 p.m. Initially she
went to the wrong building and had to rush to another building. She arrived at the correct location
and went to the courtroom floor she was assigned at around 12:50 p.m. When she arrived, she saw
people waiting and learned they were waiting for a trooper to come out of an office. See id.
1.7 OnJune 3, 2024 at around 1:20 p.m, the trooper came out, he handed out letters to the people
that were waiting and explained that an agreement was reached and that we were dismissed. The
trooper asked if we needed a note for work. The trooper then went back into the office to get the
notes, and came back out a few minutes later and gave us the notes. Plaintiff received her note,
stopped by the restroom and left. She walked back to her car at around 2:10 p.m 2:30 p.m. Before -
heading home, Plaintiff inspected her car for damage, because she had hit a short cement object
while trying to park when she arrived at the courthouse. See id.
1.8 OnJune 3, 2024 at 2:45 p.m. she drove back home; and she arrived home at around 3: 20p.m.
1.9 OnJune 3, 2024 from 3:30 p.m 4:00 p.m. she worked on her assigned career path planning -
and roadmap for application rationalization (this was offline). See id.
1.10 The events listed above were shared verbally with both Katie Whiting (HR), Eric Obermier
(Supervisor), and Steve Foucheck who has since replaced Eric as the Director of Information
Technology. Katie offered to enter the request on Plaintiff's behalf in the Salesforce timekeeping
system, which serves as the approval record. She did not enter the time in Salesforce but later
reminded me to enter and submit the time, which was approved by my supervisor. Plaintiffhad spent
the majority of the day going back and forth to the courthouse and did work while not driving or at
Page 2 of 6
76 the courthouse, so she just listed the day as jury duty. There was never any attempt to deceive what
her day looked like with both her supervisor or HR. See id.
1.11 Around 4:00 p.m. on June 24, 2024 Plaintiff checked with Eric (supervisor) via Teams to see
if they were meeting in person or he wanted to meet remote for a regular one-on-one meeting. Eric
responded that they would meet in his old office after he finished his current meeting. Plaintiff told
Eric to let her know when he was ready. Plaintiff walked into what she thought was her regular
one-on-one with her supervisor. In this meeting, the following people were present, the HR Director
Diana Herring, Eric Obermier Plaintiff's supervisor, and JJohn Wright Legal Counsel. Diana then
began explaining that Plaintiff was being terminated based on ethical violations due to entering 8
hours for jury duty that should have only been 4 hours. Diana then had Eric read the agency ethical
policy to Plaintiff, which she did not hear due to the shock. Diana went on to explain two options
for termination. They were immediate termination or resign effective July 1, 2024. Diana also
explained the benefits and mentioned that Plaintiff was no longer eligible for the Performance
Incentive Payment Plan (PIPP) FY 24, which requires employment on July 1, 2024, which is
Plaintiffs last day per the resignation letter. Plaintiff earned this working long hours and weekends,
leading one of the major initiatives of her career, during the technology separation effort from the
Texas Education Agency. Plaintiff tried to explain that she did not know she was supposed to keep
up with the time for the day and also explained that she shared the events of that day with Katie.
Diana just kept repeating that we were done with this conversation. She never let Plaintiff finish
what she was trying to tell her, it was just raa constant "This conversation is over." Plaintiff then was
asked to sign a resignation letter that Diana had prepared. Plaintiff asked if she could take it home
to review and Diana stated that she needed to sign it right then. She then turned to John. Plaintiff
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77 does not remember if he agreed or not, but he said we can make you a copy. Plaintiff was still
hesitant, but they insisted they needed a signature right then. After Plaintiff signed it, they asked if
she had any personal belongings at her desk and to return the laptop which she had with her at the
meeting. They then asked for her badge, and she told them it was at her desk. They then called Skip
Baylor, the facilities coordinator, to get Plaintiff's belongings and make a copy of the resignation
letter. After Skip got Plaintiff's purse, she realized that she had a few camping items at her desk that
she had forgotten. Skip put all of the items in a brown banker box and brought them to her. She then
asked Eric if she could have an old laptop bag to put her stuff in. She did not want the humiliation
of being walked out with a box. Eric agreed and said it was fine to use an old bag. As she was trying
to put her stuff in her backpack, she continued to try to explain her thought process for entering the
time and kept being told this conversation is over. Diana also made a comment about this not being
Plaintiff's first time and Plaintiff has no idea what she meant. She has never had any discussions
about her timekeeping and does not have any disciplinary actions on her record over her 18 years
there. See id.
