Rosales v. Pennington County Jail

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedApril 12, 2021
Docket5:21-cv-05019
StatusUnknown

This text of Rosales v. Pennington County Jail (Rosales v. Pennington County Jail) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rosales v. Pennington County Jail, (D.S.D. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA WESTERN DIVISION

JUAN LANDROVE ROSALES, 5:21-CV-05019-LLP

Plaintiff,

vs. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PENNINGTON COUNTY JAIL, YANTIS, PAUPERIS AND 1915A SCREENING FOR COMMANDER AT PENNINGTON COUNTY DISMISSAL JAIL IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Juan Landrove Rosales, filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Doc. 1. Rosales is confined at the Pennington County Jail. Id. at 1. He moves to proceed in forma pauperis and filed his prisoner trust account report. Docs. 2, 3. I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Rosales moves to proceed in forma pauperis and filed his prisoner trust account report. Docs. 2, 3. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner who Abrings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis . . . shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.@ 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The court may, however, accept partial payment of the initial filing fee where appropriate. Therefore, A >[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceedings or over a period of time under an installment plan.= @ Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)). The initial partial filing fee that accompanies an installment plan is calculated according to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), which requires a payment of 20 percent of the greater of: (A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner=s account; or (B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner=s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal. Rosales filed a prisoner trust account report that shows his average monthly deposits for the past six months as $54.00 and his average monthly balance for the past six months as $2.90. Doc. 3. Based on this information, the Court grants Rosales leave to proceed in forma pauperis and waives the initial partial filing fee. In order to pay the remainder of his filing fee, Rosales must Amake monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month=s income credited to the prisoner=s account.@ 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The statute places the burden on the prisoner=s institution to collect the additional monthly payments and forward them to the Court as follows: After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month=s income credited to the prisoner=s account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner=s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The installments will be collected pursuant to this procedure. The clerk of the court will send a copy of this order to the appropriate financial official at plaintiff=s institution. Rosales will remain responsible for the entire filing fee, as long as he is a prisoner, even if the case is dismissed at some later time. See In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529B30 (8th Cir. 1997). II. 1915A Screening A. Factual Background Rosales claims he purchased a radio from the commissary. Doc. 1 at 4. As a form of punishment, his radio was allegedly taken from him and he was given a “like radio[.]” Rosales 2 alleges that the radio he purchased is being held in personal property. Id. He seeks reimbursement for the radio and to get the radio back. Id. at 7. B. Legal Background and Analysis The court must assume as true all facts well pleaded in the complaint. Estate of

Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 36 (8th Cir. 1995). Civil rights and pro se complaints must be liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2004). Even with this construction, “a pro se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 518 F. App'x 502, 504 (8th Cir. 2013). Civil rights complaints cannot be merely conclusory. Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1993); Parker v. Porter, 221 F. App'x 481, 482 (8th Cir. 2007). A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations . . . [but] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). If it does not contain these bare

essentials, dismissal is appropriate. Beavers v. Lockhart, 755 F.2d 657, 663 (8th Cir. 1985); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). If it does not contain these bare essentials, dismissal is appropriate. Beavers,755 F.2d at 663. Bell Atlantic requires that a complaint’s factual allegations must be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Id. at 555; see also Abdullah v. Minnesota, 261 Fed. Appx. 926, 927 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atlantic noting complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations regarding all material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory).

3 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss them if they are “(1) frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

1. Claims against Pennington County Jail Rosales names the Pennington County Jail as a defendant. Doc. 1 at 1. “[C]ounty jails are not legal entities amenable to suit.” Owens v. Scott County Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003). Rosales’s claim against the Pennington County Jail is therefore dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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Rosales v. Pennington County Jail, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosales-v-pennington-county-jail-sdd-2021.