II.
Argument
2.2 Under Texas law, it is illegal to terminate an employee because the employee serves as a
juror. An employee whose employment is terminated is a violation of Civil Practice & Remedies
Code Section 122.001. An employer may not discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate or coerce
any employee because the employee serves as a juror, or for the employee's attendance or scheduled
attendance in connection with the service. An employer who has violated this law is liable for the
damages stated below.
Page 4 of 6
78 2.3 The State has clearly and unambiguously waived immunity from suit under Section 122.001.
S.B. No. 370 passed the Senate on April 17, 2019 by a 30-1 vote. The previous version of Section
122.001 was specifically limited to "A private employer." The word "private" was removed from
the statute showing a specific intent to include non-private employers.
2.4 Furthermore, there are now two versions of similar statutes. One section is limited to private
employers and the other is not. This shows an intent to include both private employers as specifically
named in one section, and to include non-private employers in the other section. The Legislature
clearly intended to stop retaliation of employees serving their civic duty by including two similar
statutes. There is no doubt that a government entity is an employer and one section names employers
and one is specifically limited to private employers.
2.5. These are all allegations contained in Plaintiff's petition. These allegations at this stage must
be taken as true. As such, Defendant's Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
THE MELTON LAW FIRM, P.L.L.C. 925 South Capital of Texas Highway, Suite B-225 Austin, Texas 78746 (512) 330-0017 Telephone
/s/ John F. Melton John F. Melton jmelton@jfmeltonlaw.com State Bar No. 24013155 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
Page 5 of 6
79 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
By my signature below, I hereby certify that on July 1, 2025, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served on all parties of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:
email: dschlottman@jw.com David Schlottman Jackson Walker, LLP 2323 Ross, Suite 600 Dallas, Texas 75201
/s/ John F. Melton John F. Melton
Page 6 of 6
80 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
John Melton Bar No. 24013155 jmelton@meltonkumler.com Envelope ID: 102667649 Filing Code Description: RESPONSE Filing Description: PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION Status as of 7/2/2025 9:05 AM CST
Associated Case Party: TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND CORP.
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status David Schlottman dschlottman@jw.com 7/1/2025 5:32:37 PM SENT Erin Shea eshea@jw.com 7/1/2025 5:32:37 PM SENT Stephen Russo srusso@jw.com 7/1/2025 5:32:37 PM SENT Lauren Vogel lvogel@jw.com 7/1/2025 5:32:37 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: ROSALINDAE.ROMERO
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status John Melton 24013155 jmelton@jfmeltonlaw.com 7/1/2025 5:32:37 PM SENT
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Paige Densman paige@jfmeltoniaw.com 7/1/2025 5:32:37 PM SENT John Melton jmelton@jfmeltonlaw.com 7/1/2025 5:32:37 PM SENT
09/05/2025 01:51:42
81 TAB 3 07/10/2025 12:43:20 PM Velva L. Price District Clerk Travis County D-1-GN-24-009170 CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-24-009170
ROSALINDA E. ROMERO, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
Plaintiff, : v. : TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL : FUND CORP., §
Defendant. : 98™ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
On this day, the Court considered Defendant Texas Permanent School Fund Corp.'s
Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction ("Plea") in the above-entitled and numbered action. After
considering the Plea, the responses, and the arguments of counsel, the Court is of the opinion that
the Plea should be and hereby is GRANTED.
It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff Rosalinda E. Romero take nothing on her claims,
and all claims asserted against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice. Any other relief sought in
this matter not expressly granted is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 10th day of July .2025. A ( Hénorable Jessica Maigrum
Agreed as to form:
/s/ David Schlottman David Schlottman Counsel for Defendant Texas Permanent School Fund Corp.
/s/ John Melton (with permission 09/05/2025 01:51:42 John Melton Counsel for Plaintiff Rosalinda Romero
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION PAGE 1 OF 1
89 TAB 4 CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE
TITLE 6. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
CHAPTER 122. JURORS RIGHT TO REEMPLOYMENT
Text of section as amended by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 234 (S.B. 370), Sec. 1
For text of section as amended by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 356 (H.B. 504), Sec. 1, see other Sec. 122.001.
Sec. 122.001. PROTECTION OF JURORS' EMPLOYMENT; JUROR'S RIGHT TO REEMPLOYMENT; NOTICE OF INTENT TO RETURN. (a) An employer may not discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any permanent employee because the employee serves as a juror, or for the employee's attendance or scheduled attendance in connection with the service, in any court in the United States.
(b) An employee who is discharged, threatened with discharge, intimidated, or coerced in violation of this section is entitled to return to the same employment that the employee held when summoned for jury service if the employee, as soon as practical after release from jury service, gives the employer actual notice that the employee intends to return.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Amended by:
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 234 (S.B. 370), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2019.
Text of section as amended by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 356 (H.B. 504), Sec. 1
For text of section as amended by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 234 (S.B. 370), Sec. 1, see other Sec. 122.001. Sec. 122.001. JUROR'S RIGHT TO REEMPLOYMENT; NOTICE OF INTENT TO RETURN. (a) A private employer may not terminate the employment of a permanent employee because the employee serves as a juror or grand juror.
(b) An employee whose employment is terminated in violation of this section is entitled to return to the same employment that the employee held when summoned for jury or grand jury service if the employee, as soon as practical after release from that service, gives the employer actual notice that the employee intends to return.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Amended by:
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 356 (H.B. 504), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2019.
Sec. 122.002. DAMAGES; REINSTATEMENT; ATTORNEY'S FEES. (a) A person who is injured because of a violation of this chapter is entitled to reinstatement to the person's former position and to damages in an amount not less than an amount equal to one year's compensation nor more than an amount equal to five years' compensation at the rate at which the person was compensated when summoned for jury or grand jury service.
(b) The injured person is also entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in an amount approved by the court.
(c) An action for damages brought by a person under Subsection (a) must be brought not later than the second anniversary of the date on which the person served as a juror or grand juror.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985. Amended by Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 442, Sec. 5, eff. Jan. 1, 1992; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 770, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.
Amended by:
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 356 (H.B. 504), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2019.
Sec. 122.0021. CRIMINAL PENALTY. (a) A person commits an offense if the person violates Section 122.001. (b) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.
Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 770, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.
Sec. 122.0022. CONTEMPT. In addition to and without limiting any other sanction or remedy available under this chapter or other law, a court may punish by contempt an employer who terminates, threatens to terminate, penalizes, or threatens to penalize an employee because the employee performs jury or grand jury duty.
Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 770, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.
Amended by:
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 356 (H.B. 504), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2019.
Sec. 122.003. DEFENSE. (a) It is a defense to an action brought under this chapter that the employer's circumstances changed while the employee served as a juror or grand juror so that reemployment was impossible or unreasonable.
(b) To establish a defense under this section, an employer must prove that the termination of employment was because of circumstances other than the employee's service as a juror or grand juror.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985. Amended by Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 442, Sec. 6, eff. Jan. 1, 1992.
Amended by:
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 356 (H.B. 504), Sec. 4, eff. September 1, 2019. Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
John Melton Bar No. 24013155 jmelton@meltonkumler.com Envelope ID: 108965749 Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument - R Romero Status as of 12/11/2025 7:12 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
David Schlottman 24083807 dschlottman@jw.com 12/10/2025 7:12:28 PM SENT
Paige Densman paige@jfmeltonlaw.com 12/10/2025 7:12:28 PM SENT
John Melton jmelton@jfmeltonlaw.com 12/10/2025 7:12:28 PM SENT